











Title of Document: CHAOS AND THE MICROCOSM: 
LITERARY ECOLOGY IN THE 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY   
  
 Heidi C. M. Scott, Ph.D., 2009 
  
Directed By: Professor Neil Fraistat, Department of English 
 
 
This dissertation investigates literary responses to environmental change in 
nineteenth-century England.  Two tropes, chaos in narrative and the microcosm in 
lyric poetry, suggest how literary works may have been precursors of ecolgical 
science.  I argue that literary epistemology in the long nineteenth-century developed 
precocious theories of the way nature operates based on contingent narrative and 
microcosm systems.  These ideas were adopted as empirical strategies once scientific 
ecology emerged in the twentieth-century, and both tropes are prominent in twenty-
first century ecological science.  Ecology appeared late among scientifi  disciplines 
partly because it relies on cooperation between reduction and holism: climate change 
theory, for example, uses microcosm models to develop narratives of environmental 
contingency.  Five chapters consider these two tropes from historical, literry, and 
scientific perspectives.  The first chapter is a historical introduction to ninetee th-
century science that traces the development of environmental awareness from 
  
industrial pollution and early studies of nature in microcosm, especially in the work 
of Charles Darwin and Stephen Forbes.  Chapter two investigates four narratives of 
environmental chaos spanning the long nineteenth-century: Gilbert White, Mary 
Shelley, Richard Jefferies and H.G. Wells emplot the radical new notion of a post-
apocalypse environment in narratives that rely on chaotic discontinuity, rather than 
the coherent gradualism that marked evolutionary theories of the time.  Chapter three 
examines microcosmic imagery in the work of several important poets, including 
William and Dorothy Wordsworth, John Clare, Percy Shelley, and Matthew Arnold.  
I argue that the imagination and close observation of nineteenth-century poets help d 
the nascent sciences conceive of ways to simplify nature without dismembering its 
complex structures. Chapter four, devoted to the ecological thinking of John Keats, 
traces his abandonment of teleological narrative in Hyperion in preference for the 
microcosmic Odes.  Finally, chapter five reconciles the two tropes with an excursion 
into modern ecosystem science, paying particular attention to our contemporary 
strategies for investigating climate change.  This chapter serves as a ummation of the 
dissertation by complicating the dichotomy between chaotic narrative and model-
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Chapter One: History and Theory of a Post-Classical  
Environment 
I: General Introduction 
 
It is summer 1855.  Down on the street level of a fictional London, the Stink 
has settled.  Effluvia of industry drains into a black-snaking Thames, smoke rises 
from stacks to collude with the fog.  The stinging smog wafts in sheets between 
tarnished buildings, and Londoners of all classes cross paths in confused alarms 
compelling each to her own scheme of urban exodus.  A particularly cruel, freakish 
summer has grown to maturity: the rains are absent and cholera skulks in the lacunae 
of medical knowledge.  Parliament’s only redress of the Stink is to force the closure 
of myriad factories in the bowl of greater London, but those extreme measures will 
only prevent a thicker accumulation of foul air; for true relief, London needs its rains 
back.   
Today, the Prime Minister Lord Byron is dead, and the hegemony of his 
political party, the Industrial Radicals, hangs in the balance.  His successor Charles 
Babbage is contending with an obscure revolutionary force headed by the enigmatic 
Captain Swing of the neo-Luddites.  Byron’s daughter Ada Lovelace, Queen of 
Engines and mathematical genius, has contrived with a savant named Mallory to 
conceal the skeleton key to computation, a stack of machine code cards, in the skull 
of a Brontosaurus in London’s museum of Practical Geology.  4,000 miles to the 
west, Professor Coleridge and Reverend Wordsworth are settled in pantisocratic 
peace, having spent long philosophical lives in Pennsylvania, just north of the 




years of imprisonment at the side of Napoleon Bonaparte on the isolated island world 
of St Helena, a few pixels of tropical green in the mid-Atlantic ocean.     
I have just summarized an alternative “steam punk” history of the nineteenth-
century, rendered from the imaginations of two prominent twentieth-century science 
fiction writers, William Gibson and Bruce Sterling.  The Difference Engine (1991) 
needs to throw only a few historical switches to realize its dystopian vision of hyper-
industrial England: the first generation of Romantics pursues its youthful ideals n the 
New World, the second generation is spared the fevers and drowning that curtailed 
their creative genius, and Babbage’s Mechanical Notation presented to the Royal 
Society in 1826 actually results in public dissemination of the Analytical Engine and 
its industrial offspring.  Ada Lovelace, the world’s first computer programmer, shares 
credit for Babbage’s epiphany, and is treated as England’s first lady even as her 
conscience stings from the environmental defects of industrial Britain, and her 
gambling addiction fed by the number machines.   
The fictional hero Edward Mallory, paleontologist, explorer, fellow of the 
Royal Society and foe to the philistine neo-Luddites, acts as a centering piece to this 
spin on history.  He is an avatar of geological catastrophism, and has developed a 
radical new theory on the Cretaceous extinctions that carried off the dinosaurs, or 
“Land Leviathans”: a massive comet impacted Earth 65 million years ago, and set 
global ecology on a dusty, dark, polluted tailspin for decades, and perhaps hundreds 
or thousands of years.  In scientific history, this is the Alvarez Impact hypot esis 
formulated in 1980.  Mallory’s wanderings through the streets of alternate-1855 




with a chaotic chain of environmental events in the modern day.  He muses, mid-
wheeze, about how things fall apart: 
These Londoners were like a gas, thought Mallory, like a cloud of minute 
atomies.  The bonds of society broken, they had simply flown apart, like the 
perfectly elastic gassy spheres in Boyle’s Laws of Physics…they were merely 
reckless, now, stripped by Chaos to a moral vacuity.  Most of them, Mallory 
thought, had never seen any event remotely like this one.  They had no proper 
standards left for judgment or comparison.  They had become puppets of a 
base impulse…the good men of civilized London had surrendered themselves 
to primitive madness. (243) 
 
Environmental chaos has swept away all of the government’s rational contingency 
planning, and the social niceties of the world’s premier industrial power have fallen 
prey to an apotheosis of instinct.  Chaos, though, was a concept for which the 
precocious Mallory had already developed a modern understanding.  From the 
fifteenth-century until the middle of the twentieth-century in etymology, chaos 
generally denoted a formless, volumeless void of primordial matter that defined 
elemental disorder, a mythological trope.  God’s work in Genesis was to organize 
chaos into the coherent world; Satan sought to manage chaos to his advantage in 
Paradise Lost, as did the fallen Saturn in Keats’s Hyperion.   
Mallory’s chaos, however, derives from advanced mathematical modeling, 
which the scientific world came to conceptualize on a larger scale in the 1960s.  Its 
earliest origins are found in the billiard ball experiments of Jacques Hadamard, from 
1898.  Scientific chaos denotes the behavior of a deterministic system that appears to 
behave randomly because of its extreme sensitivity to initial parameters.  The system 
spontaneously organizes as a result of these initial conditions, and its non-linear 
behavior provides models for the possible behavior of complex, hierarchical systems 




dynamics, and patterns in climatology.  Mallory’s anachronistic understanding of 
chaos holds a characteristically nineteenth-century debt to the imagination: 
There are tumults of the mind, when, like the great convulsions of Nature, all 
seems anarchy and returning chaos; yet often, in those moments of vast 
disturbance, as in the strife of Nature itself, some new principle of order, or 
some new impulse of conduct, develops itself, and controls, and regulates, and 
brings to an harmonious consequence, passions and elements which seem only 
to threaten despair and subversion. (192)             
 
Eventually, Mallory observes the spontaneous order that will lift the London miasma 
and return rule to its streets; that organization depends, in true Victorian style, on the 
patriotic pith of the people: “they had rallied in instinctive defense of their scientific 
institutions and the civil values of law and property…the lurching madness of Chaos 
had reached its limit.  Within the faltering maelstrom, a nucleation of spontaneous 
order had arisen!” (258). As fits a fictionalized historical drama, the weather catalyzes 
the initial chaos in the streets, but then complies with the social control imposed by 
ruling powers: as Mallory assassinates the revolutionary Captain Swing, the bless d 
rains return to wash down a beleaguered city.  The nineteenth-century rides down its 
industrial rails, and Mallory is given the additional kudos of authoring the theory of 
Continental Drift, which in reality gained the status of paradigm only in the 1960s, 
after decades of debate on Alfred Wegener’s introduction of the idea in 1912.  Gibson 
and Sterling’s novel abbreviates industrial history by a full century: London’s “Great 
Smog” was to occur in the winter of 1952, and it killed 4,000 people in 4 days 
(though a “Great Stink” resulting from the unwitting disposal of organic sewage 
occurred in summer 1858).  The types of ‘order’ that result from such chaotic 




redress of the calamity, and the Great Smog is viewed as one crucial stimulan  of the 
environmental movement in the twentieth-century.   
We need not fictionalize the literary history of the nineteenth-century in order
to recognize patterns of narrative chaos, and emergent tropes of control, in the writing 
of environmentally-minded philosophers of that new industrial age.  This study will 
read the works of Gilbert White, Mary Shelley, John Keats, Richard Jefferies, H.G. 
Wells, and several lyric poets as they grapple with new ways to conceptualize n ture, 
especially the anthropogenic nature of the new industrial age.  My century-long 
survey of writing (from 1789 with Gilbert White to 1895 with H.G. Wells) is selected 
to trace the evolution of literary thought about natural systems during industry’s 
initial advances; all the writers I discuss have innovative ways of imagining natural 
organization and contingency.  In this post-Classical era of the nineteenth-century, 
moments of ecological disaster, such as earthquakes and volcanoes, aligned with a 
growing consensus that human industrial activity was changing the atmosphere in 
industrial hotspots.  These epistemological junctions serve as a rationale and a 
foundation for this study of literary responses to environmental change in nineteenth-
century England.     
My study is organized around two tropes: chaos, which involves the 
disruption of traditional narratives and the rise of a surprising new order, and the 
microcosm, which provides a coherent, simplified model system that is used to 
comprehend the dynamics of less tenable, larger systems.  Both figures of thought
have been adopted as empirical tools in contemporary ecological science, and they 




milestone in human history, the point at which anthropogenic emissions are actively 
reorganizing global systems, exemplifies how scientific theory can be untenable 
without cooperation between models, in the microcosmic vein, and chaotic narratives 
of the future, both utopian and dystopian.  My suggestion is that the aesthetic roots of 
ecological insight, the seed of imagination that anticipated scientists’ sudie  of 
discreet parcels in nature as isolated worlds at the empirical level, was so n by 
literary intellects of the nineteenth-century who consciously drew spheres around 
their perceptions in order to make sense of spots of time, moments of place, amid the 
incoherent larger world.   
Chaos theory has come to occupy a central role in the many sciences devoted 
to predicting the future affect of global climate change.  Prediction, or modeling, most 
often takes the form of complex computer simulations using many variables; a 
complementary form of narrative modeling emerges from fiction writers using their 
expertise to plot out plights of future generations in the twenty-first century and 
thereafter.  The intellectual aim of these contrasting epistemologies is to imagine, 
quantify, and qualify future courses, to calculate the new threats to society and the 
environment posed by industrial surprises such as global climate change.  We might 
legitimately expect that literary works become environmental only insofar as the 
science of the time is publicly elucidating an ecological problem.  But the 
phenomenon of a dynamic and degraded environment sunk its roots into human 
consciousness early in the Industrial Revolution, and literature was at the vanguard of 




As I read literary texts as works of ecological chaos, I do not mean to claim 
that they achieve anything as formal or specific as the mathematical chaos discovered 
in the 1960s.  The vogue of chaos theory as a new way to read patterns in many 
disciplines from the fine arts to literature to law has resulted in some grumpiness from 
mathematicians who would like to sequester chaos theory within their own 
discipline.1  I am using the chaos trope as a metaphor for how writers began to 
imagine their natural surroundings during the industrial shifts of the nineteenth-
century.  There are intriguing moments when writers anticipate ecological concepts 
that have been formalized under mathematical chaos theory, such as population 
dynamics and meteorology, but in general my use of the chaos trope indicates an 
author’s vision of the natural world that falls between perfect order and utter 
randomness.  In arguing for the power of metaphor in the creation of meaning, I take 
the “interaction” view espoused by Max Black (1962) wherein metaphors have a 
cognitive function that is distinct from any literal comparison between two material 
entities: tenor and vehicle are systems set in tension with one another, and their 
mutual influence is the engine that generates meaning.2 
                                                
1 Stephen Kellert’s Borrowed Knowledge (2008) provides a balanced survey of the non-scientific 
applications of chaos theory by focusing on its recent use in literary theory, legal theory, and 
economics.  Kellert discerns among legitimate and illegitimate uses of formal mathematical chaos in 
these fields, and discusses the ways in which metaphorical chaos is an alternative approach to 
analyzing processes with enigmatic patterns.  In effect, chaos as a metaphor allows for a third vision of 
emergent structure that was invisible in the classic dichotomy between order and disorder: “the 
restructuring produces three terms instead of two, bringing a new conceptual organization to an 
existing field” (116).  This third option can be understood using rhetorical theory as a kind of “flanking 
move on an antithesis” (Kellert 116, quoting Fahnestock 1999, 89).    
 
2 Kellert quotes Max Black and his discussion of interaction metaphor is enlightening.  It is the view he 
takes for his survey of the chaos trope as an altern ive to more negative views of metaphor such as 
dismissive (any metaphor is deceiving) and comparative (metaphor can be replaced by literal 




Literary critics have not sufficiently investigated the roots of ecological 
science in the writing of the nineteenth-century.  This might be explained by the fac  
that the science of ecology was not formalized until early in the twentieth-century, 
and so true interdisciplinary relationships only become explicit after 1900.  But the 
environmental apocalypse narrative, originally borne on early nineteenth-century 
geological insights of chaotic upheaval in deep time can be seen as a metaphorical 
predecessor to scientific chaos.  Nineteenth-century advances in biology stimulated 
imaginative interest in the natural complexity of living things of very modest 
proportions, and the microcosmic worldview brings the aesthetics of minutiae into a 
theoretical proposition about congruent scales in nature.  The philosophy of studying 
a parcel of nature as its own self-regulating system, coherent within its bounds, is a 
premise that permitted biology to expand beyond its initial mainstays of taxonomy, 
dissecting and cataloging, towards a distinct science of ecology.3  This concentration 
on the oikos or dwelling place, a scientific inquiry into natural systems that requires 
cooperation between reductionism and holism, established a formal place in 
ecological science over the course of the twentieth-century.  The denotatio  of 
microcosm evolved away from purely metaphysical ideas towards a theory of scalar 
relations in the natural world, and my contention is that the literary imagination 
ushered this evolution over the course of the nineteenth-century.  The chaotic 
narrative and the microcosm effectively organize disparate strands of environmental 
                                                
3 Later in this chapter I will survey the work of historian Richard Grove (1995), who shows how 
colonial islands held by England and France became incidental microcosm experiments during the 
eighteenth-century, but without any overt theorizing of the ecosystem-based dynamic of material and 




thinking in nineteenth-century literature, and bring the nascent ecological sc ences 
into a clearer relationship with literary prophecy.     
Both tropes have a philosophical legacy from the Ancients; these conventional 
images were adopted by writers again in the early Modern period, as I will show in 
chapters two and three.  The environmental broil of the nineteenth-century worked a 
metamorphosis on quiescent convention, and writers wrought new secular figures out 
of the old, Theistic conceptions.  From the archetypal elemental jumble of God’s pre-
creation, chaos evolved into a trope of simultaneous dissolution and the new synthesis 
that might grow into a higher level of organization.  The microcosm was transformed 
from a little world of the body or brain, a philosophical construct that aligned the 
individual with his Creator, into a small-scale natural system that could be studi d as 
a model of ecological organization.  The tropes’ nineteenth-century evolution, when 
viewed through a literary lens, will explore an imaginative debt that subsequent 
ecological science bears to nineteenth-century literary imagination.   
At a surface level, the two tropes appear as aesthetic complements whose 
relationship is based on essential contrast, and to a certain extent they are.  Revising 
one of Blake’s proverbs: “the microcosm contains, chaos overflows.”  The 
microcosm is insulating, even isolating, and chaos breaks through perceived 
boundaries in unpredictable ways.  Little worlds are self-sufficient, coherent and 
modest; chaotic systems engulf formerly-independent matter and energy to force 
rapid transformations.  But once we kick a little deeper into the conceptual pool, we 
find strange currents that confuse and conjoin these tropes.  Microcosms in ecology, 




greater dominion.  A shallow lake can shift from pellucid clarity to a phytoplankton-
choked morass if that autotrope receives just a bit more sun, or a few more 
nitrogenous nutrients, than the average year.  An aquarium will be overcome by algae 
when its detritivorous snail perishes.  Delicate balances, while provisionally self-
sustaining, are perilously close to dissolution; both balance and rapid degeneration are 
vying fates in microcosmic systems.4  While we may not find aesthetic pleasure in the 
slimy aquarium or the weedy pool, an ecologist can show how this system has 
spontaneously evolved to a different scheme of self-organization, or alternative st ble 
state, where a new complement of species has gained dominion over its organic and 
inorganic components.   
On the other hand, chaotic dynamics provide a matrix of higher organization 
and eventual coherence based on minute, unpredictable variations in an initial system 
exhibiting particular parameters.  I’ll move to an entirely different realm of inquiry in 
order to display the prevalence of the quasi-chaotic dynamic: the socio-political 
phenomenon of industrialism.5  Thomas Newcomen devised an “atmospheric engine” 
in 1712, which was the first practical application of mechanical steam technology.  
Humphrey Gainsborough and James Watt improved his design over the course of a 
                                                
4 Though many biochemical systems have buffering agents that help control for the wild disequilibria 
that might result from small variation, experimental microcosms, which can be clumsy by virtue of 
simplicity, are less likely to have the evolutionary daptation of buffering.   
 
5 Ilya Prigogine (1984) uses an example of steam ships succeeding sailing ships over the course of the 
nineteenth century to demonstrate how new technologies sometimes create their own niches in 
economic ecology.  This can have runaway environmental implications, as well: “Such innovations 
transform the environment in which they appear, and s they spread, they create the conditions 
necessary for their own multiplication, their ‘niche’” (196).  In close succession, Prigogine uses 
chaotic modeling to demonstrate how patterns of urbanization and rural depopulation are directed by 
“strong feedback and nonlinearities” (197).  Chance factors, such as where a technology or resource is 
first employed, break the symmetry of a population distribution based purely on diffusion.  
“Enterprise” works like a force of gravity in population, and results in a set of positive (destabilizing) 
feedbacks: “the expansion of such enterprise depends o  a demand that this expansion itself helps to 




few decades, and by the late eighteenth-century, steam engines established an 
indispensable economy of production, rapidly organizing the new industrial society 
along a new set of parameters: urban settlement, industrial work time, acceler ted fuel 
consumption, revised class dynamics, mass transportation, and the modern conception 
of empire based on productiveness.6  The initial conditions of the early eighteenth-
century were disposed to allow these effects their subsequent evolution, but one small 
technological input proved the precedent of a massive ontological shift from agrarian 
to industrial life.  London and Manchester of the nineteenth-century came to serve a  
models for myriad cities worldwide in the twentieth, and even twenty-first, cen uries, 
and the models for studies of industrial ecology.   
With such a progressive history, there is a danger in reading chaos narrative as 
teleological or inevitable; such is the bent of most heroic narrative histories of 
imperial and industrial Britain.7  But this false telos involves inadequate factoring of 
the enabling initial conditions, what Keats lamented as “the van of circumstance” into 
which some pernicious seed is sown.  A less celebratory account of chaotic dynamics 
could be (and has been) read in the epidemiology of measles through the ranks of 
urban populations, another offspring of industrial life.8  Both tropes, then, participate 
                                                
 
6 For an analysis of this socio-economic shift in relation to literature, see Raymond William’s The 
Country and the City (1975).   
 
7 Jared Diamond effectively reorganized the conceptual terrain of anthropology by integrating the 
importance of initial environmental conditions with social evolution in his esteemed study Guns, 
Germs and Steel (1997).  The three titular factors, he argues, were the organizing principles explaining 
why Western culture and technology dominated the imperial age rather than Eastern cultures, or 
various indigenous peoples.  The book delivers a single-handed knockout punch to social Darwinism, 
which glorifies Western genius at the expense of ‘under-developed’ cultures.       
 
8 Alan Bewell’s Romanticism and Colonial Disease (1999) is a comprehensive study of literary 
reactions to the threat of tropical invasion in the British imperial corpus.  Though his book does not 




in one another’s dynamics while retaining essential contrasts.  And both tropes came, 
by the end of the nineteenth-century, to denote a quite different concept from their 
meanings only a century earlier; these ideas live at the epistemological center of 
modern ecology.                    
The narratives and poems selected for this study each demonstrate a specific 
way in which a returning trope can serve to organize the thoughts of a culture 
struggling with new phenomena.  A literary trope is a returning theme or motif that 
helps not only to aid in the communication of ideas, but tropes have also frequently 
been identified as constitutive of experience.9  Conceptually-crucial tropes of the 
imagination inform the development of inchoate sciences lacking foundations in 
theory, such as ecology of the nineteenth-century.  I stop short of claiming an actual 
causal relationship between the evolution of literary tropes in the nineteenth-century 
and their subsequent adoption into scientific epistemology.  However, I maintain that 
British culture, in order to develop a discourse around the natural world newly altered 
by industry, had first to create theoretical scenarios and frames of reference using the 
literary imaginary; these chaotic environmental narratives and microcosmic visions 
became tools shared by an intellectual culture developing reactions to the 
                                                                                                                                          
paranoia of miasmic conditions, and convincingly defends his thesis that “anxiety about disease is 
rampant in the period” (20).   
 
9 In Metaphor and Thought (1979), Andrew Ortony discusses the long philosophical tradition of 
theorizing tropes as necessary for our cognitive processes of learning and social understanding.  
Though “trope” originates from the Green “turn” or “twist,” and Plato was skeptical about the value of 
poetic tropes in inquiries of philosophy and science, scholars including Quintilian, Ramus, and Vico 
have argued that tropes lie at the heart of our conceptualization of experience, and their ideas have 
been borne out by cognitive and linguistic studies through the twentieth century (252-3).  Figures of 
thought including metaphor, synechdoche, and metonymy are so ingrained in our language because, 
Ortony argues, “human cognition is fundamentally shaped by various processes of figuration,” and 
“our ability to conceptualize experience in figurative terms must also explain why nonliteral speech is 




environment under industrialism.10  The science of ecology is only the most recent 
method we have developed to examine nature.  
The nineteenth-century is evolutionary theory’s period of birth and 
adolescence.  Lyell’s geological gradualism, Malthus’s economic analysis of 
population, and Darwin and Wallace’s identification of natural selection 
revolutionized narratives of past and future change in the biological world.  
Historians of science and literary critics alike have feasted on the intell ctual pabulum 
resulting from the public debates on ontological and religious qualms, and the 
aesthetics, bloody or blooming, of natural selection.  Gillian Beer’s respected study of 
narratives in evolutionary theory, Darwin’s Plots (1983), clarifies the relationship 
between the qualities of a culture’s discourse and the type of thought that can develop 
in such a context.  She introduces her study with this crucial, epistemic notion:  
“’Darwin’s plots’ refers both to the narratives Darwin grew up amid and the 
narratives he created to change the face of cultural discussion…how Darwin said 
things was a crucial part of his struggle to think things, not a layer that can be 
skimmed off without loss” (xxiv-xxv).  She identifies the two great nineteenth-
century themes that the theory of evolution unites: growth and transformation (97).  
Where growth is akin to organicism, and is a scheme of inter-organization set in 
space, transformation is a concept of change set in time (101).  My selection of two 
complementary tropes, microcosm and chaotic narrative, is congruent with this binary 
                                                
10 Richard Dawkins has gone so far as to label certain tropes as a kind of cultural genetics, or ‘memes’; 
units of cultural currency that evolve and propagate through further communication and application – 
see his work The Selfish Gene (1976).  While the tropes of chaos and the microcosm are probably too 
broad in circumference to qualify as Dawkins’s cultural memes, they remain figures of thought that 





of organicist growth and narrative transformation as central nineteenth-century ideas 
that both ushered in and were reinforced by evolutionary theory.  My focus, however, 
will not lock in on evolutionary theory specifically; my interest lies in the 
foregrounding of scientific ecological methods by selected literary uses of the chaos 
and microcosm tropes.     
The dissertation will progress through five chapters.  This first chapter will 
serve as a historical introduction to conditions in the nineteenth-century, paying 
specific attention to the development of environmental awareness from industrial 
effect, and the beginnings of self-contained studies of nature in a systems-based 
epistemology.  Chapter two investigates four narratives of chaotic environmental 
disruption spanning the long nineteenth-century, and develops an argument around 
specific ways that writers chose to emplot the radical new history of a human-altered 
environment.  Chapter three moves into the manifold usefulness of microcosmic 
imagery in poetry, from the psyche to the circumscribed plot of land, and theorizes 
how the microcosm evolved from its metaphysical roots into an empirical strategy.  
Chapter four, devoted exclusively to Keats’s brief poetic career, traces his 
abandonment of teleological narrative amid a new belief in the chance-driven world, 
and his final dwelling place the little worlds of the Odes.  Finally, chapter five will 
aim to reconcile the two tropes with an excursion into modern ecosystem science, 
showing how narrative might be recuperated in empirical practice, how modeling 
systems remain a mainstay of prediction, and concluding with a discussion of 




II: The Critical Terrain  
 
Literary criticism more often relies on the history of science in relation to 
literature than on affinities between the epistemologies of the sciences a d 
humanities.  The spirit of the “two cultures” worldview expounded by C.P. Snow in 
the middle of the twentieth-century still haunts us, but it is not the first exposition of 
essentialist exclusion.  Romantic-era scientists like Humphrey Davy divide the 
imaginative poet from the deductive scientist in terms of disciplinary opposition, and 
Wordsworth acquiesced to this arrangement, dressing poets as social, diplomatic 
thinkers and scientists as isolated ascetics.11  Davy wrote,  
Men of science, instead of worshipping idols existing in their own 
imaginations [as poets do], have examined with reverence and awe the 
substantial majesty of nature.  Discovery has not visited them and disappeared 
again, like flashes of lightning amidst the darkness of night; but it has slowly 
and quietly advanced, as the mild luster of the morning promising a glorious 
day. (In Heringman 2003: 40)  
 
Interdisciplinary intellects constantly attempt to break down these assumed inherent 
binaries between science and the humanities; surprisingly, these diplomats more 
frequently come from scientific disciplines.  E.O. Wilson, whose Consilience aims 
toward the unity of knowledge by hierarchy, writes in a philosophical essay “On Art”: 
Scientific innovation sometimes sounds like poetry, and I would claim that it 
is, at least in the earliest stages.  The ideal scientist can be said to think like a 
poet, work like a clerk, and write like a journalist…the two vocations [science 
and poetry] draw from the same subconscious wellsprings and depend upon 
similar primal stories and images. (Cooke and Turner 1999: 76) 
 
Wilson’s description of the ideal scientist does not necessarily discount Davy’s 
scheme of opposition, rather it involves and complicates their reciprocal relationship.  
                                                
11 For a comprehensive reading of this generally friendly rivalry, see Catherine Ross’s chapter in 




The scientist who thinks like a poet is visited with lightning flashes of inspiration, 
which she can sustain through the many rounds of experimentation (like a clerk), and 
record clearly without embellishment (like a journalist).  Wilson’s identification of 
“similar primal stories and images” is well-noted, too: the common culture supporting 
ideas in all of the various professions is assuredly as important a unifier as 
disciplinary divisions are potential dividers.         
Literary ecocriticism has a mission to foster interdisciplinary ties between 
science and literature.  In the last twenty years ecocritical scholars have begun 
developing a body of scholarship dedicated to the analysis of literature in the context 
of modern science and the late industrial environment of the twenty-first century.  
This diachronic approach signals a shift from more familiar paths of literary historical 
studies, which consider writers in their own scientific or environmental milieu 
without much reference to subsequent thought.  The beginning of mainstream 
environmentalism in the 1970s ushered in an imperative of reading nature-inspired 
literature with the valence of modern ecological philosophy, even when the literature 
in question was not overtly critical of industry’s or capitalism’s view of nature as pure 
resource (as it was with the Americans Muir, Emerson, Thoreau, Abbey).  The 
ecocritical model is particularly adept at interpreting British Romantic naturalism as a 
set of ideas and concerns about the state of the early nineteenth-century environment, 
and ecocritics initially relied on a traditional pairing between the historical 
perspective and a good mind for literature.12   
                                                
12 Several of the best-known ecocriticism studies, important works in their own right, frame the 
conjunction of historical science and literary close readings within a particular theoretical school.  
Carolyn Merchant’s Death of Nature (1980) became full-fledged with the feminist movement, 




By taking the further step of integrating modern science into a reading of 
nineteenth-century texts, I hope to demonstrate that the tropes manifested at literary 
and cultural levels provide a foundation for subsequent empirical design concepts; it 
is not outlandish to claim that scientists’ imaginations, as well as artists,’ are 
stimulated and set into focus by tropes in their cultural economy.  Beginning with the 
final decade of the twentieth-century, scientific chaos found a small place in literary 
studies.13  Using the energy of a new public enthusiasm for the concept, scholars, 
most prominently Katherine Hayles (1991), carved out a narrative literary theory 
around the paradox of chaotic order.  She admits the reciprocal influence of cultural 
and scientific moments, which form a philosophical feedback loop of information and 
new ideas.  Part of the cultural receptivity to chaos was the condition of 
postmodernity, which literary deconstruction had outlined as an “emergent awareness 
of the constructive roles that disorder, nonlinearity, and noise play in complex 
systems” (5).  Higher levels of understanding can emerge from disrupting linear
narrative and identifying absences and omissions as new ways to organize complex 
thought.  As such, chaos  
provides a new way to think about order, conceptualizing it not as a totalized 
condition but as the replication of symmetries that also allows for 
asymmetries and unpredictabilities.  In this it is akin to poststructuralism, 
                                                                                                                                          
patterns, Jonathan Bate’s Song of the Earth (2000) has an ethical thesis set in deep ecology (“earth for 
earth’s sake,” the touchstone of many subsequent studie  and disciplinary outlines of the project of 
Green studies).  Among the more diachronic studies, James McKusick’s Green Writing (2000) is 
sensitive to Blake and Mary Shelley’s awareness of industrial effect, which he briefly directs towards 
global warming ontology (109).  His study integrates he thought of modern scientists like Stephen Jay 
Gould in its conclusive moments.  Alex Argyros’s A Blessed Rage for Order (1991) develops a 
critique of deconstruction using the new science of chaos, which is an approach that this dissertation 
takes example from, though my interest is not in deconstruction per se.    
 
13 Though there are a few studies of the microcosm in the history of philosophy, most notably Leonard 
Barkan’s Nature’s Work of Art (1975), I have uncovered no studies of the literary microcosm that 




where the structuralist penchant for replicating symmetries is modified by the 
postmodern turn toward fragmentation, rupture, and discontinuity…iteration 
and recursion are seen as ways to destabilize systems and make them yield 
unexpected conclusions…small causes can lead to large effects. (10-11)    
 
The project of Hayles and her contributors in Chaos and Order was to identify the 
several ways in which this new form of the chaos trope informs our readings of 
coherence in the postmodern world.  The trope belonged to both science and 
literature, and had evolved through a series of exchanges which eventually brought 
the insight that chaotic systems were “rich in information rather than poor in order” 
(6).  The perceived poverty of order in a chaotic worldview was merely the myopia of 
reading into a narrative that it ought to be linear, coherent, and causal.  Once this 
essentialist imperative was divested, the richness enabled by chaos theory em rged 
following a shift in the circumference of perspective.  Postmodern narratives like 
Borges’s “Garden of the Forking Paths” narrativize endless regressions and str ge 
intersections, themselves new perspectives on the nature of time and place.   
Turning chaos into a perspective on the environment involves seeing the 
beauty in contingent dynamics in nature, recognizing their ubiquity, and welcoming a 
third alternative between rigid order and wanton disorder.  The nonlinear systems that 
help define chaos also identify minute motions and variations in the most quotidian of 
occurrences, such as wind gusts and water whorls.  Hayles is careful to maintain that 
balance makes an idea like chaos particularly useful: chaos does not obviate order, it 
merely reorients our understanding of how order is wrought in the natural world by 
signaling the prevalence of slight variations.  She invokes images of increasingly 




Industrial pollutants are released into the atmosphere; along with carbon 
dioxide, also a by-product of technology, they create the greenhouse effect; 
the resulting climate changes wreak havoc with the global ecosystem.  
Cascading effects from initially small causes could, and have, been observed 
at any time.  But whereas in earlier epochs they tended to be seen as 
anomalous or unusual, now they are recognized as paradigmatic of complex 
behavior. (15) 
 
With this quasi-ethical perspective, it is surprising that none of the twelve essays in 
her volume display any concern with environmentalism in literature; the entries, most 
of which are limited to twentieth-century works, approach chaotic dynamics largely 
through established literary theory, especially deconstruction.  Perhaps this omission 
is an emblem of the book’s age (published in 1991); only in the intervening years has 
the evidence for global climate change become unassailable, both in scientific circles 
and in any reasonable public sphere.  I believe a new moment for literary chaos has 
arrived.  Within the continuum between its ancient and modern denotations, chaos 
holds a cache of insight to bring fresh perspective to nineteenth-century 
environmental narratives.    
Chaos in science grew out of the theoretical advances in thermodynamics 
required to increase efficiency in industry.  The best-known avatar of modern 
scientific chaos, Nobel Prize winner Ilya Prigogine (1984), dates the beginnin  of 
complexity in science with the work of nineteenth-century physicist Jean-Joseph 
Fourier, who also first theorized the greenhouse effect.  Complexity analyzes the 
interaction among a large number of particles acting as a system, and requires a 
factoring of boundary conditions, the inside and outside of a liminal vision.  
Complexity posits the irreducible interdependency of parts of a hierarchical system, 




conceptual possibility.  It is an epistemological offspring of industrialism, borne f 
the need to make industrial systems, like steam engines, more efficient.  In 1811, 
Fourier presented to the French Academy of Sciences a mathematical description of 
the propagation of heat in solids (Prigogine 104).  Fourier’s ideas opened up a new 
idea of irreversible processes in nature, distinct from the Newtonian view of eternal 
cycles of regeneration and temporal reversibility.  In Prigogine’s important 
formulation, this advent of complexity represents the epistemological break between 
being and becoming (209).14  Thermodynamics, the science of becoming, aims to 
predict how systems will react to outside inputs; it opposes the closed system of 
Newtonian mechanics, which circles around static, eternal forces such as gravity 
(106).  The difference between an ideal cycle of thermal energy and the actual cy le, 
which progressively loses energy depending on the efficiency of the system, 
depended on the bracing new concept of entropy, nature’s tendency to become less 
energetic, and more disorganized, through time.15   
 Humanists may appear too glib in applying these highly specified 
mathematical principles to literary epistemology.  “Chaos” itself is a sensational term, 
and is at least half misnomer: the feature that distinguishes scientific chaos from 
mythological chaos is the spontaneous order that arises from the seemingly-random 
                                                
14 The evolutionary counterpart to the entropic “becoming” of thermodynamic systems is held in the 
idea of natura naturans, nature continually creating a new self out of the old.  Beer identifies natura 
naturans as one of the myth-like Earth mother concepts that Darwin inherited from his precursors to 
counter the static notion of the created cosmos; conceptually it assisted his scheme of continual 
momentum under the scrutinizing watch of natural selection.  Victorian poets Arthur Hugh Clough and 
Constance Naden would vary the theme playfully by introducing evolutionary erotics into the endless 
possibilities of ‘becoming’; Clough’s Natura Naturans is an evolutionary update to the Renaissance 
carpe diem theme. 
   
15 Entropy is the second law of thermodynamics, formalized in 1865.  In poetry it has been invoked 
and paraphrased by Yeats in The Second Coming: “Things fall apart: the centre cannot hold; / Mere 




behavior of the system.  The word chaos, then, indicates how a system looks before 
an epistemology has arrived at the proper level of perspective to recognize its 
organizing principles and emergent patterns.  While students of literature are rightly 
intrigued by the discourse of chaos, its paradoxes, strange attractors, and fractals, the 
willy-nilly application of mathematical chaos to any narrative or poem that behaves 
strangely might seem to cheapen interdisciplinarity.   
However, literary scholars are under no obligation to play by scientific 
epistemology’s rules in their analyses, and in fact a certain amount of cross-reading 
can have a freshening effect on a quantified, overly-rigid paradigm.  Part of the 
present project is to recover two highly-formalized scientific tropes fromtheir 
twenty-first century denotations towards their originary homes in interdisciplinary 
philosophy.  Therefore, my use of chaos and microcosm throughout the analysis 
gestures to the evolution of a set of connotations associated with these concepts over 
the course of the nineteenth-century.  From mythological chaos, the epitome of vile 
incoherence, arose the intriguing paradox of higher levels of order; one of these 
structures is biological life itself.  Analogously, from an idealist philosophical 
construct of little worlds resembling the larger cosmos arose the concept of an 




III: “Dehistoricized” Humankind  
The nineteenth-century in England was an era of acceleration.  In geology, the 
great time-parsing science that took off during the turn-of-the nineteenth-cetury, 
older, intuitive aesthetics of a stable and static nature made room for scheme of 
catastrophic and sudden change; the two visions share ground in today’s life sciencs.  
In Chemistry, a proliferation of competing paradigms emerged to explain the 
molecular basis for all matter, organic and inorganic, and scientific consensus aligned 
behind Dalton’s atomic theory, supported by Davy’s insight that chemical bonds were 
electrical in nature (Bowler and Morus 2005: 72).  Natural history, with the aid of a 
geological perspective, began to formalize theories on the dynamics of organic life; 
from among a complement of evolutionary theories, Darwin’s omniscient principle of 
natural selection emerged as sovereign by the century’s end.  Biology turned its 
attention to minutiae, and cell theory circumscribed organic life into a confederacy of 
basic, semi-autonomous units.  Louis Pasteur’s germ theory permitted an 
understanding of disease based on the transmission of microorganisms.  Travel 
narratives from around the world stunned the domestic public with accounts of the 
world’s variety; from the barren polar extremes to tropical imbroglios, fromthe 
“Hindoo” cultures of the East to the native Americans of the West, the British 
scrambled to keep their theories of biology, anthropology and geography adapted to 
the known entities of the day.  From the exchange of tubercular bacteria to the 
economy of spices and exotic species, the British mind took on the hazards and 
pleasures of global interchange as the new worldwide commerce they had actively 




human sciences aligned behind a mechanical understanding of the body and our 
behavior, which cleared the way for medical and pharmacological advances, whil  
inevitably reducing mysterious organic complexity to corrective mechanics.   
In practical chemistry, James Prescott Joule quantified the relationship 
between heat and work, pushing scientific conceptions of energy towards an 
industrial ideal of nature as a massive steam engine, capable of prodigious energetic 
outputs from modest masses of coal.  Transportation by rail brought the industrial and 
population centers in temporal proximity, and large parts of the population exchanged 
their rural subsistence existence for the monetary and time-regulated work imp sed 
by urban industry.  More energy per capita was released from fossil fuels, and more 
consumers traveled to and fro with little inhibition.   
Thermodynamics’ theory of the universal degradation of mechanical energy 
introduced a whole new set of concerns to public thought by mid-century, concerns 
well beyond the industrial baron’s desire to get maximum work per energy input.  
The relationship between order and disorder was no longer a simple distinction 
between elements within a system and those outside of it.  Defining boundaries, 
which is a more difficult and arbitrary task in ecosystem ecology than in industrial 
engineering, became an essential part of understanding the organization of a system 
through time.  Biology of the nineteenth-century would only serve to complicate the 
relationship, as evolution by natural selection demonstrates the increasing articulation 
of complex forms through evolutionary time.  The nineteenth-century mind, then, was 
faced with the incongruent trends of chemical and mechanical dissolution based on 




progressive organic structuring at higher-order levels.  Entropy and biological 
evolution were in concord, however, by the common principle of becoming, of 
dynamism through time.  If nature was a machine, then thermodynamics theorized 
energetic senescence and structural decay over time.  But there was also little d ubt 
that Homo sapiens were a more “advanced” form of biological life than the trilobites 
and mollusks of geological antiquity.  If the principle of organization was organic, 
was each individual life an island of negentropy that would eventually be recycled in 
the great ocean of elements?   
Critics of the new industrialism sprouted from the soil of all social classes, 
and the cool calculations of empiricists were assailed by thinkers less devote  to ratio, 
and more to imagination, as the principle by which knowledge advances.  Critics 
suggested that science of the eighteenth-century took natural order and coherence for 
granted as a foundation on which to build organizing systems like taxonomy.  
Empirical science assumes the world is inherently knowable.  While scientific 
thinking welcomes an ideal of brightening the dark corners of the unknown using the 
light of empirical science, it assumes that the darkness engulfs some knowable entity 
in the physical world, rather than a gap or a loop or a lasting enigma.   
 Michel Foucault’s theory on the fate of natural history after the Classical age 
of the eighteenth-century is a valuable referent here.  In the “Classifying” chapter of 
The Order of Things (1970), Foucault identifies the Classical reliance on the 
continuity of nature as the only scheme that “can guarantee that nature repeats itself 
and that structure can, in consequence, become character” (147).  Foucault argues hat 




which the Classical Great Chain of Being breaks under new geological evidence that 
catastrophe and extinction are determining factors in natural history.  Cuvier is 
Foucault’s figure for the post-Classical natural philosopher who used comparative 
anatomy as evidence to counter deistic design.  Though Cuvier did not believe in 
species mutability, his way of reconstructing historical evidence of the pre-human 
world was enormously important to the thinking of his contemporaries (including his 
rival Lamarck) and his intellectual inheritors.  Foucault’s thesis about the post-
Classical nineteenth-century helps us comprehend the nature of the ontological shift 
from deistic determinacy towards secular indeterminacy, both in our outside 
environments and within ourselves.  Although the Enlightenment brain could 
consider a dialectic in which interruption and dispersal (catastrophist ideals), as well 
as gradual erosion and accretion (gradualist ones), were inherent principles in th  
geological history of the planet, the conceptual leap to identify time as an agent of 
internal restructuring, of biological evolution, constitutes a shift in the order f things 
from nature-as-outside to nature as the wild without and within.  The “complex 
operations” behind encoding nature as subject to coherent order, which Foucault 
would call an “episteme” of Classical thought, coveted teleology as a necessary 
complement to mutability, if God (or any reassuring creative genius) was to remain 
central to human origins (158).  This acceptance of dynamism through time is not 
equivalent to a modern acceptance of biological evolution: when change is guided by 
a telos, it is merely a refiguration of “preformationism” set to time.  TheClassical 
mind was constrained to suppose that 
the upheavals or catastrophes of the globe were arranged in advance as so 




the direction of infinite amelioration…The universe in its entirety has been 
larva; now it is a chrysalis; one day it will, no doubt, become a butterfly.  
Such a system, it is clear, is not an evolutionism beginning to overthrow the 
old dogma of fixism; it is a taxinomia that includes time in addition – a 
general classification. (152)     
 
Assigning species a taxonomic place in the network of life involves translating 
phenotypic similarity into schematic proximity.  The older notion could nevertheless 
accommodate the new geological imperative of change through time by distributing 
extant species along a visual metaphor, the tree of life.  Instead of independently-
created clusters of greater and lesser physical similarity, the tree organized life 
phylogenically, through time.  But to science of the Classical age, Adam and Eve did 
not yet have atavistic doppelgängers preserved in fossil layers, evidence that would 
fundamentally change our relationship with a faith of Creation and the assumed static 
dominion of humans over subordinate species.  Natural philosophy still possessed a 
peace of mind based on the internal soundness of human essence.      
 The ambivalence about humanity’s involvement in ontological change 
produced some fascinating literary efforts to elucidate the bizarre past realities 
suggested by geology.  These narratives are met with the challenge of capturing the 
essence of deep time, which is outside easy comprehension of a rational creature who 
lives only half a century, and whose Biblical world assured a more manageable 6,000 
year parcel of past time.  Erasmus Darwin was one of the earliest British th nkers to 
take on the prickly implications of evolution.  His widely-read poems brought the 
concept of human evolutionary mutability, at least in a retrospective view, to public 
attention.  He was a prominent though not perfectly respectable philosopher because 




couplets.  Historian Peter Bowler has called Darwin one of the first 
“transmutationists,” philosophers who accepted spontaneous generation as truth, and 
therefore were “forced to postulate a process by which living structures become 
progressively more complex” (2003: 84).  Darwin’s ideas were influenced by his 
medical training, and like his contemporary Lamarck he believed that living things 
were self-improving and passed on these “acquired characteristics” to their ffspring 
(86).  Both men were innovators in the post-Classical construction of dynamism in 
the natural world, and along with (mainly French) radical materialists including 
Buffon, Le Mettrie, Diderot, and d’Holbach, Darwin brought the color and vigor of 
an evolutionary worldview into English debate (81-86).      
 Erasmus Darwin was elected to the Royal Society in 1761, and he contributed 
to that group’s signal journal, Philosophical Transactions; he proved himself a social 
radical among the English by supporting the French Revolution, and proved a son of 
the Enlightenment by his enthusiasm for the new Industrial order (Weber 2000: 26).  
Like his grandson of greater historical fame, Darwin was most beguiled by the 
elaborations of natural history, which proved to be his indulgent muse.  In the long 
poem The Temple of Nature (1803), he invokes bio-geological catastrophism within 
an explicitly Biblical frame.  The section is titled “The Production of Life,” and 
original sin, in this scheme, is the literal agent of environmental downfall: 
 Where Eden’s sacred bowers triumphant sprung, 
 …the fair Bride, forbidden shades among 
 Heard unalarmed the Tempter’s serpent-tongue; 
 Eyed the sweet fruit, the mandate disobey’d… 
 Now rocks on rocks, in savage grandeur roll’d, 
 Steep above steep, the blasted plains infold; 
 The incumbent crags eternal tempest shrouds, 




 Round the firm base loud-howling whirlwinds blow, 
 And sands in burning eddies dance below. (ll. 33-52)   
 
The prelapsarian world, an all-provisioned garden explicitly created by the 
benevolent One, was an environmental relic of sinlessness, our enduring trope of 
Paradise.  That much is Biblical.  Darwin’s rhetoric of the sublime ruination of Eden
as a result of original sin, though, elaborates on both Genesis and Milton by 
incorporating geological catastrophism without requiring human mutability.  His 
language manages not to offend those accustomed to the violent strokes of an 
omnipotent Old Testament deity, but Darwin is slipping scientific content into this 
otherwise-compliant account of the Fall.   
 For understandable polemical reasons, Erasmus Darwin begins his long poem 
with a commonplace, original sin and the expulsion from Paradise.  But his 
underlying aim is to interrogate earlier biogenic mysteries, and implicitly he must 
dismiss the static creation of Adam and Eve in order to make a non-Biblical narrative 
retrogression anterior to Eden.  Here, Darwin is on shaky speculative ground, and not 
only because of the challenge to Biblical literalism.  He is lyrically advancing the 
newest theories about the common origin of life, which prizes a teleological notion of 
evolutionary elaboration through deep time.  Darwin’s poetry is heavily inflected wi h 
scientific terms, which reflects how the language of the new science held imaginative 
valences and helped to legitimate, by its own specialized discourse, the validity of ts 
theories: 
 First Heat from chemic dissolution springs, 
 And gives to matter its eccentric wings; 
 With strong Repulsion parts the exploding mass, 
 Melts into lymph, or kindles into gas. 




 The ponderous atoms from the light divides,  
 Approaching parts with quick embrace combines, 
 Swells into spheres, and lengthens into lines. 
 Last, as fine goads the gluten-threads excite, 
 Cords grapple cords, and webs with webs unite;  
And quick Contraction with ethereal flame 
 Lights into life the fibre-woven frame. – 
 Hence without parent by spontaneous birth 
 Rise the first specks of animated earth; 
 From nature’s womb the plant or insect swims, 
 And buds or breathes, with microscopic limbs. (ll. 235-250)          
                           
There is a physical, gravitational appeal to this account of the spontaneous generation 
of atoms, which invokes the complementary movements of attraction and repulsion, 
contraction and expansion, and the gathering vitality of biological life from the mor
elemental impulses of physics and chemistry.  Darwin is taking the essential 
conceptual steps of linking the solidity of a Newtonian physical world with the 
higher-order lyrical grace inherent in the biological organization of even the most 
basic life forms.  And, only 200 lines later, he has moved well beyond (or well 
before) any acceptable Biblical convention of the natural history of creation.  I  
moves past Classical thought while still holding the quasi-determinist notion of 
organic teleological succession. 
His challenge to orthodoxy would be faint-hearted if he left humans austere in 
this account of the earliest motions of spontaneous generation.  Plants and insects, 
perhaps, derive their forms from a simple atomic impulse to create a web, but 
acculturated humanity?  Here is where Darwin proves his radical bent.  He has no
moral objection to placing humans along a teleological continuum with mere 
rudiments, with bursting the Edenic bubble that insists on a superhuman event of 




circumference of static humankind: God created Adam with a useful tongue, thus 
rendering Man austere above animals and plants.  Darwin’s account is a wrecking ball 
to our Edenic insulation: 
Thus the tall Oak, the giant of the wood, 
Which bears Britannia’s thunders on the flood; 
The Whale, unmeasured monster of the main, 
The lordly Lion, monarch of the plain, 
The Eagle soaring in the realms of air, 
Whose eye undazzled drinks the solar glare, 
Imperious man, who rules the bestial crowd, 
Of language, reason, and reflection proud, 
With brow erect who scorns this earthly sod, 
And styles himself the image of his God; 
Arose from rudiments of form and sense, 
An embryon point, or microscopic lens! (ll. 303-315)   
 
Darwin’s rhetoric appeals to his readers’ sense of a noble nature, full of admirable 
beasts that prosper in their contrastive environments, with an appeal to solid English 
patriotism in the Oaks, a well-known synechdoche for the mighty British navy.  He 
selects animals that are most often used in theriomorphism, and though he allows that 
man “rules the bestial crowd,” he discernibly demurs from physical predetermination 
as man “styles himself the image of his God.”  He boldly renders God as an 
imaginative construct that has been useful in organizing human narratives and 
explaining the elaborate order we observe in ourselves, as members of the natural 
order.  With this dismissal of the self-primacy that is a commonplace of monotheism, 
Darwin draws the connection: humans, alike with all the animals and plants we both 
admire and malign, arose from rudiments, tiny points of chemical affinity set in the
dark reaches of past time.   
Though we may have come a long way from those elemental rudiments, 




assumption of ontological latency.  The living world outside of us has indeed changed 
through time, but Darwin’s Temple of Nature, itself explicitly an ideological dwelling 
place erected by the author as a substitute for the church of God, brings evolution 
inside the human skin.  His scheme allows nature’s energetic fluctuations the craf ing 
primacy that had been the assumed, unassailable work of God.  Darwin is preparing 
the field of nineteenth-century evolutionary debate by laying down the lines of 
physics and chemistry, and pushing the scrum towards a higher-order goal of 
evolutionary biology, which includes humanity in the creative process.  Though 
Darwin’s poem falls short of a full reconciliation between evolutionary dynamics and 
environment (the “evolutionary ecology” that synthesizes the relationship between 
genetics and environmental circumstance through time), it begins to illuminate the 
necessary continua among distinct species through evolutionary time, the articulation 
of phenotype by virtue of ecological niche, and the possibility that human action, 
rendered symbolically in the eating of the fruit of knowledge, can have devastating 
effects on the environment.   
His poetic narrative is teleological, rather than chaotic, but it destabilizes the 
static, concrete foundation of creation that had been the cultural paradigm of human 
self-conception.  It gestures towards all-important contingency.  Many of the seeds of 
the new evolutionary biology are contained within this temple, and Darwin was to 
influence later poets as well as descendent scientists over the course of the century.  
His literature begins the conscious steps away from the Classical mindset of pre-
formation and begins the modern work of understanding the human condition as an 




would later emerge through a more careful interrogation of the dynamic between 
human industry and a dissolute environment.  These connections were to become 
charged in subsequent decades. 
In the chapter “The Limits of Representation,” Foucault writes of “the great 
upheaval in the Western episteme,” the cultural moment when 
it was discovered that there existed a historicity proper to nature; …man found 
himself dispossessed of what constituted the most manifest contents of his 
history: nature no longer speaks to him of the creation or the end of the world, 
of his dependence or his approaching judgment; it no longer speaks of 
anything but a natural time; its wealth no longer indicates to him the antiquity 
or the immanent return of a Golden Age; it speaks only of conditions of 
production being modified in the course of history…The human being no 
longer has any history: or rather, since he speaks, works, and lives, he finds 
himself interwoven in his own being with histories that are neither subordinate 
to him nor homogeneous with him.  By the fragmentation of the space over 
which Classical knowledge extended in its continuity, by the folding over of 
each separated domain upon its own development, the man who appears at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century is ‘dehistoricized.’” (367-369) 
 
Like the fossil record that first met with so much scrutinizing energy in Erasmus 
Darwin’s time, humanity itself was beginning to reckon with a spotty, discontinuous 
and seemingly unauthored history of the natural world, and the most intrepid thinkers 
were beginning to accept humanity’s ontological immersion in the scheme.  Perhaps 
more alarmingly, the fossils held evidence that humans were only an infant species 
set against the long evolutionary history of the natural world.  Erasmus Darwin’s 
quip, “Omnia ex Conchis” (all from oysters), cut deeply at the consciousness of 
primordial origins that became the source of agony for so many nineteenth-century 
intellects.  As Gillian Beer describes,  
Evolutionary theory implied a new myth of the past: instead of the garden at 
the beginning, there was the sea and the swamp.  Instead of man, emptiness – 
or the empire of mollusks.  There was no way back to a previous paradise: the 




forms in flux, and the earth in constant motion, drawing continents apart.  This 
consciousness of the fluent, of the physical world as endless onward process, 
extended to an often pained awareness of human beings as slight elements 
within unstoppable motion and transformation.  Nostalgia was disallowed, 
since no unrecapturable perfection preceded man’s history.  Ascent was also 
flight – a flight from the primitive and the barbaric which could never quite be 
left behind. (2000: 119)   
 
Though we still held a place in natural history, it was no longer so solidly the position 
of the sovereign, intellectual collector musing over a cabinet of curiosities as though 
it were God’s inscrutable jigsaw puzzle created for our amusement.  Much of the 
nineteenth-century history of science involves crafting reconciliations between 
religious belief and scientific insight, as many thinkers were able to exercise negative 
capability on the subject, and were understandably loathe to shred the elaborate 
cultural curtain of Christianity with undue haste.  But the new information yielded by 
a scientific investigation of nature’s inner workings sent waves of suggestive 
questions over the face of the formerly-reflective waters.  When we looked at 
ourselves with scientific frankness, we began to see another thing altogether 
embedded in the deep past, and that thing was alien to anything extant in the world.  
Also, it preceded us; it was our mother.  The objective evidence for human evolution 
began to make more sense than graceful mother Eve and the fantasy of an animated 
rib.   
 Foucault’s “dehistoricized” humanity of the post-Classical age helps to clarify 
some of the questions that innovative writers of the nineteenth-century raised in their 
work.  If our species was understood as a child of evolution, whether teleological or 
random, what was to come after us; would our phylogenic offspring look as bizarre as 




mere chance of evolution?  If God was not inexorably laying down our future path, 
could we trust our barely post-monkey brains to pursue a wise course?  How could 
the personal indulgences of industrial materialism be justified in the natural order of 
things?  What happens downstream of environmental catastrophe?   
 None of these new questions, of course, has a monolithic or stable answer.  
But nineteenth-century intellects balanced the cultures of science and literature in 
their consideration of modern purpose.  The narratives that I will investigate in 
chapter two, a purposely diverse selection, are generally indebted to an aesthetic of 
fragmentation as one of the primary methods of capturing the nineteenth-century 
cultural spirit.  Disjuncture, as a figure both of human fate and of human action, 
became (in a gentle irony) the organizing principle of narrative: chaotic dynamics 
allowed for surprising new schemes of organization, as well as dissolution.16  For a 
precious while, the imagination and conscience of the humanistic literati held a 
common economy with the reason and science of the empirical schools.  Novels and 
narrative poems practiced their own experiments on the mode and tempo of 
environmental change through deep time.   
 The literary microcosm shows an alternative commitment to understanding 
nature in the post-Classical world.  Where narratives most often lend themselves to 
the form of prose, or blank verse (poetic prose), the trope of the microcosm appears in 
lyric poetry throughout the century.  During the nineteenth-century, the microcosm 
turned from an ancient philosophical concept to a modern scientific model used to 
                                                
16 Shelley’s Ozymandias concisely represents the emotional force of enviromental upheaval resulting 
in historical fragmentation.  The sonnet’s ironic mo ent, “Look on my works, ye mighty, and 
despair!” divides Ozymandias’s teleological vision of history from its actual realization in rubble and 
dust.  The Romantic fascination with antiquity and ruins feeds upon the wild sensations of chance-




comprehend the dynamics of simplified systems, and conceptual microcosms were 
frequently articulated in literature.  The trope also appeared in holistic scientifi  
studies beginning with Stephen Forbes’s 1887 coinage of microcosm ecology.  His 
scientific efforts relies on imagination for its persuasive power, which is grounded as 
much in the successful defense of an investigative method (or a way of looking at 
things) as in the hard empirical evidence that results.  I will discuss Forbes’s 
pioneering work at the end of this chapter and return to it in the final chapter, which 
discusses modern ecology.  Environmental ethics are enriched by an active 
appreciation of scalar congruence from the microbiological (the atom and the cell) to 
the macrobiological (the ecosystem and the earth).  With such elucidating power, the 
microcosm has been used by empiricists with equal success as it has animated the 
imaginations of environmental philosophers.  The degree of proximity between those 
two paths is revealed in the contentious debates surrounding the concept of earth as 
Gaia, a macrocosmic ideal formalized to science by James Lovelock in the 1970s.17                     
                                                
17 The Gaia theory has been lauded and marauded since it was first introduced.  It has become an 
organizing trope of environmentalist philosophy; its formulation occurs, probably not coincidentally, 
just after the first image of Earth taken from space by NASA, one of the loneliest pictures conceivable.  
The critics of the Gaia hypothesis as a material description of the geo-climate system are myriad and 




IV: Chaotic Industrial Skies 
We’re accustomed to thinking of climate change as a scientific theory of 
relatively recent advent - it has received widespread attention in scientifi  
communities since the 1970s.  But the history of human-induced climate change 
begins almost as early as the Industrial Revolution, the catalyst that ushered in th  age 
of carbon emissions.18  The first Industrial Revolution relied on the power of coal, 
which drove steam engines in a number of fixed-place tasks, particularly in textiles 
and agriculture.  The advent of moving industry, the kind that would power railways 
and steamships, came later in the nineteenth-century, and finally the internal 
combustion engine, driven by petroleum rather than coal, individualized the 
advantages of a motorized society.  The superior energy density of petroleum 
molecules to earlier forms of energy (coal, wood, turf, hay) permitted a greater ease 
of carrying the fuel source long distances; only since the early twentieth-cen ury has 
it become commonplace for an individual to drive 6,000 pounds of metal, rubber, and 
human at 60 miles per hour simply by depressing a pedal, and in America for only 
10¢ of fuel per mile.  This massive release of energy on a quotidian basis drives 
developed nations, and indeed it is difficult to imagine a return to older forms of 
transportation after these sanguine machine-driven decades.   
At the beginning of the nineteenth-century, none of these fundamentals of 
modern existence in a developed nation had yet been insolubly installed in nearly 
                                                
18 William Ruddiman (2001) is the most conspicuous among scientists who claim that the history of 
human-induced climate change begins much earlier with the massive transformations in land-use 
brought about by the agricultural revolution, dating back at least 8,000 years.  This “early 
anthropocene” hypothesis suggests that the natural Mil nkovitch cycles of climate that correspond to 
Earth’s orbital variations in the Milky Way have long been affected by human activity, and that an 
observed delay in the onset of the next ice age is traceable to deforestation and animal husbandry 




every aspect of existence: human settlement patterns, food systems, military, 
medicine, work and play.  This dissertation will be limited to the exposition of British 
literature that addresses personal reactions to the new industrial ontology.  But its
measured scope nevertheless gestures at a much broader vanguard of concerns pushed 
forward by the rapid environmental changes induced by industrialism in England.  
This particular study of Romantic and Victorian literature hopes continually to inform 
the modern environmental reader not only of our philosophical ancestry in 
preservation and sustainability, but also of the various complementary 
epistemologies, scientific, literary, and hybrid, that have assisted our progress towards 
awareness of the current tenuous state of environmental affairs.   
The first scientific theory that could be identified with modern global 
warming came from the experiments of Joseph Fourier, a French physicist who 
pursued a theory of heat conduction, and the same man who chaos science’s 
Prigogine identified with complex nonlinear systems.  His “General Remarks on the 
Temperature of the Terrestrial Globe and Planetary Spaces,” published in the A nal s 
de Chimie et de Physique in 1824, envisions Earth as a giant greenhouse 
(Christianson 1999: 12).  Fourier’s vision of natural atmospheric insulation is one of 
cosmic benevolence: the gasses and water vapor that collect at the outer reaches of 
the earthly sphere provide essential incubatory warmth for the plant and animal life 
on the surface.  While the gasses emitted by human industrial activity were self-sam  
as those naturally occurring in the stratosphere, Fourier did not pursue a theoretical 
connection; the Earth system seemed simply too large and humans altogether 




reassurance of religious faith, and scientific theory based on a designed global 
environment served as reciprocal reinforcement both of human passivity and active 
divine benevolence.19   
In 1861, John Tyndall furthered Fourier’s ideas by demonstrating the high 
absorbent power of gasses in the atmosphere, including carbon dioxide and ozone.  
But his conclusions, like those of his contemporaries, tended to place value on the 
insulating power of naturally-occurring ozone gasses, which seemed to keep the 
known ice ages of deeper geological history at bay.  While pollution on local levels 
was a palpable, even choking, concern, an overall trend of warming seemed merely 
utopian to the chilled blood of northern European scientists.                                     
Indeed, the very notion of global greenhouse grew into a prosperous cultural 
trope in England of the nineteenth-century.  The literary transition period of mid-
century witnessed the advent of architectural engineering towards impressive glass 
domes such as the Crystal Palace, erected for the 1851 Exhibition.  Joseph Paxton 
owed his architectural ingenuity to the physical structure of an exotic water lily at 
Kew Gardens, the Victoria regia.  The engineer placed his infant daughter on one of 
the floating leaves, and instead of sinking under her weight into the shallow water, the 
leaf proved strong and buoyant enough to support the child on the surface 
(Christianson 79).  Paxton deduced that the geometrical venation on the undersurface 
of the leaves could be recapitulated as transverse girders in an otherwise glass 
structure.  His fusion of a slender iron skeleton supporting expanses of dermal glass 
became both an environmental metaphor of the microcosm and a literal triumph of 
                                                
19 The term “greenhouse effect,” which is first to make a stigma of Fourier’s global shell, was coined 




engineering in the new Victorian age: the structure housed botanical and cultural 
collections from the outer circumferences of imperial reach.   
At the same time, the greenhouse concept held more sinister implications.  
Denizens of England’s new industrial megalopolises, particularly Manchester and 
London, were visual witnesses of a polluted industrial microclimate.  As Elizabeth 
Gaskell records in North and South (1855),  
For several miles before they reached Milton, there was a deep lead-coloured 
cloud hanging over the horizon in the direction in which it lay.  It was all the 
darker from contrast with the pale grey-blue of the wintry sky…Here and 
there a great oblong many-windowed factory stood up, like a hen among her 
chickens, puffing out black ‘unparliamentary’ smoke, and sufficiently 
accounting for the cloud which Margaret had taken to foretell rain. (59)  
 
The 1844 legislation meant to curb industrial emissions went largely unheeded by 
libertarian factory owners (Gaskell’s Thornton is one of them).  By 1866 
Manchester’s medical representative identified the citizens as among the unhealthiest 
in Britain, as a consequence of their industrial atmosphere (Christianson 21).   
By century’s end, Manchester had cast an appreciable plague on its own flora, 
as well: in an 1893 essay on “The Air of Large Towns,” Manchester researcher G. H. 
Bailey appeals to the populous in his preamble to the scientific data demonstrating the 
measurable pollutants.  He writes, “general experience has shown that evergreens 
cannot be grown in the heart of our larger cities and even the more hardy deciduous 
trees make little progress and sooner or later succumb.  The sulfurous and other 
noxious vapors and the deposits of soot, hydrocarbons, etc., which form on the leaves 
are the chief agents in the destruction of plant-life” (201).  Trees are only a step
removed from animals, and Bailey invokes Britain’s famed urban fogs, “when the air 




environment: “The death-rate indeed from such [respiratory] diseases after foggy 
weather frequently increases to three-fold its normal value and is always 
exceptionally high in the densely populated districts” (201).  Bailey’s prescription to 
correct this miasmic condition is for the British to emulate futuristic Americans with 
“the substitution of gaseous fuel.”  He continues,  
though it may not get rid of fogs altogether, [natural gas] will doubtless 
mitigate in a very large measure their noxious character and in the era wh n 
lighting is done by electricity and heating by gas the whole aspect of our 
towns will be changed for the better…a signal service would be rendered and 
a distinct advance would be made in the direction of banishing the fog demon 
once and for all. (202)   
 
The demon ought to be banished by the new century with the aid of better technology 
and cleaner fuel sources, Bailey suggests in this millennial passage that came 
somewhat rue.  Natural gas and petroleum occupied more of the twentieth-century 
energy market than it previously had, but petrol-driven automobiles in cities offset 
many of the gains.  In 1910, as T.S. Eliot notes of urban modernity, the miasmic 
yellow fog still rubbed “its back upon the window-panes…lingered upon the pools 
that stand in drains…curled once about the house, and fell asleep” (Prufrock, ll.15-
22).  Strangely, like the new generations of urban workers, the demon was endemic 
and somnolent, a child of industry.  It had settled in a sleepy command over its 
siblings’ habitat.                   
Another view of Britain’s rising conscience relating to industrial air polluti n 
might be drawn on the statistics of average chimney height over the course of the 
nineteenth-century.20  As the tallest of the remaining oaks were felled, these brick-lain 
                                                
20 Gale Christianson traces the growth of “Cleopatra’s Needles” from an average somewhat below 300 
feet before mid-century (some requiring over a million bricks), towards new records of 435.5 feet in 




proxies came to adorn the skylines of urban centers, and great engineering effort was 
invested in making ever-taller stacks capable of distributing their effluent ov r a 
wider area.  The “not in my back yard” instinct of environmental self-distancing 
directly informed the linear trend towards towering chimneys.  An average of 100 
chimneys rose each year in London between 1846 and 1853 (Christianson 56).  Not 
merely taller chimneys, but legislative dispersal of industry was tried as a solution to 
the new atmospheric malaise.  The House of Commons Select Committee on the 
Smoke Nuisance, created in 1843, recommended that manufacturers be removed from 
the city center to a radius of five or six miles (57).  These measures effectiv ly 
substituted a visibly apparent local environmental problem for an almost invisible but 
widespread trend towards the literal blacking of England.   
Industrial melanism is an illustrative case in point.  That model case of 
evolution by natural selection and encryption physiology began in the UK with the 
revelation that a mutation for uniform darkness in a tree-dwelling moth, Biston 
carbonaira, was assisting the formerly-rare species in newfound competitive success 
with its rival, B. betularia.  The carbonaria mutant was better adapted to the 
industrial world: its color matched the sooty trunks of trees, and predators targeted th  
more apparent betularia, whose mottled wings now stood out against a dark grey 
background.  The revelation of industrial melanism is owed to a common 
collaborative scheme in the sciences: one naturalist named Edleston began collecti g 
                                                                                                                                          
reached their planned heights: industrial chimneys had to contend with extreme heat, soft foundations, 
prevailing and buffeting winds, and minute asymmetries of construction that would quickly become 
exacerbated under the other stresses.  Not only did the Victorians find taller stacks more tolerable for 
their emissive distribution, a discernable movement towards aesthetic chimney architecture, some of it 
patterned after the Egyptian prototype, served to show that chimneys were an indispensable feature of 




and noting the prevalence of carbonaria in 1864, and a successive entomologist 
named J. W. Tutt synthesized the research towards the end of the century, and made 
use of a larger trend of melanism in insects now extant on the European continent to 
record the first proof of humans affecting biological evolution.      
One other advance in environmental sciences of the nineteenth-century is 
worth noting here.  Robert Angus Smith, a Scottish chemist and industrial adversary, 
discovered acid rain in 1852 in the environs of Manchester, and published the long-
researched monograph Air and Rain: the Beginnings of Chemical Climatology in 
1872.  These rains had the alarming power of literally dissolving the facades of 
English architecture, which were already besotted with carbon emissions.  Since the 
beginning of the nineteenth-century, industrial smoke, and particularly sulfur dioxide, 
has decreased the pH of rain from a balanced average of 6 to a marginally-acidic 4.5 
or 4.  Readings of 2.4, the acidity of vinegar, have occasionally been recorded in 
heavily industrialized areas (“Acid rain” by NASA).  Events of the so-called 
waldsterben, the death of the trees, had been known to follow large volcanic 
eruptions, but die-offs in forests surrounding industrial areas (northern England, the 
Black Forest of southern Germany, parts of eastern Europe, China) only grew into 
human ken over the course of the twentieth-century.  Acid rain’s tendency to deface 
tombstones and public statues make the phenomenon a particularly bracing example 
of the self-annihilating side-effects of industrial emissions.  Even names carved in 
stone, the Victorians discovered, were imperiled in posterity by the airborne appetites 




Denizens of the nineteenth-century did not come to realize the adverse effects 
of industry in a vacuum.  Atmospheric sciences originated out of a combination of 
Enlightenment chemistry, which made great advances is elucidating the chemical 
nature of air, and the geological explorations of volcanoes at the turn of the 
nineteenth-century.  Luminaries like Humphrey Davy, Alexander von Humboldt, and 
James Smithson scrambled around the calderas of the world’s most active volcanoes 
in pursuit of applied information and material samples.  Davy climbed Mount 
Vesuvius fourteen times in 1820 alone, inspired by his research in coal mines to test 
the various contemporary theories on volcanic action (Matthews 1957: 197).  
Measures of volcanic emissions, both quantitative and qualitative, became crucial 
data used to parse among many competing theories on the role of volcanoes and 
earthquakes in earth history.  A deep time ruled by catastrophe captured the literary
imagination, as well: volcanoes, earthquakes, and comets emerged as chaotic, world-
ruling events, perhaps as substitutes for more conventional deism.  In 1822 Byron 
raised catastrophic speculation to the level of a new, atavistic mythology: “Who
knows whether, when a comet shall approach this globe to destroy it, as it often has 
been and will be destroyed, men will not tear rocks from their foundations by means 
of steam, and hurl mountains, as the giants are said to have done, against the flaming 
mass? – and then we shall have traditions of Titans again, and of wars with heaven” 
(quoted in Palmer 2003: 56).  His wish for this sublime, techno-geological battle 
reveals the imaginative energy contained in catastrophe science, which glosses over 




Nor were environmental catastrophes merely the condition of an immature 
early earth, as Cuvier had insisted in the context of his geological catastrophi m.  
Though Cuvier had succeeded in “bursting the limits of time” for the imagination 
hooked on geology, time present was providing ample evidence that the earth was 
engaged in an ongoing dynamic evolution; episodes of destruction and despoilment 
had to be factored into our understanding of environmental conditions.  Great 
upheavals were the ongoing condition of existence on the planet, as recent history 
demonstrated.  In 1755, a massive earthquake of magnitude 8.75 crumbled the 
Portuguese capital of Lisbon; it catalyzed a tsunami and a fire that colluded to kill at 
least 30,000 people (some sources place the number closer to 100,000) (Palmer 210).  
This event appeared in the writing of Voltaire, Rousseau, and Kant, particularly as 
relates to theories of the sublime.  In 1783-4 the Icelandic volcano Laki erupted, 
releasing 120 million tons of sulfur dioxide over the northern hemisphere and 
triggering a series of famines, unseasonable cold, and a blood-red appearance of the 
sun over Europe; Gilbert White and Benjamin Franklin are among the natural 
philosophers that recorded the natural effects of such volumes of atmospheric 
pollution.  In 1815 the Tambora volcano in Indonesia produced a similarly 
spectacular effect: its emissions caused the famous “year without a summer” in 1816, 
the coldest year in the northern hemisphere since 1601 (the year following a massive 
volcanic eruption in Peru) (Briffa 1998: 451).  The average temperature anomaly 
shows a global cooling by about 0.5 degrees Celsius.  Snow fell on New England that 
June, and the inhabitants of Villa Diodati on Lake Geneva, the Shelleys, Byron, and 




In 1883, Krakatoa erupted in a series of booms, one of which is the loudest sound 
recorded in history (it was heard distinctly on Mauritius, 3,000 miles away).  
Following the typical patterns, Krakatoa’s eruption triggered tsunamis, worldwide 
cooling (temperatures did not return to average until 1888), and bizarre, portentous 
optical effects such as the red sunsets and blue moons (Shelf 1981: 699).  These 
catastrophic eruptions influenced the plots of chaotic literary narratives, a 
meteorological mandate that I will discuss in chapter two.  
As G.M. Matthews (1957) has usefully noted, the comprehension of natural 
catastrophes, especially volcanoes, went hand-in-hand with the scientific lucidation 
of industrial pollution: the two inquiries were mutually-enabling.  Alexander von 
Humboldt’s copious research on South American geology, which forms the basis for 
early theories of species distribution and biogeography, also relied on observations of 
industrial affect, “for it was only after analogies had been drawn from industry that 
certain volcanic processes were explained” (197).  Humboldt developed the 
‘cyanometer,’ an object of Byron’s gentle ridicule, in order to quantify the blueness 
of the sky.  He measured the notably un-blue skies around active volcanoes, which 
had the additionally sublime effect of coloring the surrounding objects in lurid, 
unnatural hues.  He recognized volcanic action as the key to opening new theoretical 
schemes in geophysics:  
Volcanic phenomena…considered in the totality of their relations, are among 
the most important topics in earth Physics.  Burning volcanoes appear to be 
the effect of a permanent communication between the molten interior of the 
earth and the atmosphere that envelopes the hardened, oxidized crust of our 
planet…[volcanoes provide information on] that intimate connection between 
so many diverse phenomena. (From “Fragmens de Geologie et de 





These theoretical connections, though not fully explicit until continental drift theory 
unified geophysics under a new paradigm in the twentieth-century, were common to 
scientific discourse from the beginning of the nineteenth-century.  G. M. Matthews 
quotes an Edinburgh Review essay from 1804, which marvels at the inherent 
soundness of an initial link between volcanic and industrial pollution: “it is wonderful 
how it so long eluded observation, when the slag of every furnace exhibits it in the 
most striking manner” (197).   
The commonality between industry and volcanoes went well beyond 
observations of odd weather.  Chemical analyses of volcanic emissions deconstructed 
the molecular cocktail behind the dull appearance of sooty smoke.  James Smithson 
(whose legacy would be devoted to the establishment of Washington’s Smithsonian 
Institution) revealed his analysis of Vesuvius soot in a paper for the Philosophical 
Transactions in 1813, in which he concludes, “This Vesuvian salt, considered in its 
totality, has presented no less than nine species of matters, and a more rigorous 
investigation, than I was willing to bestow upon it, would probably add to their 
number” (from “On a Saline Substance from Mount Vesuvius”; quoted in Ewing 
266).  Scientists were also dissecting the volcanic ash left behind in the lower, more 
primitive geological layers as evidence of ancient volcanic activity.  The chemical 
complexity of these fiery byproducts was only beginning to find the light of empirical 
science, and Smithson was particularly accomplished with a blowpipe, that 
indispensable chemist’s tool used in sciences from metallurgy to mineralogy to 
inorganic chemistry.  Seeking evidence for the Plutonist theory of geology, which




Smithson sought evidence supporting the notion that earth was an extinct comet or 
star:  
Every thing tells that a large body of combustible matter still remains closed 
within this stony envelope, and of which volcanic eruptions are partial and 
small ascensions.  Under this point of view, an high interest attaches itself to 
volcanoes, and their ejections.  They cease to be local phenomena; they 
become principle elements in the history of our globe; they connect its present 
with its former condition; and we have good grounds for supposing, that in 
their flames are to be read its future destinies. (Quoted in Ewing 2007: 74)  
 
Its future destinies, indeed, where industry smells of the future.  The identifiable 
compounds Smithson precipitated out of these Vesuvian salts are as follows, in 
decreasing abundance: sulfates of potash and soda, muriates of soda, ammonia, 
copper, and iron, and miscellaneous metallic “submuriates”.  Though the arcane 
chemical terminology occludes a direct connection with later analyses of industr al 
pollution, the link remains: sulfates are the salts of sulfuric acid, and muriates are 
derivatives of hydrochloric acid such as potassium chloride.  In his analysis of air 
particulates in a foggy Chelsea of 1893, G.H. Bailey found the chemical composition 
at fully 4.3% sulfuric acid, 1.4% hydrochloric acid, 1.4% ammonia, 2.6% metallic 
iron, and a whopping 31.2% “other mineral matter,” particularly silica (sand) and 
ferric oxide (oxidized iron) (201).  Carbon and hydrocarbons made up the remainder.  
In chemical terms, the particulates demonstrably emitted by volcanoes through 
geological time shared their molecular structure with the new aerosols of industry, 
particularly elemental carbon, sulfuric acid, hydrochloric acid, and ammonium.  
Chemistry changed dialects over the course of the first industrial century, but 
nonetheless it became clear that the geogenic past held information to inform an 




closer look at literary narratives that linked environmental disaster with human 
activity.  Though these works are a species of artistic augury, it will become lear that 
literary portends are not merely the paranoia of a superstitious imagination at free 
reign, but form the basis of a scientific revolution that includes humans as primary 




V: Early Ecological Microcosms 
 
On another epistemological frontier of the nineteenth-century, natural history 
was evolving from its eighteenth-century status as a science cataloging a coherent 
world towards in situ observations, or field studies.  The cabinet of curiosities had 
embellished the décor of eighteenth-century naturalists and delighted collectors and 
the inquisitive with a notion of life as a divine Concordia discors.  The underlying 
sciences of geology and chemistry were disposed to investigation outside the field: 
fossils are best understood when placed amid massive collections, and experimental 
chemistry relies on the controlled, ideal conditions found in laboratories.  But the 
nineteenth-century’s aesthetics of the picturesque encouraged naturalists to pur ue 
their studies al fresco, amidst nature’s vital interactions.  For biology to grow into its 
own proper discipline, it needed to study its subject, life, where life was ongoing.  
Like laboratory experiments, the new biology also needed parameters to focus the 
level of investigation, and to define its terms and subjects.  One way to generate a 
frame of reference is to delimit the subjects by placing them in a system, ev n if that 
system is somewhat arbitrary because of the breadth and depth of interdependence in 
nature.   
The writing of Alexander von Humboldt, Charles Darwin, and Stephen 
Forbes provides some perspective on how the science of life approached field 
observation and experimentation as it became more sophisticated during the 
nineteenth-century.  These biologists established a discourse style that was based on 
the fruits of travel, though their works are more directed than travel narratives.  




boogey-man of the brain, but a vital, synthesizing imagination was crucial for 
biologists to grasp the implications of organic inter-reliance from small to large 
scales.  This new approach, which Goethe had identified as the “gentle empiricis” 
that does not manipulate or mutilate, but simply grows within the mind of the 
sensitive observer, preserved the webs of life as they had independently developed 
through evolutionary time.  Though it would be misleading to claim that all 
biologists of the nineteenth-century followed Goethe’s passive aesthetic (consider 
the vivisectionists), ecological empiricism demanded of its practitioners a holistic 
perspective in order to attain any intelligible advances.  The impala cannot be 
understood as a biological entity without also considering savannah grasses and 
prides of lions.  Systems created coherence by imposing frame of referenc , and 
holism permitted biological life to keep its strings attached; indeed, the strings 
themselves were to become ecology’s rai on d’être.       
These two prerequisites to an ecological vision coincided on the tropical 
islands colonized by European powers.  Islands served as the first places to suffer 
palpable environmental degradation at the hands of colonists, who introduced alien 
species across the spectrum of biological kingdoms.21  They were fortuitous early 
microcosm experiments.  Though the microbes, fungi, and pests such as rats were 
accidental baggage, the European ships also brought goats, horses, beasts of burden, 
and the full complement of western staple crops.  Islands were also used for intensive 
cultivation of native species: fruits, spices, and medicines were increasingly in 
                                                
21 Richard Grove’s Green Imperialism (1995) elaborates on the importance of colonial exp oration 
beginning in the sixteenth-century, particularly the French and English establishments on isolated 
islands throughout oceanic regions of the equator and southern hemisphere.  It is an important study of 





demand in Europe.  Small isolated islands such as Mauritius in the Indian Ocean and 
St Helena in the South Atlantic, which in a wild state sported an epidermis of thick 
forest, were denuded and converted to pasture and farmland.  Conversions from this 
“savage” state of wilderness to a combed, controlled and productive system of 
agriculture were instrumental to colonial ideology and the Enlightenment desire to 
improve nature by taming it.   
These directed changes constituted a symbolic shift from the wild island 
towards the cultivated garden.  The two related microcosmic symbols found a home 
in the colonial conscience: the island itself served as a suggestive metonym for many 
systems (the entire world, self-regulating nature, monarchal society, national 
economy), and the garden embodied a controlled network of productive species 
owing its existence to educated and hard working colonists (Grove 14).  Islands 
provided manageable parcels of nature with a complement of tropical species and a 
climatological receptiveness to botanical improvement, at least for a while.  They 
carried an ideological promise of redemptive potential at the religious level, as a 
scattered series of possible new Edens, as well as ingenuity on scientific and medical 
levels, as loci of botanical cultivation for the derivation of new medicines.  Colonial 
islands were nature’s first provision of ecological laboratories. 
Perhaps not surprisingly to humans of the twenty-first century, islands were 
most instructive about this new notion of ecology when their systems reacted 
drastically to the disequilibria introduced by colonial cultivation.  The interrelation of 
organic and inorganic nature at specific scales was not to be formalized as ecological 




early eighteenth-century, many of whom were the most advanced and radicalthinkers 
of their age, began to draw links between human agrarian activity and natural 
despoilment based on their experience with these isolated parcels.  Deforestation, in 
particular, led naturalists towards an understanding of the relationship between for sts 
and atmospheric composition (Grove 153).  A series of “dessicationist” theories grew 
out of the observed drought conditions on islands that had been cleared of their 
moisture-holding trees.  The extent to which island acres were forested, especially on 
slopes and in windward faces, also affected the soil quality, depth, and distribution 
downhill, where land was most often turned to intensive agriculture.  From the seeds 
of island experience, colonial scientists gathered data to support the new notion that 
human activity could change an ecosystem for the worse as well as for the better. In 
fact, it introduced the irony that human energy directed specifically at improving 
nature from an untamed state towards a Biblical garden, pious as well as economical 
labor, was the sort of artificial control that replaced one scheme of wilderness with 
another, more frightening one: outlandish and sudden despoilment of foliage, water 
and soil-starved fields, and a virulent unfiltered sun.    
The island of Mauritius, which turned from French to English rule in 1810, is 
an example of this early outgrowth of environmental conscience from the scope of a 
microcosm.  In 1715 the French turned the island to sugar cane and indigo 
production, and scientists quickly noticed the deleterious effects of land clearing, and 
the water pollution resulting from effluvia of the indigo industry.  On an island with 
limited freshwater resources, industrial pollution emerged as a menace to human




Mauritius established legislation to curb industrial excrescences by 1791 (Grove 256).  
Governor Decaen, who regulated Mauritius from 1803 until its loss to England during 
the Napoleonic wars, instituted a series of laws aimed at alleviating the environmental 
deterioration that was now evident.  His legislation enforced the protection of river 
banks for 120 feet on each side and the preservation of forest on two-thirds of the 
mountain slopes (Grove 257).   
Such ecological considerations addressed the problems of excessive runoff 
and topsoil loss, as well as protecting against the desiccation of denuded landscapes.  
Forests, it was observed, cultivated clouds, especially at the higher elevations.  This 
new sylvan valuation succeeded earlier notions of forests as dark and insidious groves 
that grasped miasmic fogs in leafy layers and sustained an unhealthy boggy dampness 
at the soil level.  Decaen’s measures had only a limited time to alleviate Mauritius’s 
ecological wounds, however: when the British seized control of the island in 1810 
they wondered at the under-use of the mountain and riparian terrain, and set the land 
to another cycle of heavy cultivation (Grove 261).  Within a short time the British 
began to notice the dissolution of their agrarian schemes, and William Chambers, a 
prominent industrialist, set the scientific world into serious and increasingly public 
debates about the dangers of desiccation with the following set of observations: 
Very shortly it was noticed that the streams were shrinking; that one spring 
after another had disappeared; that the green of the meadows was changed to a 
dusty brown; that the grain sown grew up thin and hungry; and that the earth, 
in short, ceased to be productive.  Reflecting persons were not slow in 
discovering the cause of this great change.  They noticed that the periodical 
rains, however abundant they might be, soon cleared away from the cultivated 
country, leaving it exposed to the rays of a fiery sun, which scorched and 
withered up everything for want of a perennial supply of moisture.  The next 




upon which experience had proved the fertility of the lower lands depended.  
(“Failure of springs in the East” (1863) 1-3; quoted in Grove 261)   
 
Such accounts were part of a growing and increasingly public consensus that human-
driven environmental improvements were not so simple and unidirectional as early 
agrarian science had assumed.  Though by the mid-nineteenth-century the problems 
of unchecked landscape alteration were beginning to be manifest, it remained the 
place of island colonies to reveal environmental trends that could only later be 
applied to the vast tracts of the mainland.  In these island microcosms, the climat 
was changing palpably, and for explicable anthropogenic reasons.  The reversal of 
atmospheric desiccation was indeed possible, but it required the admission that a 
certain amount of economically unproductive wilderness served to hold an ecological 
system in a more steady state.   
 Charles Darwin set himself to a rigorous education in island biogeography 
during the five years of the Beagle’s voyage from 1832 to 1836.  The adaptive 
radiation of finches across the Galapagos Islands is scientific history’s premier lesson 
in how a series of islands can reveal, in microcosm, the larger forces at work that 
mediate between organic and inorganic nature, in this case allopatric speciation.  But 
Darwin learned from another island that humans, over the course of a few hundred 
years, can have profound impacts on small circumscribed environments.  During the 
final latitudinal ascent of the Beagle, in July 1836, the party landed at St Helena, an 
island of 164 square miles in the middle of the South Atlantic.  St Helena is famed as 
Napoleon’s place of forced exile from 1815 to his death in 1821, but it was used by a 
motley series of European sailors starting in the early-sixteenth-century, when goats 




 It became a permanent British territory in 1834.  When the Beagle arrived in 
July of 1836, Darwin had fully grown out of his recalcitrant academic youth to 
become an energetic and accomplished naturalist, actively considering competing 
scientific theories of geology, botany, and natural history during his rambles through 
Oceana.  The flora and fauna of St Helena, however, reminded him somewhat too 
much of home.  His diary from the voyage, which provided the bulk of his 1839 
volume The Voyage of the Beagle, is revealing of a semi-conscious environmental 
ethic.  First, the revelation of the island microcosm: “St Helena, situated so rmote 
from any continent, in the midst of a great ocean, & possessing an unique Flora, -- 
this little world, within itself, -- excites our curiosity” (412).22  Darwin’s impression 
of the uncanny effect of English landscape in an exotic land has survived in 
fragments: 
In latitude 16° & at the trifling elevation of 1500 ft, it is surprising to behold a 
vegetation possessing a decidedly English character.  But such is the case; the 
hills are crowned with irregular plantations of scotch firs; the sloping banks 
are thickly scattered over the thickets of gorse, covered with its bright yellow 
flowers; along the course of the rivulets weeping willows are common, & the 
hedges are formed of the blackberry, producing its well known fruit.  When 
we consider the proportional numbers of indigenous plants being 52, to 424 
imported species, of which latter so many come from England, we see the 
cause of this resemblance in character.  These numerous species, which have 
been so recently introduced, can hardly have failed to have destroyed some of 
the native kinds.  I believe there is not any account extant of the vegetation at 
the period when the island was covered with trees; such would have formed a 
most curious comparison with its present sterile condition and limited Flora.  
It is not improbable that even at the present day similar changes may be in 
progress.  Many English plants appear to flourish here better than in their 
native country. (411) 
 
                                                
22 To our great misfortune, this suggestive passage comes directly after a 2 page gap in the diary’s text, 
which the editor notes “relates the loss of two inserted pages [of ]discussion on the changes in the 




Americans of the twenty-first century are used to the concept of invasive specis: 
kudzu and bamboo from the East, ivy, the starling, and Dutch elm disease from 
Europe.  Introduced species often become virulently successful in new environments 
because they are freed from the competition and predation of their natural 
environments.  Invasive species have certain common characteristics, such as fast 
growth and reproduction, wide dispersal mechanisms, a broad range of environmental 
tolerance, and association with humans.  The concept of invasiveness shows how 
ecology, including the evolutionary ecology that is largely Darwin’s gift to biology, 
cannot discount the human factor when considering any environment.  Though human 
impact may be as ancient as the species itself (which has existed a mere 200,000 
years or 1/22,000th of the history of life on Earth), only the last few centuries have 
revealed the potential for a new endemic world order created by human traversal of 
the globe.   
Even to a Victorian patriot, the little world of St Helena seemed ecologically 
damaged because the several species of animals and plants that came with settlers 
claimed a devastating proportion of the ecological niches.  Darwin notes that different 
species of birds and insects are “very few in number; indeed I believe all thebirds 
have been introduced within late years.  Partridges and pheasants are tolerably 
abundant: the island is much too English, not to be subject to strict game-laws” (364).  
He makes a survey of the impact of European ungulates on the former forests of St 
Helena: 
The fact, that the goats and hogs destroyed all the young trees as they sprung 
up, and that in the course of time the old ones, which were safe from their 
attacks, perished from age, seems clearly made out.  Goats were introduced in 




were exceedingly numerous.  More than a century afterwards, in 1731, when 
the evil was completed and found irretrievable, an order was issued that all 
stray animals should be destroyed.” (363)        
 
The culling of stray goats in 1731 constitutes an early act of what was later called 
restoration ecology, where humans imposed a check on the positive feedback loop of 
goat procreation.    
Oceanic islands provided an experimental system by which colonial 
naturalists learned to discern the series of negative (stabilizing) feedback systems 
essential to an ecosystem, and how these feedbacks change in unpredictable and 
severe ways with the introduction of new species.  Though these islands became 
cultural offspring the Imperial power, their regulation, through time, grew wise to the 
environmental imperatives of the contrasting tropical climate.  The adventurous 
scientists who took posts at the edge of Empire were more likely avatars of 
experimental and radical measures such as reforestation.  Conservation, by definition, 
is a conservative practice, but its instantiation in tropical colonies was a radic l action 
that curbed the economic imperative of forwarding consumerism that informed 
legislation of the time.   
 Alexander Von Humboldt’s Cosmos (1845), a unifying study of natural 
history in the nineteenth-century, was the consolidation of travel, research, theory
and lectures from his previous half-century of scientific activity.  Borne co ceptually 
on the imaginative notion of a coherent and unified earth system that is a prototype 
for Gaia theory, he supported his philosophical occasion with hordes of detail, the 
gleanings from increasingly-diversified sciences of astronomy, physics, geology, 




death in 1859 provides an opening for a tempting chronological thesis that the old, 
Romantic, holistic, harmonious cosmos splintered under the hammer of Darwinian 
evolution, which introduced biological strife as the ontological condition of life.23  
But to do so would be to elide the more subtle interdependencies between 
Humboldtian ecology and Darwin’s network of natural selection acting on variation 
within a complex organic and inorganic matrix.  Though incessant competition, 
carnage, and chaos were read meta-textually onto Darwinian evolution, England’s 
great Victorian bore an acknowledged debt to Germany’s great Romantic, most 
succinctly summarized in the The Origin of Species (1859) closing trope of the 
tangled bank: 
It is interesting to contemplate a tangled bank, clothed with many plants of 
many kinds, with birds singing on the bushes, with various insects flitting 
about, and with worms crawling through the damp earth, and to reflect that 
these elaborately constructed forms, so different from each other, and 
dependent on each other in so complex a manner, have all been produced by 
laws acting around us. (450) 
 
Darwin sought reasons to be sanguine about his notion of natural selection, and the 
aesthetic of the Law he rendered into prose invokes at least as much Humboldtian 
harmony as it does Malthusian mêlée.  Though admittedly no avid student of 
literature, Darwin’s narrative choice to place his empirical eye in the midst of an 
entangled intermixture, the closing image of his great work, demonstrates his debt to 
a newfound secular valuation of a complex, irreducible network of biological life.   
 Close on the heels of Darwin’s discovery of natural selection, Stephen Forbes 
is the American naturalist who was first to put the microcosm to work as an explicit 
scientific practice.  The influence of earlier nineteenth-century science is evident in 
                                                




the discursive narrative style of his paper, “The Lake as a Microcosm,” presented in 
1887 to America’s Scientific Association.  A systems understanding of the 
environment conveys organic sensibility, as though the organization of disparate parts 
itself constitutes a higher sense of awareness that can never be appreciated in a 
machine universe:   
Nowhere can one seem more clearly illustrated what may be called the 
sensibility of such an organic complex, -- expressed by the fact that whatever 
affects any species belonging to it, must speedily have its influence of some 
sort upon the whole assemblage.  He will thus be made to see the 
impossibility of studying any form completely, out of relation to the other 
forms, -- the necessity for taking a comprehensive survey of the whole as a 
condition to a satisfactory understanding of any part. (77) 
 
This “comprehensive survey” is particularly taxing on the scientist faced with the task 
of explaining, in prose, his hypotheses of inter-organization.  The dry, cataloguing 
discourse of rational science is not equipped to convey such images of hierarchy and 
dependence: it effectively describes experimental design, controls, the outcome of 
trials, and conclusions.  But the laucustrine microcosm, like Humboldt’s cosmos and 
Darwin’s narrative of natural selection, continually appeals to anthropomorphic 
language for intelligibility.  As a result, these accounts read more as literature than as 
modern science.  Forbes continues:  
First let us endeavor to form the mental picture. To make this more graphic 
and true to the facts, I will describe to you some typical lakes among those in 
which we worked, and will then do what I can (with much difficulty and 
perplexity no doubt, and I fear with no very brilliant success), to furnish you 
the materials for a picture of the life that swims, and creeps, and crawls and 
burrows and climbs through the water, in and on the bottom and among the 
feathery water plants with which large areas of these lakes are filled. (79-80)   
 
He seeks an image, a metaphor for that “picture of the life that swims,” and his image 




in the sense of biosystems, and it relies on an open imagination for figuration.  
Chapter three of this study will turn this imaginative eye on the literary woks that 
anticipate such hybrid epistemology as ecosystems science, and I will return in more 
detail to Forbes’s work in the final chapter of the study.  Forbes’s “Lake as a 
Microcosm” serves as a pivoting point between literary and scientific uses of the 
microcosm trope.      
 This survey of nineteenth-century science has established the common ground 
from which literature began to elaborate the human condition in a post-Classical age.  
It is not valid or defensible to assign either a scientific or literary appro ch primacy; 
both were actively processing the implications of human mutibility in a contingent, 
dynamic world.  By accepting the mutual influence of empiricism and imagination 
even within a single brain, as well as among consortia of intellects, we can see how 
the bewildering transition from being, in the created sense, to becoming, in the 
evolutionary one, informed new methods of understanding the world during the 
industrial era.  Even lacking the genetic principle of mutation, a discovery of the 
twentieth-century, intellects discovered that there were wild, unpredictable impulses 
within the formerly static systems, and that this wildness, rather than exception or 
anomaly, was a principle by which life (d)evolved.    
 Kant had introduced the a priori principle into objective science of the 
eighteenth-century, flagging the human instinct to perceive teleology, an assumption 
of the Classical age.  Kant brought the observer into the observation, rendering our 
senses and reason involved, rather than austere.  The questions became personal; they 




knowledge.  With the brave new industrial world rapidly unfolding, a new emphasis 
fell on dynamic prediction.  In literature, prediction often took the form of our deepest 
hopes versus our darkest fears, the many worlds that could come into being -- for the 
static, created world was now a relic of the past. 
 With these environmental conditions of the nineteenth-century surveyed, we 
may now turn to the literature of the century that explores ways to narrate 
unpredictable nature, and how patterns and models might be generated.   Chapter two 
investigates four distinct narratives of environmental chaos spanning the long 
nineteenth century: Gilbert White, Mary Shelley, Richard Jefferies and H.G. Wells, 
emplot the radical new notion of a post-apocalypse environment in narrative schemes 
that rely on chaotic discontinuity, rather than the coherent gradualism that marked 
evolutionary theories of the time.  The first three narratives were written a  least 
partially in reaction to a massive volcanic eruption, and my readings investigat  how 
imaginative literary works of the long nineteenth century process apocalyptic 
moments and their aftermath.   
 Chapter three moves into the various uses of microcosmic imagery in the 
work of several important poets, including William and Dorothy Wordsworth, John 
Clare, Percy Shelley, and Matthew Arnold.  The microcosm has been figured through 
poetry as representing the psyche, the body, and the circumscribed plot of land.  This 
chapter shows how the trope evolved from its metaphysical roots in Plato, who held 
that the human body was a microcosm of the Earth, into a true empirical strategy 
dedicated to understanding the anatomy of small natural systems like islands and 




helped the nascent sciences conceive of ways to simplify nature without 
dismembering its complex structures.   
 Chapter four, devoted wholly to the ecological thinking of Keats, traces his 
fragmentation of teleological narrative in the Hyperion poems in preference for the 
little worlds of the Odes.  His transition from Miltonic blank verse in 1818 to the self-
developed voice of his most personal metaphysical excursions in 1819 may show an 
intentional re-evaluation of what poetry of the environment could accomplish in his 
century.  Though the Odes (especially Nightingale, Psyche, and Autumn) are already 
known as superlative poems of the Romantic period, I build upon recent ecocritical 
readings (particularly Bate [2000], and Bewell [1999]) that claim they are avant-
garde in ecological conception.  Proceeding from Bate’s eco-existential reading of the 
Odes, my thesis pursues the Odes’ imagistic and formal qualities, which amount to an 
early study of systems ecology.   
 Finally, chapter five reconciles the two tropes with an excursion into modern 
ecosystem science, paying particular attention to our contemporary strategies for 
investigating the climate change phenomenon.  Though this chapter serves as a 
summation of the dissertation, it also complicates the dichotomy between narrative 
and model-microcosm, and brings the study into concerns of the present day.  I 
introduce ideas of non-conformist ecologists of the twenty-first century, such a 
William Cronin and Tim Allen, who criticize the predominance of models and 
mechanisms (the offspring of a microcosmic view), and favor a recovery of narrative 
in ecological science. Global warming narratives, most of them disaster scenarios, are 




century soil.  Hardly 250 years into the industrial revolution, we face apocalypse 
narratives factually based in science, which deliver informed accounts of what might 








This chapter will trace an alternative pattern of chaos that contrasted with the 
hegemony of coherent gradualism in narratives of the nineteenth-century.  The 
prevailing gradualist thought about nature was based on a particular interpretation of 
geological evidence, and this coherent scheme of deep time unfolding with relative 
uniformity strongly influenced Darwinian evolutionary theory.  The four narratives of 
environmental rupture I investigate show what an alternative state involving chaos 
could impose upon traditional narrative structures.  With the innovative use of 
randomness, contingency, and indeterminacy in these stories about nature, the authors 
find a new frame for figuring the tempo of environmental change and human 
involvement in contingency.  Their infusion of chaos into natural histories (even 
fictional ones) is linked to Foucault’s theory of post-Classical thought in the 
nineteenth-century, which suggests that the “dehistoricized” human of the post-
Enlightenment era was forced to realize that humanity had no special place in nature 
nor any Providential destiny.  Filling this ontological vacuum is a valuation of the 
power and potential inventiveness inherent in a chaotic worldview; the discovery of a 
new infinity.      
 My sampling of works considers representative texts from moments in history 
that required explanation for what was happening in the evolving relationship 
between culture and nature; consequently, they fall roughly at generational fo tsteps 




(Jefferies), and the fin-de-siècle (Wells).  James Chander’s England in 1819 (1998) 
proposes a theoretical rubric for re-integrating historicism in Romantic studie  by 
focusing on specific years that can be seen as ‘representative’ of a spirit of the age: 
1798 and 1819 stand out as years of spectacular literary output and pivotal events in 
history, and yield representative anecdotes that clarify the historicist project in 
twenty-first century literary criticism.24  This chapter benefits from Chandler’s 
strategy by aligning specific environmental events with literary production: my 
selection is informed by actual dramatic events in the natural world, especially 
volcanoes.  Though a coherent evolution in ideas about chaos over the course of the 
long nineteenth-century is elusive, trends of modernization in the chaos trope are 
demonstrable as indicators of literary minds influencing, and influenced by, scientifi  
advances.  For example, Gilbert White in Enlightenment-era 1789 assumes he will 
find a static, perennial nature in his parish and finds surprising evidence to the 
contrary when storms, landslides, and volcanoes roar; by 1895 H.G. Wells can 
manipulate the gradualist theory of evolution by natural selection to imagine deep, 
atelic disjunctions between the Victorian age and the deep future.  Both writers 
produced narratives of chaotic change that challenged scientific and religious 
conventions of their time, but both works are still heavily imprinted by the cultural 
conditions of their emergence.   
                                                
24 Chandler explains his methodological strategy that balances between history and ethnography: “I 
attend closely to a number of mediational moments [i  1819], stressing that the return to history in 
recent years returns to a much older conjunction of tw  discursive frameworks: a discourse of 
chronology, which Levi-Strauss attempted to reveal as the ‘historian’s code,’ and a discourse of 
culture, which presumes a sense of equivalence between historiographical and ethnographical 
operations.  In the latter, this sense of equivalence is itself grounded in the practice of correlating the 





 This interest in identifying revolutionary ways that nineteenth-century writers 
imagined patterns in nature is linked to another historical trend: how industrial 
pollution was increasingly figured into narratives of environmental disaster.  
Especially in the earlier works (White and Shelley), industry plays only a minor role 
in affecting nature’s behavior.  By the second half of the century, Jefferies and Wells 
designate industry’s pernicious effects as an essential component of nature’s 
behavior, introducing a moral, environmentalist thread to their writing.  Relevant to 
the theme of pollution and sudden change is the fact that three of these four works 
were written in the historical context of major volcanic eruptions.  As discussed in 
chapter one, volcanoes were the first indicator that atmospheric chemistry can be 
changed by sulfuric and carbonic emissions, and these gasses and particulates were 
eventually linked to industry.25   
 Each writer has conceptual insights borne on observation and imagination that 
contribute innovative ideas about change in nature; these ideas foreshadow theories in 
modern chaos ecology, particularly population ecology, succession dynamics, 
meteorology, and climate change.  Gilbert White studies population fluctuations and 
extinction in Selborne, and writes dramatically about Laki’s eruption and its chaotic 
influence on the atmosphere in 1783.  Mary Shelley, whose Frankenstein (1818) was 
directly precipitated by the Tambora eruption of 1816, counters the cooling and 
                                                
25 Max Nordeau’s essay on Degeneration (1892) represents the end-of-century realization that industry 
in urban areas has epidemiological consequences becaus  ity folk breathe “an atmosphere charged 
with organic detritus…one can compare him without exaggeration to the inhabitant of a marshy 
district” (quoted in Otis 526).  Nordeau’s reversion t  the older, miasmic theory of disease that had 
been disproved by Pasteur, Koch, and Lister in previous decades shows the conceptual difficulty of 
distinguishing unhealthy places from unhealthy microorganisms that hold their niche in those places 
(Otis 575).  Both atmospheric pollution and disease transmission are ecological issues because they 
depend on the relationship between physical environment and measurable features such as air 




clouding of a volcano year with miasmic accounts of atmospheric warming in The 
Last Man (1826).  Her epidemiology of universal plague examines extinction as 
tragedy, but serves to reinforce a Malthusian worldview where unpredictable checks 
on population are a constant stressor on survival.  Richard Jefferies wrote under the 
conditions of 1883’s eruption on Mt. Krakatoa, which resulted in crop failures and 
local famine for several years afterwards.  His knowledge of Darwin and his own gift 
for narrating evolutionary change result in a prescient account of biological 
succession based on initial conditions.  London’s virulent air and water pollution in 
the Victorian era is invoked when he imagines the chaotic afterlife of the industrial 
environment.  H.G. Wells was brought up in working-class industrial London amid its 
poor environmental conditions, and his utopian vision of the tropical garden of 
London in the deep future quickly disintegrates into a realization of a dystopian 
machine world.  His vision of the future holds a sophisticated interpretation of 
evolution that directly challenges progressive gradualism.  Fortuitous events in 
population dynamics and climate change are essential components to his scientific 
projection of the future.26   
Geology by the nineteenth-century had outlined two distinct patterns for how 
deep natural history might have unfolded.  These contrasting theories of 
catastrophism (Cuvier’s paradigm) and gradualism (Lyell’s) were both supported by 
the fossil patterns to a limited extent, and lively debates about the nature of deep tim  
                                                
26 Further reading to reinforce these cultural-environmental junctions includes: Stuart Peterfreund, 
“’Great Frosts and … Some Very Hot Summers’: Strange Weather, the Last Letters, and the Last Days 
in Gilbert White’s Natural History of Selborne” (2003); Christopher Goulding, “A Volcano’s Voice at
Eton: Percy Shelley, James Lind, and Global Climatology” (2003); Jeremy Hooker, “’Which Way is 
England?: Richard Jefferies’s After London” i  his Writers in a Landscape (1996); Katalin Csala-Gati, 




continued through the nineteenth-century when biological change came to the fore 
among scientific concerns.  Darwin’s evolution by natural selection builds upon 
Lyell’s geological views, and the doctrine atura non facit saltum (nature does not 
proceed in leaps) is essential to Darwin’s theory that omniscient natural selection 
slowly carves adaptive forms from the variations in populations, and requires a 
steady, deep evolutionary time to make those forms apparent.  Peter Bowler (2003) 
discusses the influence of geology on evolutionary theory according to the dichotomy 
of continuity versus catastrophe:  
Lyell’s steady state worldview was a by-product of his desire to uphold the 
‘principle of continuity,’ according to which there were no breaks or sudden 
steps in the sequence of events, no causes outside the everyday range of 
experience.  This aspect of his geology impressed Darwin, and Darwin’s 
theory of evolution is a classic expression of the principle of continuity in 
biology.  It uses only processes that can be observed at work in modern 
populations to explain changes in the past…Modern evolutionism has 
managed to combine the elements of continuity and cumulative change that 
were polarized in Lyell’s time…the catastrophist form of discontinuity has 
reemerged in the theory that the history of life has been punctuated by mass 
extinctions caused by asteroid impacts.  (9-10)    
 
The narratives I interpret in this chapter used catastrophe to make sense of nature’s 
patterns of change over time, and they did so by moving entirely beyond “the 
everyday range of experience” into empirical and emotional exhibitions of the extra-
ordinary.  These works of natural history, both experiential and fictional, explore the 
implications of catastrophe and establish a modern narrative aesthetic based on 
violent discontinuity.  The literary appraisal of disasters in natural history is 
continuous with contemporary ideas of chaos ecology and punctuated equilibrium.          
Most great novels of the nineteenth-century conformed to the convention of 




Eliot to Gaskell.  Nature may change cosmetically from anthropogenic stresses, as in 
Gaskell’s North and South (1855), but these industrial imprints are set into the stable, 
fostering, motherly nature of gradualism.  Where classic novels like Middlemarch 
(1874) and Bleak House (1852-3) prized coherent conclusions advancing moral 
arguments centered on human action, more modern narratives of environmental 
disaster drew momentum from the mystery surrounding sudden and extreme events in 
natural history.  Furthermore, natural history in the industrial age became entangl d 
with human activity; ecological damages apparent in the air, water, and soil towards 
the end of the nineteenth-century became focal points around which to organize 
modern drama.   
By the end of the nineteenth-century, a well-recognized collective anxiety had 
settled on the British consciousness, and concerns about degeneration, squalid 
urbanism, substance abuse, and widespread psychosis became deeply informative to 
Victorian novelists.  Stephen Arata (1996) has shown how the “decidedly 
eschatological impulse” of fin-de-siècle novels indicates that biological theories of 
devolution served as conductors for theorizing social decay, in effect laying a 
scientific foundation under “a form of common sense” (1, 2-3).  Arata’s focus on 
degeneration takes famed cases such as The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde 
(1886), The Picture of Dorian Gray (1890), and Dracula (1897) as epitomes of 
physiological and psychological degeneration in Victorian novels.  I seek to extend 
this project by looking at ecological degradation as an essential tristesse of the 
nineteenth-century novelist, and also as a new beginning.  Visions of decay, but also 




more than dramatic elegies for their respective eras in the nineteenth-century.  I  
chaotic narrative, catastrophe may engender unforeseen bounties.       
These four innovative works that experiment with setting human agonists 
within a vortex of changing nature relate back to the “dehistoricized” narrative 
Foucault has identified as essential to post-Classical thinking (369).  The energies of 
transformation in the biological world defied the predictive mechanics of Newtonian 
physics and Copernican cosmology, and held great imaginative potential for 
theorizing other kinds of patterns in nature.  By putting flesh back on the fossils of 
Cuvier’s geological catastrophism, these writers invoked new ideas of natural 
contingency in their narratives.  The genre of the ecological thriller sometimes affords 
a paradoxical sense of control, when characters hold latent capabilities that come o 
shine under the new exigencies of environment just as the old, outworn culture is 
turned under.  Chaos becomes a new outlet for romance, with fresh adversities 
confronted by modern heroes: disease-impervious wanderers, post-apocalypse 
pilgrims, time travelers.  The eco-thriller is also receptive to tragedy and subversive 
comedy, as H.G. Wells so brilliantly realized, so fresh stores of human emotions and 
futuristic imagination could be tapped using this proto-ecological genre.  
The larger thesis at play here is that literary schemes of sudden environmental 
change predate, and to some extent anticipate, the twentieth-century scientific 
paradigm of chaos as one of nature’s essential patterns.  Whenever a truly ecological 
concept appears in these four narratives, I claim the literary priority on hat idea, 
whether or not that work was read and interpreted by later scientists.  Unfortunately, 




humanist and scientific learning, so an argument based on direct causation between 
literary parentage and scientific heir is, for most ecological concepts, elusive.  I don’t 
consider an immediate influence as necessary, however, for an illuminating study of 
how the first industrial culture produced innovative theories of contemporary nature.   
In his later writings Richard Jefferies (c. 1887) expressed a belief that 
scientific theory is formalized directly from intuitive findings of long-established 
cultures, using the kind of folk-knowledge that helped pre-scientific societies 
navigate and survive in a mysterious natural world:   
If you have been living in one house in the country for some time, and then go 
on a visit to another though hardly half a mile distant, you will find a change 
in the air, the feeling, and tone of the place.  It is close by, but it is not the 
same.  To discover these minute differences, which make one locality and 
home healthy and happy, and the next adjoining unhealthy, the Chinese have 
invented the science of Feng-shui, spying about with cabalistic mystery, 
casting the horoscope of an acre.  There is something in all superstitions; they 
are often the foundation of science.  Superstition having made the discovery, 
science composes a lecture on the reason why, and claims the credit. (2001: 
92)   
 
Jefferies’s point, besides the gentle jab at Baconian scientific hubris, is that scientists 
do not observe the natural world with pure objectivity; scientists come to study 
systems in nature with the wisdom of their own culture as a standing hypothesis.  The 
theories of miasma that were paradigmatic in the nineteenth-century were based on 
morbid relationships between people and certain environments, and resulted in 
superstitious behavior.  Science’s formal “lecture on the reason why” with the rise of 
epidemiology is continuous with the folklore knowledge that sets taboos on unhealthy 
places, and establishes aesthetic traditions that favor healthy landscapes and 




Where Jefferies highly appraises folk knowledge of nature, Gilbert White 
shares the “superstitious awe” of Selborne’s denizens when a volcano stains the sky,27 
Mary Shelley’s heroes rely on superstition and augury to guide them through the 
harrowing, chaotic patterns of a plague, and H.G. Wells’s time traveler is educat d by 
the social behavior of the Eloi, who shun the Morlock wells and desperately fear 
nightfall (when Morlocks advance), before he realizes the right theory about their 
predator-prey relationship.  These authors are devoted to demonstrating, though the 
medium of literature, how cultural wisdom that is stigmatized as superstition is 
actually the ground upon which scientific fortresses are built.        
The first work, Gilbert White’s Natural History of Selborne (1789), is the only 
nonfiction work among the four; it is best defined as a chronicle proceeding through 
decades of close study.  White’s understanding of the events around him progresses 
from an aesthetic of Classical cycles towards a more bewildered and open-ended 
vision of wild, unpredictable nature.  He invokes Milton’s chaos as a literary device 
that gives imagistic energy to his descriptions of the meteorological chaosaused by 
Laki’s eruption.  The three later novels I analyze in this chapter use sudden 
environmental change as a new mechanism driving human history; each imagines a 
futurity in which the nature of nineteenth-century Britain has succumbed to some 
                                                
27 Richard Jefferies wrote an introduction for the 1887 edition of Gilbert White’s Selborne.  Though he 
is full of admiration for the perspective on a small landscape that White attains, he is critical of 
White’s ignorance of the people of his parish.  Their folk wisdom, Jefferies implies, was lost in 
White’s scientific narrative: “If the great observe had put down what he saw of the people of his day 
just as he had put down his notes of animals and birds, there would have been a book composed of 
extraordinary interest…he saw and heard all their curious ways, and must have been familiar with their 
superstitions…It must ever be regretted that he did not leave a natural history of the people of his day” 
(quoted in Looker 1965: 180-181).  White’s passage bout the superstitious fear demonstrated by 
country folk in the summer of 1783 is notable because he both distances himself from this “primitive” 
reaction to the volcanic weather and he partakes of the same emotions of awe and wonder at the 




ecological punctuation event.  Mary Shelley’s The Last Man (1826) unravels a tragic 
tale of apocalyptic epidemiology; Richard Jefferies’s After London (1885) envisions 
a revolutionary fallow period and a return to feudal society following a mass 
extinction in England; H.G. Wells’s The Time Machine (1895) narrates a deep 
evolutionary future deterministically-evolved from the social circumstances of 
industrial society.  Each of these narratives gestates the infant paradigm of ecological 
dynamism in its distinctive way, and the environment of industry increasingly 
influences projections of the human legacy after the nineteenth-century (all three 
novels take place in the future).   
My use of the trope of chaos as a method of narrative analysis requires a brief 
preliminary discussion.  In literature beginning with the Renaissance and perhaps 
most notably in Milton’s work, chaos appears as figured in its original, related 
denotations: It is a formless void, an imbroglio of elements, a conglomeration of 
things without shape or order.  There is an awesome power unleashed in images of 
chaos in Paradise Lost, as chaos is the realm of Satan, but it is also God’s workshop 
from which He creates the divinely ordered natural world.  Chaos is the Garden’s 
ontological opposite; however, the two realms are polarized by a difference in 
coherence, not in an opposition of material versus immaterial.  Chaos is the elementa  
world deprived of any principle of organization; its analogue in biological origins is 
the primordial soup of amino acids or RNA from which, it is theorized, life 
spontaneously organized (perhaps with the energetic assistance of lightning).  These 
images of ultimate material disorder, which hold essential imaginative power in their 




century would have held in their lexicon.  Though chaos denotes disorder, it is 
inconceivable without the complement of some system in which the chaos of 
elements will find coherence.  In Creationist tradition, the Deity is the organizing 
force; in evolutionary theory, there inheres a principle of nature that spontaneously 
(without requiring an outside intellect) articulates adaptive forms from simple laws; 
Darwinists would call that law natural selection, but postmodern evolutionists have 
further appraised the random agents of mutation, genetic drift, and catastrophe in the 
evolutionary play.   
From this chao-theistic origin in myth and literature emerged a second 
denotation of scientific chaos that stands in parallax with the first: it holds a sightly 
different perspective on the same object of study (nature), and suggests an error in the 
original perception.  Mathematics of the mid-twentieth-century demonstrated the new 
chaos as an empirical pattern denoting the spontaneous order that can appear in 
complex systems.  Order does not demand a teleological endpoint; this fortuitous 
order merely implies that the elements of a system generate emergent rlationships 
through time.  The evolution of a chaotic system appears random at many levels of 
analysis, but with the proper scope of investigation chaotic systems demonstrate an 
articulate organization, and emergent interrelation of parts.  Chaos in this sense was 
added to the Oxford English Dictionary in 1997, defined as “behaviour of a system 
which is governed by deterministic laws but is so unpredictable as to appear random, 
owing to its extreme sensitivity to changes in parameters or its dependence on a large 
number of independent variables” (OED online, 1997 Additions Series).  Chaos 




subtle fallacy of a teleological, gradualist natural history by introducing ra dom 
potential to every moment.   
 The four chaotic narratives in this chapter are precocious from an ecological 
standpoint because they highly appraise random events in natural history and weave 
them into the fabric of futurity.  I do not stress interdisciplinarity by claiming that 
these works demonstrate formal mathematical chaos; such a claim would play into 
objections that literary criticism oversteps its bounds by adopting scientific tropes as 
critical methodologies.  However, the very pattern of sudden ecological punctuation 
is a timely contribution of a literary imagination.  These works are precursors to 
contemporary chaos theory because they establish how chaos might look, not in 
equations or in recursive computer modeling, but in fictional narratives where 
nature’s fabric has unraveled.  They display how chaos directs the new ecological 
vision that seized the nineteenth-century cultural imagination.  Each text 
imaginatively foreshadows the scientific theory that randomness articulates order in 




II: The Natural History of Selborne  
 
Between 1768 and 1787, Gilbert White brought to the Enlightenment’s 
resources the first in-depth, in situ study of an ecosystem.  The text has never been 
out of print since it was first published in 1789.  White’s chronicle of The Illustrated 
Natural History of Selborne, which discursively reports on several aspects of 
Selborne’s environment -- its geology, botany, and zoology in particular – is notable 
for its movement through time, with the three dimensions of space fixed in White’s 
home parish.28  His original use of phenology, the study of naturally-recurring cycles 
such as the seasons, provisionally advanced knowledge according to Enlightenment 
expectations of stability.  A devotion to ornithology, in particular, predisposed him to 
detailing species migration according to predictable annual patterns.   
Almost in spite of its design, however, The Natural History of Selborne 
deconstructs the Enlightenment sensibility of coherent, patterned nature.  By the end 
of White’s chronicle, the author views extraordinary environmental events as 
prescriptive of Selborne’s natural state.  Meteorological contingency becomes a 
principle of ecological behavior that White is determined to address, though the only 
epistemological tools at his disposal are close observation, basic measurement and 
epistolary narrative.  The latter opened the way for a new century of chaotic 
                                                
28 Like a Jane Austen novel, the wider world of colonial politics sheds only indirect light on White’s 
observations: his migrating birds have unknown harbors to the north and south; the grand oaks felled 
for £20 each are hauled off to military uses, he visits London and speculates on animal populations in 
America, but the circumference of his vision only occasionally gestures to other places than Selborne.  
Like the other works discussed in this chapter, the passage of time allows the observation of natural 
change rather than place.  This distinguishes White’s epistemological strategy from, for example, that 
of Alexander Von Humboldt, who traveled extensively in his researches on the natural world, and first 
theorized the importance of elevation to the distribution of plant types in the topography of the Andes 





environmental stories, as generations of nineteenth-century Britons adopted his t xt 
as the model for a new kind of relationship with nature based not only on eternity and 
balance, but more importantly on sublime awe and indeterminacy.      
Critics have nearly always distilled White’s text down to precisely the inverse 
of chaos by celebrating its stable Enlightenment essence.  David Allen’s important 
study of the evolution of biological science, The Naturalist in Britain (1976), invokes 
such Classical paradigms.  Selborne is “an irresistible classic: Somehow, it enshrines 
a portion of our necessary collective mythology…For it is, surely, the testament of 
Static Man: at peace with the world and with himself, content with deepening his 
knowledge of his one small corner of the earth, a being suspended in the perfect 
mental balance.  Selborne is the secret, private parish inside each one of us” (50-51).  
Though the first two-thirds of White’s chronicle are passably “at peace with the 
world” and imply the utopia of a microcosm, Allen’s Edenic summation of 
Selborne’s cultural import as a “collective mythology” that knows Paradise only as 
sunny spots of greenery is an incomplete reading.  Though the Static Man may be
responsible for outlining Selborne’s initial coordinates like creations in the Garden, 
before the end of 25 years White has grown into a much less self-assured reader of 
the complex dynamics around him.  Indeed, the opposite principles of 
unpredictability and discord come to command the narrative contours of Selborne, 
and bring it into the modern epistemological age of bewildering change.  If Selborn  
were really a chronicle recording eternal peace it would be functionally obsolete; a 
twenty-first century visitor to the parish would find very little to recognize from 




set of poignant by-gone myths about the balance of mother nature, but because White 
successfully divests the static paradigm in favor of a more frightening natural 
condition, that of discord and contingency.  White’s gift of empathy for the nature 
around him, a “much more modern gift” than mere observation, allows him to 
supersede his contemporaries with the rich texture of his chronicle and push it 
towards Romanticism (50).29  
Donald Worster’s (1994) evaluation of Selborne also figures the work within 
Enlightenment thought, though he shows how White’s work was precocious of some 
ecological concepts.  Worster emphasizes the importance of biological heterogen ity 
in the legacy of White’s work, claiming that Selborne’s diversity allowed White, “a 
man of considerable sophistication and learning, to devote his life to so small a 
terrain.  In any case, in contrast to the general mania among eighteenth-century 
British scientists for collecting and cataloguing exotic species from the farthest 
corners of the world, White’s attention was remarkably focused on this microcosm, 
the natural order of his little parish” (6).  Selborne possessed the diversity required to 
demonstrate intricate symbioses between species, the anchor of an ecological vision 
based on nature’s balance or economy (indeed, Worster’s history is entitled Nature’s 
Economy).  But the microcosm of Selborne, White would discover, was vulnerable to 
violent change and rapid degradation partially by virtue of its diminutive scope.  
                                                
29 Mary Ellen Ballanca’s recent study of naturalist journals, Daybooks of Discovery (2007), briefly 
discusses the critical reception of Selborne as an Enlightenment, static text, see especially p. 46, 75-77.  
Bellanca finds more subjective speculation-as-epistmology in White’s early journals, which she 
usefully captures as “a palimpsest of concurrent and intersecting narratives” that show “his fascination 
and delight in an ever-living yet ever-changing, ever-elusive, ever-miscellaneous nature” (77).  Thoug 
I agree with her evaluation of White’s narrative multiplicity, my reading of Selborne centers more on 
the epistemological mysteriousness borne of observing unruly nature than on White’s “delight” in 




These theories of chaotic endangerment have not been developed in the critical 
literature on Selborne.                
By 1770, two years into his study, White details the elaboration of more 
precise methods of observation, and gives himself the title of “monographer,” he who 
writes on a single, scientific subject: 
Men that undertake only one district are much more likely to advance natural 
knowledge than those that grasp at more than they can possibly be acquainted 
with: every kingdom, every province, should have its own monographer 
(125).30   
 
White’s single subject is not a taxonomic group, it is a location; his circumference is 
not defined by species, but by ecosystem.  Though Selborne is not an “ecosystem” in 
the modern biological sense of a semi-closed unit of interdependent organisms and 
their abiotic media, Selborne is a parish, the socio-political analogue to ecosystem.  A 
parish represents a territorial unit governed by a representative of the church, and 
geography operates on the bordering phenomena of mountains, rivers, and oceans.  
White’s parish-ecosystem, then, revisits the limiting principles of ancient feudal 
territories: The Anglo-Saxon estate established borders by defensibility, a highly 
geographical consideration that holds connections with the ecological relations of an 
area.  Selborne is not a coastal parish, nor is it featured like the midlands.  White 
celebrates the microcosm of Selborne for the biodiversity it holds as a southern parcel 
                                                
30 The OED shows White’s use of “monographer” in 1770 as the first in the language.  The next 
citation, from 1826, is from an introduction to Entomology that identifies Apollodorus as the “first 
monographer of insects.”  Later in his own narrative, White advises that “A good monography of 
worms would afford much entertainment and information at the same time, and would open a large and 
new field in natural history” (197).  This monograph was not to appear until Charles Darwin’s The 
Formation of Vegetable Mould through the Action of Worms (1881), a work that does not 




of land not far from the sea, and its feudal history assures the circumscribed 
autonomy necessary for a monographic study.31       
  Over the course of four letters he comes to realize the strong potential of this 
serendipitous method of monography-by-location.  It began with simple recording 
designed to enable a more detailed report.  But even from this commonplace, White’s
instincts push his science towards innovation: 
For many months I carried a list in my pocket of the birds that were to be 
remarked, and, as I rode or walked about my business, I noted each day the 
continuance or omission of each bird’s song; so that I am as sure of the 
certainty of my facts as a man can be of any transaction whatsoever…(117)    
 
The key concept here is White’s notice of “omission” in migratory patterns.  Not 
merely the presence of an individual from an identifiable species, but also the absence 
becomes formalized towards facts in the natural history of Selborne.  Here is a crucial 
turn in methods of ecological knowledge: science was accustomed to in-depth study 
of apparent, observable, material entities, but it had no way of getting to the gaps and 
absences that are equally important to understanding patterns of species distribution 
through time, especially in disturbed environments.  White’s pocketed list 
accumulates the + of presence alongside the 0 of absence, and observation gains a 
new dimension of explanatory power by making use of both a phenomenon (the red-
breast was singing today) as well as its inverse.  White was eager to formalize his 
                                                
31 The opening passage locates Selborne geographically, with a balanced tone that appreciates both 
self-containment and diversity: “The parish of Selborne lies in the extreme eastern corner of the county 
of Hampshire…is about fifty miles southwest of Londo, in latitude 51…Being very large and 
extensive, it abuts on twelve parishes…The soils of this district are almost as various and diversified as 
the views and aspects” (7).  The ornithologist White is proud of Selbone’s literal containment of the 
great bird menagerie: “Selborne parish alone can and h s exhibited at times more than half the birds 
that are ever seen in all Sweden…Let me also add that it as shown near half the species that were ever 
known in Great Britain” (96).  These passages secure the parish of Selborne as an ecological 
microcosm, and anticipate the modern philosophy of ‘bi regionalism’ advocated by environmentalists 




methods of observation and recording in a way that begins to resemble early 
population ecology.32    
Before White, the commonsense assumption was that where a species is not 
found, that species is not to be studied.  His decision to focus on the organic 
interactions and environmental events of his home parish provides a crucial trial of 
the stability through time that Natural History had assumed to be inherent to crea ed 
nature.  By focusing on a single place through time, and appreciating the elucidating 
power of a negative phenomenon, White was able to narrate the scientific observation 
of ecological variation, and even irreversible change in its fundamental patterns.  This 
discovery is far afield from White’s original phenological rationale to formalize the 
reliable and unvarying episodes that guided Selborne through the cycle of a cosmic 
year.  Extraordinary events of environmental disturbance (cold, heat, drought, 
landslide, extinction) become more and more frequently White’s occasion for writing 
on some phenomenon, especially for the letters of the 1780s.  Because of its 
innovative methodology, White’s Selborne implicitly disavows Classical cycles set in 
eternity, and looks towards modern contingency with some trepidation.     
The widespread appeal of White’s chronicle rests partially on his caring and 
concerned voice for all the non-human denizens of Selborne; he shows more affection 
for oaks, turtles and worms than for the “hordes of gypsies which infest the south and 
                                                
32 His note on the distribution of animals in Selborne leads to pressing contemporary questions about 
nature in America, and further speculation: “how [animals] came [to America], and whence? is too 
puzzling for me to answer; and yet so obvious as often to have struck me with wonder.  If one looks 
into the writers on that subject little satisfaction is to be found.  Ingenious men will readily advance 
plausible arguments to support whatever theory theys all chuse to maintain; but then the misfortune 
is, every one’s hypothesis is as good as another’s, since they are all founded on conjecture” (65).  
White is asking how the biology of populations could study distribution patterns, and how ecological 
hypotheses themselves are to be tested empirically.  Later I will discuss his avant-garde observations f 
wasp populations.  The predator-prey relationship is one of several in the ecological sciences to make 




west of England” (179).  The results of human activity are too-often destructive of h
peaceable web of species in Selborne: where the oak is felled, the intrepid mother 
bird is struck dead (11); where hunters are unreasonable in their kills, the partridges 
and red deer become rare or extinct, leaving a “gap” in Fauna Selborniensis (22); 
lowly worms are essential to soil health (196).  White writes, 
Earthworms, though in appearance a small and despicable link in the chain of 
Nature, yet, if lost, would make a lamentable chasm…Worms probably 
provide new soil for hills and slopes where the rain washes the earth away; 
and they affect slopes, probably to avoid being flooded.  Gardeners and 
farmers express their detestation of worms…But these men would find that 
the earth without worms would become cold, hard-bound, and void of 
fermentation; and consequently sterile. (196)      
 
White’s religious-Enlightenment paradigm of the great chain of being is here stressed 
by these undeniable gaps and chasms in the interdependent biotic network.  His point 
falls hard on the ignorance of humans, when even those who make a living from the 
earth, the farmers and gardeners, assume the subordination of other species rather 
than their natural synergy.  As White observes, nature’s economy is a precondition to 
stability; when that economy is violated, surprising imbalances become manifest and 
have noticeable effects on the web of life.  The over-hunted red deer is now a specter 
of seventeenth-century Selborne, and other populations inevitably become stressed 
under the hunters’ sights.  Since humans are part of, rather than elevated over the
economy of nature, White’s advice is to place intrinsic value in diversity, a 
fundamental prerequisite to conservation.   
 White’s history shifts from an occasional tone of lamentation for a species lost 




meteorological events of the 1780s.33  With a gathering appreciation for the power of 
sporadic weather over the course of 25 years, the narrative gains momentum by 
considering the effects of climate anomalies on established ecological relationships.  
White explicitly brings meteorology, the study of the unpredictable or “meteoric,” 
into Selborne’s history:  
 Since the weather of a district is undoubtedly part of its natural history, I shall 
make no further apology for the four following letters, which will contain 
many particulars concerning some of the great frosts and a few respecting 
some very hot summers, that have distinguished themselves from the rest 
during the course of my observations. (253)       
 
This letter, number 61 out of 66 total, opens an extended exposition of sublime 
phenomena noted objectively as temperature and barometrical readings, but also 
attendant to the subjective psychological affect of the unusual, and even the 
unprecedented, in these surprising turns of natural history.  White is never able to 
return to his initially calm narrative voice that observes cyclical, consiste t patterns 
from the commonplace of Deistic design, or Enlightenment intelligibility.   
His language comes to rely on exceptional terms quite foreign to a natural 
theology based on the balanced economy of nature: paradox, severity, loathsome, 
amazing, tremendous, extraordinary, portentous, superstitious, strange, prodigious, 
violent, deluging, convulsed, and fierce all appear as descriptors in the final seres of 
letters (253-268).  The four letters that detail sudden and unseasonable extremes of 
warmth and cold prepare the reader for the last two entries, which detail the 
                                                
33 A primer for the narrative tone at the end of Selborne comes when a landslide, caused by a sudden 
massive thaw, tears a “huge fragment” hundreds of yards down a steep slope.  Houses, woods, and 
farm fields are “strangely torn and disordered” by the mysterious event; all witnesses agree “that no 
tremor of the ground, indicating an earthquake, was ever felt” (222-223).  In this as in other 
apocalyptic passages, White offers little speculation as to the causes; he seems to enjoy lingering in the 




atmospheric effects of 1783’s Laki volcano eruption in Iceland and the sublime 
thunderstorms that accompanied this many-leveled catastrophe.  White uses these 
extreme observations rhetorically, as well as epistemologically: the ethos stablished 
by his talent for close and patient description measures his brave new narrative of 
wild weather and brings to those passages a face-value believability that would have 
been lost in the work of more histrionic writers.  White feels the need to “make no 
further apology” for the unorthodox content of his final letters; he feels confident as a 
respectable member of establishment science, as well as an independent-thinking 
scholar who knows the subject of his monography better than anyone else.  Though 
Enlightenment natural history purports equal-access to the facts of nature, rendering 
the history’s author irrelevant (the fraternity of equality based on an ideal of objective 
observation), White has come to possess Selborne as his own epistemological 
microcosm.  Its own dynamic of nature makes intelligible the movements of a larger
natural world, and he knows that his audience is eager to learn the lessons of the 
model, however surprised they are by its sudden recalcitrance.  
White himself is surprised.  Sudden, unseasonable changes in temperature 
determine the biological character of entire years, they are not merely passing 
inconveniences of physical discomfort.  On the cold front, White “would infer that it 
is the repeated melting and freezing of the snow that is so fatal to vegetation, rather 
than the severity of the cold…thaws often originate under ground from warm vapours 
which arise…cold seems to descend from above…the author had occasion to go to 
London through a sort of Laplandian-scene, very wild and grotesque indeed” (253, 




less damaging to the biotic community than is equinoctial vicissitude.  Vacillation 
around a freezing temperature, especially during the growing season, is fatal to crops 
and ornamental plants, though it may be less apparently uncomfortable to humans.   
 Conversely, the summer extremes also bring variable effects:  “The summers 
of 1781 and 1783 were unusually hot and dry…The great pests of the garden are 
wasps, which destroy all the finer fruits just as they are coming into perfection.  In 
1781 we had none, in 1783 there were myriads” (263).  In the twentieth-century 
ecology portion of Donald Worster’s history (entitled “Disturbing Nature”), Worster 
revisits Gilbert White by discussing this passage on the wasps.  He calls the 
observations in this letter  
an example of nature’s irregularities that had continued right down to the 
present.  The point was that species did not all exhibit the same demographic 
patterns.  Some remained numerically constant over long periods of time, 
others oscillated greatly from generation to generation but always around a 
stable long-term norm, while still others fluctuated radically each year, with no 
apparent norm, even when weather conditions were steady, suggesting there 
was something chaotic in their genetic makeup or response to the 
environment…the variability found among species made the science of 
ecology far more complicated than had long been supposed. [my italics] 
(1994: 410)  
 
White has no desire to elide or simplify these chaotic patterns that become apparnt 
when closely observed and recorded over years’ time.  Though he did not have the 
conceptual or quantitative tools to elucidate the mysteries of population fluctuation, 
his work effectively acknowledges a problem that the science of ecology would come 
towards modeling more than 200 years later.34   
                                                
34 The first mathematical model came with the famed Lotka-Volterra equations of the 1920s, which 
concentrated on the predator-prey dynamic as an isolated, strictly interspecies system without relation 
to environmental variation.  In twenty-first century population biology, as described by theoretical 
ecologist Peter Chesson, “there is growing theoretical interest in understanding how pattern in the 




Culminating the wasp-laden summer of 1783, the Laki volcano in Iceland 
erupted, rendering the season  
an amazing and portentous one, and full of horrible phenomena; for, besides 
the alarming meteors and tremendous thunder-storms that affrighted and 
distressed the different counties of this kingdom, the peculiar haze, or smokey 
fog, that prevailed for many weeks in this island, and in every part of Europe, 
and even beyond its limits, was a most extraordinary appearance, unlike 
anything known within the memory of man…the country people began to 
look with superstitious awe, at the red, louring aspect of the sun; and indeed 
there was reason for the most enlightened person to be apprehensive… (265) 
 
Though White has generally been able to maintain his enlightened distance from the 
superstitious masses in the interest of forwarding good observational, objective 
science, here he appeals to the forthcoming Romantic discourse that appreciates the 
awesomeness of natural forces as he admits to their irreducible mystery.  Though 
frosts and heat waves are damaging of a baseline species routine, and may render a 
growing season less productive, they are small anomalies in comparison to this 
extraordinary event that caused widespread famine, stifling air pollution acr ss 
Europe, and a particularly severe winter into 1784.35   
Benjamin Franklin, on the other side of the Atlantic, is another Enlightenment 
figure who found that this volcanic eruption and its effects beggared reason.  
                                                                                                                                          
researchers appreciate that it is time to for the next step in which the role of physical environmental 
variation is a focus in theoretical models. There is also a growing realization that the details of how 
population and community patterns are affected by physical environmental pattern are every bit as 
fascinating as the details of endogenously generated pattern.”  One of the studies outlined in Chesson’s 
(2003) summary involves “the rich interplay between no linear population dynamics and temporal 
environmental variability in a predator-prey model.  [The researchers] show that the resulting 
population dynamics can look like chaos, as defined for noisy systems, and emphasize the care 
necessary for interpreting the nature of the fluctuations seen in short time series of population 
densities” (Abstract).  When population ecology takes account of a variable environment over years’ 
time, the system often shows non-linear and emergent properties consistent with chaotic dynamics.    
35 Dr. John Grattan of Aberystwyth University, Wales, has studied local parish records from 1783-1784 
across England, and concludes that the Laki eruption killed 23,000 British men and women, which 
would make it “the greatest natural disaster in modern British history.”  An estimated 120 Million tons 
of sulfur dioxide was emitted, which is three times the total industrial output of Europe in 2006 




Franklin, not knowing whether a volcano was involved, called the phenomenon a 
“universal fog,” and forthrightly rendered the mystery a useful predictive mechanism.  
If dry summer fogs were to become a new reality, “men might from such fogs 
conjecture the probability of succeeding hard winter, and of the damage to be 
expected by the breaking up of frozen rivers in the spring; and take such measures as 
are possible and practicable, to secure themselves and effects from the misci fs that 
attended the last” (377).  Franklin wishes to secure a useful indicator out of a 
confusing phenomenon.  But for White, mischief of the most imaginative variety, 
rather than rational predictiveness, takes over his prose.  He seems particularly 
fascinated by the solar warp and decay affected by the dense smoke; appealing to 
sublime imagery, the sun in 1783 “looked as blank as a clouded moon…but was 
particularly lurid and blood-coloured at rising and setting” (265).   
White turns to the resource of literature to make a lasting image of this 
apocalyptic summer.  He writes, “Milton’s noble simile of the sun, in his first book of 
Paradise Lost, frequently occurred to my mind…it alludes to a superstitious kind of 
dread, with which the minds of men are always impressed by such strange and 
unusual phenomena” (265).  The passage he quotes abuts a description of Satan as the 
“Arch-Angel ruin’d…th’excess of Glory obscur’d” (PL.I.593-594); having fallen, 
Satan’s full angelic sun is occluded by his moral corruption, and his legions are filled 
“with fear of change” (598).  Though Satan’s band of fallen angels organizes in ranks,
and they emit “A shout that tore Hell’s Concave, and beyond / Frighted the Reign of 
Chaos and old Night” (ll. 542-543), the revolution itself is a principle of disorder set 




this ensanguined sun following Laki’s eruption as a principle of corruption and error. 
The Laki phenomenon is neither to be ignored, nor can it be fully explained away; it 
partakes of the chaotic, rebellious dark side of the cosmos.  And it is, without 
question, portentous of some set of environmental disturbances yet to come: at the 
very least, it unleashes earthquakes in Italy, sulfurous summer thunderstorms in 
Selborne and dusty, cold winters throughout the northern hemisphere.  As Satan has 
only begun to cause trouble in the balanced, hierarchical world of God’s creation, 
White confers a nagging sense of augury surrounding these “horrible phenomena.”  
Between Milton’s classical use of the Chaos trope and the contemporary, dynamical 
denotation, Gilbert White negotiates his observations in a bewildering scheme of 
random/predictability.      
Selborne’s final letter recounts a particularly violent thunderstorm in 1784, 
usually a rare event in Selborne because the parish is girdled by diverting hills.  New 
technology brings the narrative atmosphere towards the nineteenth-century by 
anticipating moments of drama that writers like Mary Shelley would develop int 
poignant intersections of science and literature.  White writes, “no storm was in sight, 
nor within hearing, yet the air was strongly electric; for the bells of an electric 
machine at that place rang repeatedly, and fierce sparks were discharged” (268).   The 
electric principle, which formed the basis of new theories on the nature of life, was 
alive and detectable in the unsettled air over Selborne.  But its purpose was disperse  
and indeterminate; there was no discernable pattern to this meteorological behavior, 
and White is left only with his role as observer, admittedly finding in these strange 




Somewhat abruptly, Gilbert White concludes his chronicle to his known and trusted 
public with a self-effacing, and revealing, adieu: “As the length of my 
correspondence has sufficiently put your patience to the test, I shall here tak  a 
respectful leave of you and natural history together” (268).  Natural history of the 
Classical period has succumbed to modern contingency; this historian leaves the stage 
accompanied by the uncertainty for which scientists would need to develop a 
quantitative language to identify.   
This reading of environmental contingency in White’s Natural History of 
Selborne has, I believe, complicated the perennial reception of the text as the 
narrative epitome of Enlightenment stability and ecological balance.  The work is 
innovative for several complementary reasons: its use of monography allows a 
microcosmic vision that anticipates the development of the ecosystem concept 
(credited to Roy Clapham and Arthur Tansley, ecologists of the 1930s); White 
observes and begins to theorize the extinction phenomenon due to human activity, 
which he images as gaps in the great chain of being; his predisposition to observe 
economy in nature by no means blinds him to the importance of extreme, 
unpredictable weather and its downstream effects through many seasons and across 
species.  These elements of chaotic modernity in Selborne culminate in the 
chronicle’s fragmentation, where the author divests his audience and his science at 
once.  There is no indication in the text that White is particularly disconsolate as  
result of his modern observations, but there is a sense that the phenomena are beyond 
the state of the science.  Less than a century later, John Ruskin would lament the 




of the Nineteenth Century” (1884), putting to rest all doubt that anthropogenic 
activity could sink a malaise into the atmosphere.36  Like White, Ruskin used his 
longstanding diary entries on particulars of the weather as a basis for identify ng 
meteorological anomaly amid a background stable state.  Ruskin in 1884, unlike 
White in 1783, had the ecological effects of industrial emissions to aid his 
understanding of why and whence these events sporadically seize the elements.   
                                                
36 Ruskin’s language begs to be quoted for its pure energy and industrial gothic imagination:  The 
plague-wind “looks partly as if it were made of poisonous smoke; very possibly it may be: there are at 
least two hundred furnace chimneys in a square of tw  miles on every side of me.  But mere smoke 
would not blow to and fro in that wild way.  It looks more to me as if it were made of dead men’s souls 
– such of them as are not gone yet where they have to go, and may be flitting higher and thither, 




III: The Last Man  
 
Mary Shelley’s novel The Last Man (1826) appears to be a fiction far 
removed from the natural history chronicle of White’s Selborne.  Divided by genre 
and composed under the auspices of a different cultural climate, the two works 
nevertheless find common ground in their mutual concern for elucidating nature’s 
patterns of dissolution, and both balk in the face of nature’s chaotic plots.  Shelley’s 
work appeared as one of many “last man” narratives during the economic depression 
of the 1820s, long after the French Revolution fervor of the 1790s had chilled.  A 
subsequent nationalistic conservatism reactionary to the political agitations of 1816-
1819 kept radical writers under relative cover.  Influenced by her knowledge of 
Malthus, The Last Man depicts the environmental checks on population that the 
famous economist had used as an argument against Enlightenment utopianism.  It is 
one of the first of a series of nineteenth-century Thames Valley catastrophes; stories 
that form their own sub-genre by destabilizing the British identity during its colonial 
apogee.  Like the later nineteenth-century catastrophe novels, which include After 
London and The Time Machine, Shelley’s literary device for knocking down British 
narcissism is invoking the powers of a wild, witch-like mother nature.  The 
contingencies and anomalies of European weather in 1816 caused by the eruption of 
Indonesian volcano Tambora provided conditions for a ghost story contest for which 
Shelley wrote Frankenstein.  Shelley’s flint-stone for sparking a human catastrophe 
on the scale of The Last Man is again wild weather and its weapon of disease.  Her 




Shelley’s vision is a tragedy of humanity’s final, peripatetic years of suffering 
at the hands of a universal plague.  A reader diagramming the hero, Lionel Verney, on 
his peripatetic journey could articulate an unbroken line that wanders circularly 
through Great Britain and, later, through the European continent as the survivors 
grow more desperate.  The prolix account of his physical movements evinces a 
narrative mainstay of continuity because the novel progresses from the classic 
autobiographical beginning, “I am the native of a sea-surrounded nook…” to the 
promised resolution, “behold the tiny bark, freighted with Verney – the LAST MAN” 
(9, 470).   
But the apparent coherence and predetermination of narrative course in 
Shelley’s novel is misleading.  The frame of The Last Man, co tained in the preface, 
introduces a second author of the narrative, an unnamed vacationer who discovers, in 
1818, the “Sibylline leaves” that are rendered into Verney’s prophecy in novel form.37  
The Last Man is a narrative of fused fragments confused by time: anterior events are 
eventually seen to be posterior.  The 1818 discovery of the Leaves near Naples 
postdates the end of Verney’s tale, in 2100.  This initial narrator, whom the reader 
never again encounters after the preface, defines his editorial role of constructive 
dissemination:  
I present the public with my latest discoveries in the slight Sibylline pages.  
Scattered and unconnected as they were, I have been obliged to add links, and 
                                                
37 Shelley’s Frankenstein is a doubly-framed novel, a device that the author uses to great effect for 
manipulating point of view, narrative reliability, and temporal continuity.  Though Shelley’s use of 
framing in The Last Man is much more cursory, her ongoing devotion to this technique shows that 
there was some intentionality behind the preface, and undeniably its information complicates our 
understanding of the novel.  One could claim that te preface’s sole purpose is to seal off logical 
objections that the narrative of a last man would have no readers further in time, but her placement of 
the preface anterior to the agonies depicted in the narrative gestures to a m re essential, if enigmatic, 
role for these initial five pages (out of nearly 500 total).  It engages readings of prophecy delivered by 




model the work into a consistent form…Sometimes I have thought that, 
obscure and chaotic as they are, they owe their present form to me, their 
decipherer…My only excuse for thus transforming them, is that they were 
unintelligible in their pristine condition (6-7).   
 
These “obscure and chaotic” fragments of a narrative are assembled in a certain order, 
one that is doggedly in pursuit of coherence and causality, part of our collective 
cognitive predisposition.  In their discovered form they were admittedly 
“unintelligible,” and this undeveloped outer-frame narrator claims responsibility for 
whatever makes causal sense in the unfolding of events, including his temerity to 
compose “links” between fractured episodes.  Immediately, the apparent narrative 
continuity of Shelley’s long novel is compromised by the conditions from which the 
text emerged.  The tale of Verney, the Last Man, possesses none of its initial 
coherence when the traveler in 1818 discovers the story’s fragments in a remote cave.  
This man (or woman) after the last man organizes a coherent story from the material 
chaos of a shredded prophecy from the future; the authorship of The Last Man is
smeared between the wills of two composing minds dispersed in non-linear time.  As 
Sophie Thomas (2000) notes, “where fragments of prophecy are discovered before 
the time of the prophecy’s putative fulfillment, we have a document of what ill have 
been” (35).  Shelley’s complicated scheme of succession defies temporal causation.  
Thomas continues, “I suggest that the novel is in fact driven by, or generated from, 
the dynamic established by its relation to the preface, while remaining u able either 
to fulfill or complete it, or even in a sense to arrive at it” (36).   
Since the disparate worlds of 1818 and 2100 are denied even their temporal 




disaster in 1818, readers are left with a chaos of causation.38  For a novel so poor in 
futuristic detail (the only technological advance in the late twenty-first century is a 
winged transport balloon), the narrative scheme itself is notably post-modern.39  The 
outer narrator claims to bring sense to the chaotic fragments by imposing narrative 
order.  Readers are given a narrative that has been doubly-worked to display 
harmony, causation, and coherence out of a background of random disorder.  Any 
appearance of order, to a sensitive reader of The Last Man, is based on an illusive 
cognitive drive that interprets order from randomness rather than a reflection of he 
order of things in an objective sense.   
 Shelley’s discernment between art and artifact is revealing.  It allows 
authorship to remain indeterminate, and worries the fabric of classic linear narr tive 
form so as to experiment with a diachronic and dialectic relation of origins.  The 
fossil record was Enlightenment natural history’s Rosetta Stone for translaing the 
life-forms of the deep past into a set of historically-fixed markers of ev lutionary 
progression.  But the fossil record was famously imperfect, rife with gaps between 
pieces of evidence, and Charles Darwin in Origin was forced to explain away this 
layered text that was “a history of the world imperfectly kept, and written in a 
                                                
38 “Narrative chaos” is an angle on chaotic aesthetics that literary criticism has embraced.  Volumes 
including Hayles (1991), Parker (2007), Conte (2002), Palumbo (2001), and Livingston (1997) look at 
narrative dynamics (especially in twentieth-century literature, and particularly in Joyce) through a 
post-structural lens of non-linearity and contingency.  Science fiction and the visual aesthetics of 
chaos, including fractalization, are more recent avenues for this kind of work.  Shelley’s novel is 
surprisingly modern because of its unusual scheme of embedding multiple texts and authors in non-
linear time, but these eccentricities have not been described using the chaos trope.      
 
39 Carolyn Merchant has imagined what form a chaotic narrative of natural history might take: “What 
would a chaotic, nonlinear, nongendered history with a different plot look like? … A post-modern 
history might posit characteristics other than those identified with modernism, such as a multiplicity of 
real actors; acausal, nonsequentioal events; nonesse tialized symbols and meanings; many authorial 
voices, rather than one; dialectical action and process, rather than the imposed logos of form; situated 
and contextualized, rather than universal, knowledge.  It would be a story (or multiplicity of stories) 




changing dialect” because its aesthetic of fragmentation was so baldlyopposed to the 
consummate Victorian’s coherent, constant principle of natural selection (312).  Only 
evolutionists of the twentieth-century (most notably Stephen Jay Gould and Niles 
Eldredge) have accepted that the existing fossil record is true to the pattern of natural 
history: sporadic, inconstant, contingent, and yet eventually affecting higher-ord r 
biological complexity.  Without a doubt, grand coherent narratives can be wrought 
from historical shards, but these narratives inevitably owe some of their effect to what 
Yeats called “the artifice of eternity.”  Like the diffuse fossils that supported so many 
conceptual advances in the life sciences, the Sibylline Leaves are the true twenty-first 
century artifact, and their quilting into coherent narrative form allows their 
consumption by the nineteenth-century reading public.  Ironically, Shelley’s novel 
has received much more positive attention from her inheritors than it did from her 
contemporaries: The Last Man o ly came to widespread critical appraisal after a new 
edition was printed in American in 1965 (Parrinder 1995: 66).  It came back on the 
literary scene once its time, environmentally and in literary theory, had fin lly 
arrived.    
 The plot itself revises the age-old story of the plague from Biblical traditions, 
but it grows beyond known cyclical patterns of population checks into a new 
precedent that marks humans for outright extinction imposed by their environment.  
The plague as a living entity acts sporadically amid an otherwise one-way progression 
to the end.  Widespread confusion on many (categorical) levels surrounds speculation 
about the plague: it diffuses in winter, but appears capable of altering the environment 




noted in war-torn Constantinople, but only arrives in England from an American ship 
(originary); earth-bound disease is accompanied by extraterrestrial anomalies like the 
tri-partite solar eclipse, which compels a tidal wave over Dover (catastrophist); only 
one inoculation is ever known to occur, that of Verney himself by the “negro half-
clad” squatting in his London abode (epidemiological); the final two deaths in the 
narrative are caused by drowning, not by the universal pestilence (eschatologic l).  
From the above, we note that the plague is indeterminate of origin, it flourishes in 
coordination with an alien Nature that increasingly accommodates its infectiousness, 
cosmic events portend ill, but bear no known relation to the sublunary pestilence, 
human imperviousness is shown to be possible, but unrepeatable, and the promised 
finale of universal plague-death is denied by an alternative and more conventional 
fate.   
Each of these indeterminate dynamics deserves analysis when it comes to 
understanding Shelley’s invocation of narrative chaos, but I will confine the present 
study to the ecological anomaly of climate change and its relationship to the advance 
of the plague.  Where Frankenstein made so much of the sublime terror evoked by the 
vast arctic plains, ending with the blind image of the creature “lost in darkness a d 
distance,” The Last Man capitalizes on the paradoxical horror of a too-pleasant nature 
mocking psychological despair.  Earth again becomes a garden of “grateful 
vicissitude,” to use Milton’s phrase, but its inhabitants are, by the end, only the beasts 
of the field.  The early arrival of the warm season indicates that the survivors’ annual 
plague-trial has arrived.  Mother Nature as a figure reveals her vindictive, witch-like 




Nature, our mother, and our friend, had turned on us a brow of menace.  She 
shewed us plainly, that, though she permitted us to assign her laws and subdue 
her apparent powers, yet, if she put forth but a finger, we must quake.  She 
could take our globe, fringed with mountains, girded by the atmosphere, 
containing the condition of our being, and all that man’s mind could invent or 
his force achieve; she could take the ball in her hand, and cast it into space, 
where life would be drunk up, and man and all his efforts for ever annihilated. 
(230) 
 
This willful, destructive witch of Nature is a characterization that is frequently linked 
to chaos ecology and it was originally embodied as the fallen Eve in the Western 
tradition.40   
For Shelley, a witch-like Nature is more of a psychological affect than it is an 
accurate description of how the natural world appears in her narrative of the 
advancing plague.  Any appearance of order that Enlightenment characters like 
Raymond and Adrian (Percy Shelley) had espoused in their grand soliloquies is 
exposed as cognitive fantasy, mere delusion.  Nature is chaotic and indeterminate in 
her behavior towards humans whether, meteorologically speaking, she rages or she 
purrs.  The latter pattern of inverse causality is perhaps more alarming by virtue of its 
ironic potential: 
 The sun came out, and mocking the usual laws of nature, seemed even at this 
early season to burn with solsticial force.  It was no consolation, that with the 
first winds of March the lanes were filled with violets, the fruit trees covered 
with blossoms, that the corn sprung up, and the leaves came out, forced by the 
unseasonable heat.  We feared the balmy air – we feared the cloudless sky, the 
flower-covered earth, and delightful woods; for we looked on the fabric of the 
universe no longer as our dwelling, but our tomb. (270) 
                                                
40 Feminist ecocritics have identified three ways that modern Western culture has characterized nature: 
As virgin Eve, fallen Eve, and mother Eve.  Merchant suggests that “Chaos is the reemergence of 
nature as power over humans, nature as active, dark, wild, turbulent, and uncontrollable (fallen Eve).  
Ecologists characterize ‘mother nature’ as a ‘strange attractor,’ while turbulence is seen to be encoded 
with gendered images of masculine channels and feminine flows.  Moreover, in the chaotic narrative, 
humans lose the hubris of fallen Adam that the garden can be re-created on earth.  The world is not 
created by a patriarchal God ex nihilo, but emerges out of chaos.  Thus the very possibility of the 
recovery of a stable original garden – the plot of the recovery meta-narrative – is itself challenged” 





The tone of each of these passages of contained horror is informed by a Malthusian 
worldview, which of course helped Charles Darwin envision how survival itself was a 
virtue that affected evolutionary progress.  Malthus’s essay on the Principles of 
Population (1798) proposed that the plights of human experience (war, famine, 
disease) could not be wholly extirpated by Enlightenment human institutions such a  
democratic government, intensive technological farming, and enhanced medical 
technology.  Shelley’s father William Godwin, an Enlightenment political idealist, 
wrote a voluminous refutation of Malthus’s Principles of Population, the essay that 
sent the nineteenth-century intellectual world into a moral spin.  However, as critics 
have noted, Mary Shelley’s novel consistently builds, and then systematically 
destroys, schemes of Enlightenment-rational and Romantic-imaginative hope 
developed by her characters.41  The Last Man is a Malthusian work without recourse 
to the more salubrious consequence of evolution of any kind.  Shelley takes the 
notion one step further by envisioning a world in which even Edenic, productive, 
nurturing Nature has no succor for the cursed human race.  Much worse than 
providing a challenge to survival, Lionel Verney comes to know the pleasant natural 
world as a set of false signs that belie an inexorable fate of death-by-disease.  Perhaps 
her point is that order and causation are illusive hopes, manifestations of an 
overwrought cognitive capacity rather than a true mirror of larger intelligible forces at 
work in the cosmos.  Verney returns again and again to microcosm images of order 
and containment lost to chaotic indeterminacy at the narrative level.  His last though s 
                                                
41 Morton Paley’s introduction to the Oxford edition (1998) enumerates the roller-coaster cycles of 
hope and despair through the course of the plague’s advance.  The “delusion of the earthly paradise” 
theme simultaneously indicts the idealist aims of art, policy, science, and religion, and undermines 




play at the now-familiar binary: alone among great works of art in Rome, Verney 
describes his soul in “wheeling circuits round and round this spot, [when] suddenly it 
fell ten thousand fathom deep, into the abyss of the present – into self-knowledge – 
into tenfold sadness” (463).          
 By virtue of its thematic relevance to modern public health concerns, the 
figure of chaotic narrative, and the framing scheme of narrative-out-of-fragments, 
The Last Man has risen from the ashes of its initial public reception in 1826.  As part 
of the post-modern legacy, our twenty-first century world of environmental 
indeterminacy has come to appreciate the apocalyptic vision of which The Last Man 
is an archetypal exemplar.  Patrick Parrinder points out how Shelley’s “secular 
eschatology” became a popular notion in later nineteenth-century fiction, laying  
foundation for the other two works I’ll consider in this chapter, Richard Jefferies’s 
After London and H.G. Wells’s The Time Machine (58).  These novels are part of the 
cohort of “Thames Valley Catastrophe” narratives that grew out of gothic, urban, 
industrial themes familiar to the Victorian imagination.    
Shelley’s work is a dirge for her portion of the Romantic period.  But even 
with this funereal, backward-looking exigency, Shelley seems determined to crea e
something new in her vision of human fate, and out of a deep personal sadness, to 
bring forth a text that arrives at a new way of knowing the world.  Her fictional proxy 
Lionel Verney is touched by an excerpt from Macbeth, which he hears at a London 
theatre during the plague years: “Alas, poor country, almost afraid to know itself. I  
cannot be called our mother but our grave…where violent sorrow seems a modern 




things worth writing better than anyone else could.  But Shelley’s violent sorrow is 
modern because her way of knowing the world is through acknowledging that it can’t 
be known absolutely, but only gestured towards in fragments of vision.  By releasing 
those fragments, one gains the hope that they, like the Sibylline Leaves, will fuse into 




IV: After London, or, Wild England 
 
 Richard Jefferies’s novel that imagines a post-apocalyptic Great Britin, After 
London (1885), can be read as a continuation of Shelley’s drama of human decline.  
Though the texts have many differences, perhaps the most important being Jefferies’s 
sensitivity to the pernicious effects of industrial pollution on his late-nineteeth 
century environment, their manifest similarities keep this thread of argument based on 
chaotic narrative intact.  Jefferies’s novel describes the nature and culture of a world 
approximately a century after the great majority of humans have perished, and he 
develops an innovative narrative about the chance-driven succession of species 
radiating to fill opened niches.  The cause for humanity’s near-extinction was, as in 
Shelley, a great worldwide plague.  The narrator describes the prudent supersition 
held among the remaining humans to shun the physical relics of the old world: 
 They say when they are stricken with ague or fever that they must have 
unwittingly slept on the site of an ancient habitation.  Nor can the ground be 
cultivated near the ancient towns, because it causes fever … No sooner does 
the plow or the spade turn up an ancient site than those who work there are 
attacked with illness. (46)     
 
Though the plague haunts this scene, it is a specter of the past easily meliorated by 
distance, temporal and spatial.  Humanity itself has survived in pockets to form 
revolutionized, primitive societies, and nature, by Jefferies’s conceit, can be studied 
for its intriguing evolutions in the primordial post-modern.   
 Jeremy Hooker’s (1996) extensive writing on Jefferies includes the 
observation that the author repeatedly reacts to a “crisis of modernity” in his nature-
infused works (38).  By invoking revolutionary natural forces in After London, 




and courting this neo-wild Nature as an actor in her own right, in the foreground of 
his attention, with human actors pushed to secondary roles (43).  But Hooker’s 
reading is wholly occupied with these secondary human relations in After London, 
and the fascinating agonist of a liberated natural world never receives ample 
consideration.  My reading details the scientific insights of Jefferies’s theories of the 
new nature after industrial times.  Jefferies lived in the age of Darwin, and benefited 
from the insights of evolution by natural selection without fully subscribing to a 
Darwinian worldview.  He sought after a more synthesized scheme that factored in 
natural selection, species and population dynamics, and environment as contributing 
factors in evolutionary ecology.  In a notebook he wrote: “Natural selection a true
cause, modifying, but not sufficient cause to explain all phenomena.  Climate a true 
cause but not sufficient” (quoted in Looker 166).  He was able to sketch out these 
evolutionary synergies in After London, which figures catastrophe, extinction, 
founder effects, succession, and environmental pollution as ecological concepts. 
The first section, entitled “The Relapse into Barbarism,” is the most 
precociously ecological portion of what is otherwise a classically heroic, pastoral 
romance.  Its relevance to later ecological thought is borne on the contingencies the 
narrator recognizes in his version of natural history, contingencies made cle r by the 
scientific methods of close observation and hypothesizing that the narrator employs to 
make sense of the past.  At the novel’s narrative level, history is a selection of the 
relics of individual conversations; there is no master volume that tells the whole of 
the apocalypse story, as The Last Man presented itself (under false pretenses, as we 




of comparative relativity, involving “various traditions” without appealing to the 
classical ideal of “ultimate truth.”  Truth, as an epistemological monolith, has been 
worn down to fragments by the extenuating effects of the natural catastrophe; the 
fragments of various oral testimonies can approach, but will never arrive, at a single 
Truth.   
On another level of contingency, narrative history is estranged from Truth 
because it is borne on a series of inscrutable ecological events.  The evolutionary 
succession that follows this man-made universal flood (another secularized 
apocalypse) is random and chaotic rather than teleological, as I will discuss later.  By 
saying “the truth was lost,” the narrator implies that Truth itself is extinct, buried like 
a fossil in the shambles of past memory and the cryptic physical evidence in the new 
world.  In this vision, as in a court of law, the truth resides with those who can 
articulate the most believable narrative.  Narratives gain credit with coherence and 
supporting evidence; Jefferies’s narrator, particularly in the first part of the tale, has a 
masterful eye for detail and he brings the reader around to his version of things not by 
claiming absolute correctness, but by developing his ethos as a fully considerate, 
open-minded interpreter of the book of post-modern nature, not unlike a fictional 
Gilbert White.   
“The old men say that their fathers told them,” begins Jefferies’s narrator, 
“that soon after the fields were left to themselves a change began to be visible.  It 
became green everywhere in the first spring, after London ended…” (11).  The 
verdant wilderness that is Natural History’s new subject unfurls using the testimony 




make sense of a congress of stories and details so that it appears as a coherent and 
purposive narrative, not only of what happened, but of why.42  After London’s 
narrator is anonymous, but Jefferies does not pretend that he is omniscient, or 
objective, or even altogether self-assured.  As the “say” and “told them” cues of the 
opening passage signal the oral nature of all extant history in this new natural world, 
they are also clues to the reader that this tale is founded on a subjective, contingent 
narrative dynamic complicates theories on the environmental upheaval in the novel’s 
recent history.  The narrator continues, “none of the accounts agree, nor can they be 
altogether reconciled with present facts or with reasonable supposition…the truth was 
lost…Therefore, what I am now about to describe is not to be regarded as the ultimate 
truth, but as the nearest to which I could attain after comparing the various traditions” 
(24).           
 With the plague as a working theory on the fate of industrial human 
populations, the narrator is left to speculate on the ontogeny of the landscape.  A 
massive inland lake defines the geography of the new England, and the narrator 
insists that “the lake itself tells us how it was formed,” involving “changes of the sea 
level and the sand that was brought up [the Thames] must have grown great banks, 
which obstructed the stream” (42-43).  He entertains two major theories on the 
mechanism of creating this laucustrine environment: his theory of choice is 
gradualist, borrowing its aesthetic from the Neptunism of Werner and Lyell.  Through 
an accelerated gradualist process, the choked river Thames “began to overflow up 
into the deserted streets, and especially to fill the underground passages and drains, of 
                                                
42 Hayden White’s Metahistory (1973) is a useful primer for this kind of historical criticism, and 




which the number and extent was beyond all the power of words to describe…lastly, 
the waters underneath burst in, this huge metropolis was soon overthrown” (43).  
After a period of only thirty years, the narrator theorizes that the Lake reached 
equilibrium with sea levels, and the extreme reaches of the Lake to the East (at the 
Thames) and the West (at the Severn) came to exhibit daily tidal exchanges with the 
ocean.  In his version, the disequilibrium imposed by a saltation event achieves 
natural balance along a new principle of organization, and the Lake in After London 
becomes the focal point for both scientific explication and the playground for its hero, 
fortunate Felix Aquila.   
By gifting modern England with its own self-contained sea, Jefferies 
effectively re-centers what’s left of civilization around the shores of a new 
Mediterranean; England becomes a contained little world of vying human bands and 
strange natural forces, much more heterogeneous on cultural and biological levels 
than his own Victorian England.  Narratively speaking, After London is a microcosm 
experiment that interrogates the social and ecological dynamics of a world-made-new 
by environmental upheaval.43  It uses a defined small area that is its own natural 
system, and describes the flows of energy and resources through time.    
 One of the few ways the reader knows to identify the unnamed narrator as an 
opinionated living person (rather than simply an omniscient voice) is that he 
                                                
43 In his remarkably detailed historical study of coastal changes in England for the past two millennia, 
Outrageous Waves (2005), Basil Cracknell traces London’s encounters with high oceans from the time 
of the Romans (89-102).  Sea levels increase with warm periods (the Medieval, from 1000-1400, in 
particular) and in times of intensive storms.  In 128 -2, several arches of London Bridge collapsed and 
became the legend of the nursery rhyme.  Daily tidal fluxes have grown severe as embankments 
became more imposing in efforts to control a commerce-laden Thames.  Ecological historians such as 
Moss (2001) have imagined disaster scenarios in twety-first century London, which Cracknell 
corroborates as “right to warn of the terrible danger facing London in the years ahead if the decision is 




introduces the theories of his rival, Silvester, who is a cosmic catastrophist at eart.  
Our narrator impugns Silvester’s integrity as a philosopher of natural history by 
gesturing to his chao-theistic convictions: “Those whose business is theology have 
pointed out that the wickedness of those times surpasses understanding, and that a 
change and sweeping away of the human evil that had accumulated was necessary, 
and was effected by supernatural means” (25).  Silvester’s scheme of a divinely 
retributive catastrophe involved “some attractive power exercised by the passage of 
an enormous dark body through space” which affected the earth’s axial lean and 
“altered the flow of the magnetic currents, which, in an imperceptible manner, 
influence the minds of men” (25).  In Silvester’s reality, the psychology of 
catastrophe is material, involving attractions and magnetism on the cognitive level.  
This quasi-scientific way of explaining the more traditional Old-Testament “sweeping 
away of the human evil that had accumulated” is part of geological catastrophim’s 
legacy to the scientific debates around the turn of the nineteenth-century.  Though 
Cuvier had no interest in corroborating Biblical accounts with his fossil-based 
theories of catastrophe, evidence of upheavals in deep time tempted natural 
theologians intentionally to read these events as material evidence of the Bible’s
stories rather than as apocryphal scientific texts.   
When drained of its religious moral overtones, Sylvester’s catastrophist line of 
explanation shares aesthetic ground with the Alvarez hypothesis on the Cretaceous 
extinctions that killed the dinosaurs, and most other large organisms living on Earth 
65 million years ago.  Chaos ecology makes much of the influence of such random 




peninsula is a catastrophist’s explanation of widespread extinction, and cause of all 
downstream effects.  Another way of approaching the same paleontological puzzle is 
through a narrative of “coherent catastrophism,” where many unrelated factors 
collude to manifest the ultimate determinative event.  For the Cretaceous conundrum, 
coherent catastrophists appeal to a long series of disadvantages in the dinosaur 
phenotype, which over a period of thousands of generations weakened the taxonomic 
super order Dinosauria; in this narrative, the meteor impact is merely the coup de 
grâce ending a long decline.44  While the single Truth of what really happened has 
become, epistemologically speaking, a quaint concept, current theories of paleo-
geology welcome a landscape of relative truths and shared causations around which 
scientists cluster to form general consensuses.          
After London’s voice appreciates modern historical relativity, then, without 
undermining its own authority as a balanced record of the evidence of past events.  
The novel implicitly theorizes historical narrative at the same time as it establishes 
the history of a world-made-new, showing Jefferies’s dual commitment to authori l 
relativity and environmental contingency.  Any number of personal stories can be told 
once a certain stage is set; Shakespeare was a master of populating his stages, like the 
eternal forest of Arden, with individuals as motley as Rosalind, Jacques, Touchstone, 
and Celia.  But when the stage itself is relative and mutable, as is the landscape in 
Jefferies’s post-apocalypse England, Nature herself is a dynamic character and stories 
                                                
44 See, for example, Palmer’s (2003) discussion of coherent catastrophism (205).  Palmer quotes 
physicists Wallace and Thornhill: “It is time to re-examine those ‘laws’ of long-held beliefs that have 
diverted scientific curiosity away from uncomfortable questions about the safety of our spaceship 
Earth.  We can no longer afford to deny the possibility that global myths and images of the planetary 
gods may refer to a frighteningly close-up view of the planet within the memory of the human race” 





about her develop into a new species of bildungsroman.  As Gilbert White tacitly 
made a living character out of his beloved home parish, and found its story to be one 
of change and contingency more than the grand immutable cycle of an Enlightenment 
aesthetic, Jefferies’s environment after London flourishes by virtue of a complex 
character development.  Nature’s body, written as the fortuitous succession of pecies 
growing and adapting to fill niches in the new world, is the subject of development 
that organizes the narrative of After London.    
Part 1’s title, The Relapse into Barbarism, is devolutionary, subverting the 
narrative of the increasing articulation of natural splendor that the account act ally 
delivers.  Particularly in the context of the deep polluted evils steeped in the site of 
the old city, the “barbarism” that nature exhibits when fallow is actually ameliorating, 
evidence of the self-restorative capacities of nature that generations begi ning with 
Jefferies’s ardently traced as evidence for hope in the industrial era.  Though the 
narrator is too rational to fully anthropomorphize nature as a mother, or to speak of an 
entity that is more than the sum of individual animal groups and flora set in fallow, 
nature-as-character in the Relapse into Barbarism follows from the narrator’s voice as 
natural historian.  There are no other characters in the first part of the novel, only 
nature’s recovery as envisioned through the evolution and succession of species.  
Herein lies the novel’s relevance to modern ecological thought: using the model of a 
self-contained England, Jefferies narrates the history of what could happen when 
disturbed land is largely left to itself, and human command over nature succumbs to 
intrinsic natural forces that modern civilization had only temporarily kept at bay.45   
                                                
45 Jefferies encounters similar linguistic challenges to what Darwin faced in attempting to narrate 




As the narrator closely observes, nature’s succession follows a random, 
chaotic pattern of recovery from the apocalyptic moment of flooding, now many 
years past.  It takes only one generation for most of the industrial human legacy, 
which is called the culture of the Ancients, to fall asunder in the undergrowth.  In the 
first few pages, Jefferies treats the accumulation of time both cyclically and linearly: 
first the four seasons of a single year wreak havoc on the formerly-controlled agrarian 
countryside, meadows are “not mown” and the wheat fields have “no one to reap,” 
opening that bounty to “clouds of sparrows, rooks, and pigeons…feasting at their 
pleasure” (11).  Complex new interconnections arise by only the second year, when 
rapidly colonizing species occlude human paths, and naturally re-seeded fields grow a 
ghost crop of staples, which again are devoured and turned under by the onset of 
winter.  Though the aesthetic discord of briars and brambles instills an image of 
unchecked and unproductive nature, that which “helped to destroy or take the place of 
the former sweet herbage,” these stages of initial succession permit the natural, 
ultimate aesthetic of grandeur that is the inheritance of mature wilderness (12).  From 
a distressing vision of a harlot nature “starting from all sides at once” to extirpate the 
                                                                                                                                          
personifying the word Nature; but I mean by Nature, only the aggregate action and product of many 
natural laws, and by laws the sequence of events as a certained by us.  With a little familiarity such 
superficial objections will be forgotten” (88).  The recalcitrance of active-voice language becomes 
clear in Darwin’s argument: “It may metaphorically be said that natural selection is daily and hourly 
scrutinising, throughout the world, the slightest variations; rejecting those that are bad, preserving and 
adding up all that are good; silently and insensibly working, whenever and wherever opportunity 
offers, at the improvement of each organic being in relation to its organic and inorganic conditions of 
life.  We see nothing of these slow changes in progress, until the hand of time has marked the lapse of 
ages, and then so imperfect is our view into long-past geological ages, that we see only that the forms 
of life are now different from what they formerly were” (90-91).  By collapsing the time required to 
observe change into a few human generations (the distinction between evolution of species and 
evolution of a landscape), Jefferies casts a clear b m on his vision of nature’s spontaneous 





human legacy, time successively renders the thorny, entangled wilderness as the new 
force that permits eventual coherence: 
…protected by the briars and thorns from grazing animals, the suckers of elm 
trees rose and flourished.  Sapling ashes, oaks, sycamores, and horse-
chestnuts, lifted their heads.  Of old time the cattle would have eaten off the 
seed leaves with the grass so soon as they were out of the ground, but now 
most of the acorns that were dropped by birds, and the keys that were wafted 
by the wind, twirling as they floated, took root and grew into trees…the young 
trees had converted most parts of the country into an immense forest. (12) 
 
Keys to trees, goes this new scheme of aesthetic inheritance from the lower p ayers 
among flora, the vines and brambles, up to the grand species that serve as metonyms 
for mature English nature, the elms and oaks.  The initial chaos of competitive 
colonization is reigned in, after all, by Nature’s heavyweights; indeed the progress 
from human civilization in the form of agrarian parcels to natural civilization in the 
form of mature forests is enabled by an intermediary imbroglio.  Nature inexorably 
self-organizes towards a more steady-state climax, using many randomly co peting 
forces to develop towards a system of established, long-lived species.   
Jefferies has anticipated a debate that was to rage at the center of the 
ecological sciences for much of the twentieth-century: whether biological succession 
implies a telos towards the static climax community, or whether fallow nature is 
comprised of a more random and directionless mosaic of species competing through 
perpetuity.  Fredric Clements, the American grassland ecologist, would theorize 
succession-based climax in disturbed plant communities in his study Plant Succession 
(originally published in 1916), and he figured successional ecosystems as their own 
super-organisms, driven by internal coherence towards a higher principle of 




formation, is an organic entity.  As an organism, the formation arises, grows, matures, 
and dies…The climax formation is the adult organism, the fully developed 
community” (quoted in Merchant [2007], 182).  The climax ecosystem, figured as a 
higher-order organism with synergetic components and structural robustness, is the 
kind of aesthetic-based theory that would later make the Gaia concept controversial in 
many circles, especially among strict empiricists.      
The succession debate is one instantiation of the larger ontological rivalry 
between schemes of time: the arrow versus the cycle.  The predominance of each 
model was debated intensely with the rise of modern geology in the early ninetee th-
century, when gradualists like Hutton and Lyell came up against the catastrophi  
ideas of Cuvier and Buffon.  This debate was updated with evolutionary theory, when 
biological change through time was laid over geological schemes.  Darwin, the 
gradualist, imagined a slow, constant improvement of form through deep time, and 
later theorists like Gould and Eldredge emphasized the role of sudden punctuations 
wrought by environmental catastrophe as essential to evolutionary history.46   
A major contribution that ecology provides to these contrasting aesthetics is 
the simultaneous conception of both schemes as inherent to nature set in time: 
ecosystems undergo directional change after disturbances, then settle into a more 
stable cyclical condition until the next disturbance (a storm, a volcano, a farmer 
carving out a new field) lurches the system into the new disequilibrium.  Anticipating 
                                                
46 Gould’s book-length study of temporal aesthetics, Time’s Arrow, Time’s Cycle (1987), shows how 
important a conceptual balance between paradigms is in the post-modern understanding of nature.  The 
cyclical balance of a perfect cosmos maintained by God in Newton’s system butted heads with a 
nineteenth-century metaphor of a machine world subject to entropy.  Gould writes, “I dedicate this 
book to a different view of this discrepancy: Time's cycle cannot, in principle, encompass a complex 
history that bears irreducible signs of time's arrow.  Hutton's rigidity [on time’s cycle as the necessary 
condition for understanding deep time] is both a boon and a trap. It gave us deep time, but we lost 




later ecological philosophy, Jefferies’s detailed description of natural succe sion 
introduces humanity as a principle of disturbance; the legacy of the industrial 
Ancients dissolves as nature shifts towards its next stasis of complex organization.  
Though the established forest could be viewed as the predetermined telos to which 
nature aspires when left to itself, there is a subtle and necessary distinction between 
the tenuous balance of any mature natural system and the teleological determinism of 
a single climax community of certain species composition that will inevitably be 
reached, time permitting.   
In the first few pages of After London, we are presented with the mechanisms 
of time’s arrow which, within a century, settle back into time’s cycle as the forests 
establish deep roots in the disused farm fields, and the lake that organizes the 
geography of this new world balances with the oceans through daily tides at the 
eastern and western extremes.  Succession is a principle by which disturbed natur  
evolves through time, but the initial conditions play an essential role in crafting the 
appearance of nature’s next ecological station, often involving chaotic dynamics 
along the way.  The Relapse into Barbarism takes place within a century, and human 
culture’s dissolution permits the rise of a new primitive natural order centered on the 
serendipitous Lake.   
Because plant growth dominates the former land routes, the Lake is essential 
to the commerce of the world after London, and it comes to embody several of the 
paradoxes of the post-industrial world.  It is predominantly clear, fresh, and pellucid, 
but the regions around old cities (London in particular) are viciously polluted and 




and feudal rivalries; it is the center of the known world, but is also at the heart of 
geographical mysteries because of a highly fractal shoreline; it is both a new frontier 
and an ancestral burial ground.  The Lake takes on both the goddess and witch 
characterizations of nature; along Jefferies’s ideals, the goddess is nature’s creation, 
and the witch is the specter of industrial humans past. 
The site of ancient London represents the ecological results of the collapse of 
complex industrial society.  Poisons seep up from the submerged city and adorn the 
landscape in a hellish menagerie of fire, killer fog, and slimy soot that shellacs the 
skin of any explorer who pursues the treasures of the lost Ancient civilization.  
Without needing directly to indict the practices of the past, the toxic scene that Felix 
eventually confronts serves as an admonition of machine-driven society and the 
dystopias that mark both its present form and the legacy it leaves to the post-
apocalyptic world.  The narrator never draws a direct causal link between industry 
and the ecological catastrophe of the previous century; though industrial culpability 
would seem to be a given, it is possible that the Ancient practice of coal-driven 
manufacture was not in itself the catalyst of the rising oceans and consequent 
flooding.  Even so, the industrial gift to posterity provides the only manifestation of 
pollution that its inheritors conceive, and something deeply evil lurks in old London 
as a result of the long urban-marinating decades.  The chaos that plays out over the 
site of London is a narrative that imagines how, given a set of initial conditions, the 
industrial environment will devolve when its architects die.    
This brings to the surface an interesting question that ecologists have only 




industrial-military infrastructure if no one is around to maintain it through perpetuity?  
Even if industrial practices are not directly responsible for some Armageddon to be, 
how will those initial conditions of neglect incubate emergent ecological problems in 
the world that is heir to our legacy?  The final chapter of this dissertation will take a 
look at a narrative that attempts, scientifically, to measure the footprint of the 
industrial world through deep future time (particularly problematic are two inventions 
unknown to Jefferies: nuclear fission and plastic).  H.G. Wells engages in an 
analogous task in The Time Machine by looking at the deep evolutionary legacy of 
industrial social stratification; his narrative will be the last subject of this chapter.  For 
Jefferies, though, only a century of succession is enough to redefine the edges of 
existence; the site of old London holds waters that are not to be traversed and are only 
to be entered at extreme peril to explorers.47  The narrative develops a complex 
relationship between strange bedfellows: degraded industry and primitive nature.  
Jefferies’s interbred vision permits industrial-ecological futurity to have a life, even if 
that life imagines that “all that [Felix] saw as something so strange as to be 
unaccountable…The deserted and utterly extinct city of London was under his feet” 
(200).  Cities and the industrial legacy have succumbed to environmental disaster, but 
their deep-seeded ecological effects live on as the new, primitive world’s purgatory, 
                                                
47 Jefferies is careful not to accuse the industrial Ancients of greed, hubris, or irresponsibility; on the 
contrary, his prose cultivates a sense of wonder about the magnificent workings of the bygone 
civilization, even in the midst of his descriptions of its horrific urban specter.  The historian-narrato  
testifies, “there were said to be places where the earth was on fire and belched forth sulfurous fumes, 
supposed to be from the combustion of the enormous stores of strange and unknown chemicals 
collected by the wonderful people of those times” (200).  The Ancients are characterized as alchemists 
with “wonderful” inventions throughout the text, when they so obviously could have been vilified as 
the authors of this environmental malignity.  Jefferies preserves the innocence of vision that the latt r 
generations inherit by virtue of their ignorance of the Ancients’ culture, a gesture to legitimate 
reverence for the power of industrial technology that could be occluded by its manifest liabilities, the





the site of infinite toxic corruption that is also the gateway to impossible wealth.  
These eventualities are the result of a chaotic narrative experiment using the active 
reagents of nineteenth-century industrial London. 
By secularizing religious rites and positioning a quest-narrative on the stage of 
a post-industrial environment, Jefferies effectively recasts Romantic natural 
supernaturalism in a modern, deep-ecological mould.  The hero confronts and 
overcomes the nasty inheritance of his extinguished elders, and founds his quasi-
religious new world on the aesthetic principles of sustainability, community, a d 
harmony with nature.  Felix captures the jewels of the Ancients from the jowls of 
London, muses on his dual fortune and personal fortitude, and rises to apotheosis 
among his new brethren of the Shepherds, who are the gentle folk among the mainly 
savage races of his world.  His success comes from an ability to pay close attention to 
nature’s patterns: the tides and winds that direct his canoe around the Lake, the 
exodus of birds that warn of London’s proximity, the sense of accord given by 
landscape heterogeneity, the instinct of being home when at last he finds a dwelling 
place in Shepherd land.  In every way, this last virtue participates in the aesthetic of 
the picturesque, as contrasted with the vile sublime of dead London.  While hiking 
through higher lands on a solitary hunting trip, Felix discovers his Valhalla, a self-
contained lake, 
half a mile across, and the opposite shore was open woodland, grassy and 
meadow-like, and dotted with fine old oaks.  By degrees these closed together, 
and the forest succeeded; beyond it again, at a distance of two miles, were 
green hills.  A little clearing only was wanted to make the place fit for a castle 
and enclosure…A more beautiful spot he had never seen, nor one more suited 
for every purpose in life…There he remained a long time, designing it all in 





Felix’s ability to cultivate nature into productive harmony makes him a god among 
shepherd men, and he commands their human resources to aid in his gentle 
conversion of their land towards a sustainable community.  Jefferies’s final images of 
the world after London are overtly idealistic, with a back-to-nature narrative ending 
in the romantic comedy of Felix bringing his future bride, Aurora, to her new home.   
 But the comedic ending is never actually attained in the narrative.  Jefferies 
leaves the story fragmented, the ideals merely theoretical.  After London’s final 
image describes Felix hiking west through thick woods to reach his original home, 
where Aurora, we assume, waits for him to claim her.  Norman Page shows how 
Felix’s journey westward to claim his bride (Aurora, the sunrise), is the story of a 
man “likely to be disappointed”; the woods have consistently been equated with 
“darkness and menace” as opposed to the freedom and easy movement of the Lake’s 
open waters (361).  Though Felix’s good fortune has been uncompromised within the 
narrator’s story, his personal fate remains outside of the tale itself, and Jefferies plants 
subtle portents that complicate the easy coherence of a back-to-nature success tory.  
In the end, indeterminacy rules the narrative’s fragmentation; bibliographers Miller 
and Matthews have quoted Jefferies conviction that “A true Life History has no wind 
up and nothing finished or complete” (439).  Though the romantic pastoralism of 
After London may gesture towards ecological ideals, an indeterminate finish is 
congruent with the story’s cryptical origins; insoluble mystery forms the bookends.   
It is revealing of an 1880s zeitgeist that John Ruskin delivered his “Storm-
Cloud of the Nineteenth-Century” lecture to the London Institution in 1884, one year 




objective account of the environmental effects of industry just as coal burning greatly 
intensified in British urban centers.  The essay reveals the psychological and physical 
stresses wrought by chaotic weather that Ruskin calls the “plague wind” of his 
modern age.  Perhaps nostalgic for a time before industry, Jefferies instead imagines 
the scenario of nature’s reclaiming of her ground and atmosphere after industry, the 
post-modern primitive, and the sinister fate of urban centers in this new world order. 
Also contributing to the atmospheric chaos of that era was 1883’s eruption of Mount 
Krakatoa, an event responsible for below-average cold though 1888, resultant crop-
failures due to heavy rains, and major optical effects, most notably spectacular 
sunsets in continental Europe and England until February 1884.48  Though Krakatoa 
itself may have been beyond Jefferies conscious knowledge and that of his European 
counterparts,49 as Laki’s eruption was for Gilbert White almost exactly a century 
earlier, the ecological manifestations its eruption and of industrial emissions were 
very much within Jefferies’s direct experience.      
                                                
48 David W. Olson (2004) a physicist and astronomer, published his theory on Krakatoa’s atmospheric 
effects that draws an intriguing link to Edward Munch’s famous 1883 painting “The Scream,” which, 
Olson remarks, “has become the symbol of anxiety in our modern age.”  The figure’s petrified horror 
is made intelligible by the vivid red sunset behind him, and Munch’s journals reinforce the link 
between the spectacular, threatening sunsets and his artistic inspiration.  
 
49 With the help of hindsight, H.G. Wells was able to make an account of the Krakatoa eruption of 
1883 and use it to substantiate Jefferies’s intrinsic vi ion of ecological succession and the climax 
community.  Wells et al’s The Science of Life (1929) devotes a long chapter to the emerging science 
of ecology, which at that point is largely organized around the interactions within ‘life-communities’:  
“There is a progression of inhabitants, one set of animals and plants succeeding another in sequence, 
until finally a stable state is reached.  In a state of nature, the animal and plant life of this stable phase 
is the same as the original life of the area.  The life-community has reproduced itself.  This community 
reproduction was seen on a grand scale after the great e uption of the volcano Krakatoa, in the East 
Indies, in 1883…” (973).  The perspective of an inevtable climax community was advanced by 
Fredric Clements, and heavily debated in the first decades of the twentieth-century.  It has been 
replaced by more nuanced theories of community interrelation through time, but the importance of the 




The mature Jefferies would pen a remarkably precocious and brilliant 
observation on the role of randomness and patterns in nature; from it, he would 
recover a sense of beauty inherent in the Victorian fear of indeterminacy.  In the late 
essay, “Absence of Design in Nature” (c. 1887), Jefferies envisions scientifi chaos: 
When at last I had disabused my mind of the enormous imposture of a design, 
an object, and an end, a purpose or a system, I began to see dimly how much 
more grandeur, beauty, and hope there is in a divine chaos – not chaos in the 
sense of disorder or confusion but simply the absence of order – than there is 
in a universe made by pattern.  This draught-board universe my mind had laid 
out: this machine-made world and piece of mechanism; what a petty, 
despicable, microcosmos I had substituted for the reality.  Logically, that 
which has a design or a purpose has a limit.  The very idea of a design or a 
purpose has since grown repulsive to me, on account of its littleness.  I do not 
venture, for a moment, even to attempt to supply a reason to take the place of 
the exploded plan.  I simply deliberately deny, or, rather, I have now 
advanced to that stage that to my own mind even the admission of the subject 
to discussion is impossible.  I look at the sunshine and feel that there is no 
contracted order: there is divine chaos, and, in it, limitless hope and 
possibilities. (quoted in Hooker, 163)    
 
By recovering chaos from myth-status and placing its powers within material nature, 
Jefferies has also rediscovered infinity.  Science still has work to do in formalizing 
ideas of chaos into empirically-actionable schemes; it is limited, like the story of 
God’s creation, to a design and a system, the “petty, despicable microcosmos” that 
Jefferies seeks to explode into another new world.  The tension between tropes, each a 
distinct scheme of thought, comes to the foreground in this passage as the very tension 
between “contracted order” in the physical microcosm and “divine chaos” in the 
unraveling of future time.  The author has closed his mind to closed worlds, and so he 





V: The Time Machine 
 
Where Jefferies’s After London uses shallow time, matters of decades and 
centuries only, deep time is The Time Machine’s (1895) mechanism of narrative 
fragmentation.  H.G. Wells would later claim that ecological succession, as seen in 
After London, is essentially “the same competition” as evolutionary succession, only 
cast in different scales of time.50  The fourth, temporal dimension, when manipulated, 
imposes radical alterations on the other three dimensions of space.  Rather than a 
sudden natural disaster, Wells imagines gradual climactic and evolutionary trends
suddenly envisioned using the hero’s mechanical invention of a time machine.  
Wells’s debt to nineteenth-century science’s “bursting the limits of time” (Cuvier’s 
exuberant phrase) is evident in his projection of the future world.  His Morlocks, 
especially, are analogues to the bizarre creatures that Enlightenment geology had 
uncovered as ancient fossils.  So bracing by virtue of their uncanny similarity, and so 
repugnant in their essential difference from the human essence, the Morlocks and Eloi 
are the evolutionary monsters of the future, but they are also us.  Comparative 
physiology allows a conceptual continuity between humans and the creatures of 
                                                
50 I quote Wells et al’s 1929 encyclopedic narrative, The Science of Life:  “There is another way in 
which the little mirrors the big.  The same competition which results in the comparatively speedy 
development of ecological succession results also in the portentous slow development of evolutionary 
succession.  A landslip or man’s destructive hand uncovers a patch of the bare earth, or impounds a 
body of barren fluid; it is colonized by a succession of communities, and in a few decades is tenanted 
with rich life again.  The whole world, both land and sea, was once free of life; and aeons later all the 
land was still one great bare patch of earth and rock.  First the seas, and then the lands were colonized.  
In both there has been a succession of faunas and floras, each one on the whole exploiting the 
environment a little more effectively than the one before.  Evolution is a slow succession of a series of 
ever new and ever improved communities towards a still unrealized climax…It remains to be seen 
whether man, with his deliberate aim at a higher effici ncy, his replacement of the hitherto dominant 
tree by his own cultivations and devices, will make  mess of things and fail, or will succeed and hold 




802,701 AD, but troubling this continuity are the alienating rifts in cognition (the 
infantile Eloi) and physique (the spider-monkey Morlocks).  
Wells’s leaping narrative is chaotic in the modern denotation because the 
small impacts of initial socio-industrial conditions in the present-day have 
tremendous, determinative downstream effects in evolutionary time.  My example 
from chapter one of chaos theory applied to the history of industrialism links directly 
to Wells’s socio-biological fiction.  From the initial conditions that divided people 
between the capitalist working- and ruling-classes, and from the machines t at made 
this division profitable, Wells extracts a chaotic narrative in which the emergent 
social properties of occupation, spatial division, diet, and disposition become the 
prevailing topoi that impose biological changes in the future.  In this industrial 
condition that unfolds over nearly a million years towards the Morlock state, those 
conditions that Wells saw as most characteristic of his time have grown from seedling 
social shifts into full-blown physiological imperatives wrought by evolutionary 
selection.  No eighteenth-century narrative could have achieved Wells’s bizarre 
vision of dystopia; The Time Machine takes biological evolution and the conditions 
of industrial modernity as launch pads, and he propels these ideas through the 
exacerbating eons.      
The Time Traveler’s series of insights on the nature of the future world shows 
his theoretical progression from millenarian idealist towards the chilling evolutionary 
pragmatism that best explains his observations of the Eloi-Morlock dynamic.  Where
at first he viewed the world as a warm garden, and its people delighting in their labor-




how the Eloi are “mere fatted cattle” serving the appetites of the intelligent mechanic 
Morlocks, who live in a dark, noisy underworld (62).  This is no Enlightenment 
millennium; it is a sinister vision of (d)evolution set on industrial rails through deep 
time.  The stark evolutionary disjuncture between the Traveler’s Victorian England 
and the Morlock world (for the Morlocks are master) instructs us about manifest 
differences wrought by time, but these contrasts are unnerving because they are 
exceptions set into relief by the enduring similarities that remain.         
Once Geology forced time to expand in extra-Biblical quantities, the future 
was a concept that could sprawl beyond humanity itself.  The human became only 
one of myriad narratives that represent the world, and time itself was seen to 
discourage the eternity of any form, placing the human story on the verge of 
extinction at every ledge of future time.  Unlike Shelley and Jefferies, whose 
narratives unfold only a few generations beyond the nineteenth-century, Wells’s use 
of deep time shows the mechanisms at work, indeterminately but inexorably, to 
alienate us from our own legacy.  The sense of isolation we feel on behalf of the Time 
Traveler when his machine is lost to the Morlocks reveals the power of the deep tim 
trope; our brains are simply not equipped to imagine the passing of 32,000 
generations, each of them hungry in their own time.  For any coherence, the narrative 
needs to leap into the future, providing spots of time that (paradoxically) provide 
evidence of gradual changes wrought in the meantime.  Wells imagistically reduces 
time traversal to the flickering of a lamp; a blended grey elides the succesion of 




Once the concept is within our ken, we find ourselves frightened of a reality 
that we will never experience, but that stains the features of our own civilized ord r.  
For Wells, the literally-spatial discrepancy between social classes in an industrial 
order that entombs the workers in dark factories and blesses the ruling classeswith 
leisure can be rendered into a higher-order evolutionary trend.  Industrial civilization 
drives an evolutionary wedge between the classes.  Allopatric speciation, which 
occurs when two populations of a single species are spatially separated until they are 
distinct, is the most evident mechanism of this estrangement.  Interestingly, the sta e 
of the environment in the deep future follows suit with Enlightenment ideals of 
improvement, but Wells takes an ironic turn: the utopia of the surface world in 
802,701, a prolific, exotic garden that needs no tending as Eden did, is the deceiving 
veil over an insidious engine-driven reality.  The machine remains central, but it is 
now the machine under the garden, and the whole ecological world has become 
techno-sphere.   
Rather than projecting a future environment overtly destroyed by the products 
and by-products of industry, Wells is more nuanced in having his time traveler 
vacillate between scientific hypotheses of utopia and dystopia in the artificil ecology 
of the Morlock world.  At a basic level, the Traveler’s initial vision of an ecological 
utopia is based on aesthetics; his realization of dystopian nature comes with the 
insight that this world is an energy-exchanging system in which one group 
systematically preys on the other.  The static-state aesthetic utopia, then, falls apart 
with his subsequent and stronger theory of systems ecology, which allows him to 




The Traveler’s scientific speculations wade through some conceptual bogs, 
and his hypotheses grow more pessimistic along with his deepening acquaintance 
with this uncanny world.  From an Enlightenment telos that imagines the Eloi state 
“settled down into perfect harmony with the conditions under which it lived…the last 
great peace” he concludes, following Occam’s principle, “I thought that in this single 
explanation I had mastered the problem of the world…Very simple was my 
explanation, and plausible enough – as most wrong theories are!” (33).  There is no 
resting place for evolution, he learns, and correlatively there is no static state of the 
environment; both processes are involved in ceaseless turmoil, whether vacillating 
around an average condition or shifting wholly towards a distinct set of ecological 
relationships.  The broad scope of vision, in this case a temporal scope, is essential to 
conceiving the dynamics of evolutionary ecology that occur on super-human scales.     
The climate is hotter in 802,701 than it had been in 1895; though he avoids a 
singular explanation, the newly-arrived Traveler promotes a cosmic catastrophi  
view of the warming, which prizes contingency:  
I think I have said how much hotter than our own was the weather of this 
Golden Age.  I cannot account for it.  It may be that the sun was hotter, or the 
earth nearer the sun.  It is usual to assume that the sun will go on cooling 
steadily in the future.  But people, unfamiliar with such speculations as those 
of the younger Darwin, forget that the planets must ultimately fall back one by 
one into the parent body.  As these catastrophes occur, the sun will blaze with 
renewed energy; and it may be that some inner planet had suffered this fate.  
Whatever the reason, the fact remains that the sun was very much hotter than 
we know it. (45) 
 
Perhaps combustion of the planet Mercury, or Venus, can explain the intensified heat 
of the sun.  As in the earlier narratives, the Traveler advances no industry-based 




industry at all in the pastoral new world.  Other imperatives ensue (the Morlocks are 
interested in his flesh), and he never has the leisure to return to theories of industry-
based climate change, only to note its effects: the Eloi enjoy a half-clad existence 
almost wholly outdoors; the inconveniences of seasonal variation are unknown (but 
the absence of vicissitude contributes to the Eloi’s cognitive oblivion); the place that 
was greater London now blooms as a strange tropical paradise: 
 You who have never seen the like can scarcely imagine what delicate and 
wonderful flowers countless years of culture had created…My general 
impression of the world I saw over their heads was of a tangled waste of 
beautiful bushes and flowers, a long neglected and yet weedless garden.  (25-
26) 
 
This depiction of a terrifying yet pleasant nature harkens back to Shelley’s 
apocalyptic world.  The language is intensely descriptive because of its inherent 
contradictions, which heightens the sense of satire: the beautiful waste, the weedl ss 
neglect.  Cultural selection imposes artificially-bred beauty, and the climate 
acquiesces.  The flowers become the symbol of this future world because they are the 
only piece of evidence that the Traveler brings back to his day.  Their fruit is 
consumed by the vegetarian Eloi, and herein is another tacit contradiction: the flowers 
are the blooms of machines.  Though their principle of growth may be organic, using 
water, air, and sunlight to make carbon-based matter, their existence is owing t the 
technology that created them.  Like a biotech crop that uses borrowed genes to make
it better adapted to environmental extremes, these flowers exist because they have 
been genetically manipulated by their human-esque creators.  The Eloi, the Traveler 
ruefully comes to acknowledge, live on a glorified feed lot controlled by Morlock 




domestication, and one post-human species systematically breeds and devours the 
other at the apex of Wells’s sardonic vision.  This is not a lobby for vegetarianism, it 
is a vision of a world grown so technological that every level of what used to be 
Nature is now regulated as part of a thermodynamic system, a mechanization of 
systems ecology.  Thermodynamic systems don’t have morals; neither do humanity’s 
heirs to the industrial legacy.      
 Accompanying this lugubrious (if comical) insight into the post-human 
predator-prey dynamic is a further blow to Enlightenment teleology: the Traveler 
discovers the decay of all former knowledge as a consequence of intellect’s 
obsolescence.  Moral systems are borne on human intellectual capacity; one way that 
humans through the ages have divided themselves from other animals (perhaps 
speciously) is by a perception of our unique capacity to ‘do the right thing,’ 
sometimes in spite of self-interest.  Altruism is the subject of intense debate in 
evolutionary biology.  Though the Traveler had endured a moral blow by observing 
the Elois’s indifference to Weena’s near drowning, a deeper despond results from he 
discovery of the decayed Palace of Green Porcelain, a place resembling Victorian 
England’s Crystal Palace.  The Traveler, leafing through the disintegrating books that 
form what’s left of a massive library, says  
Had I been a literary man I might, perhaps, have moralized upon the futility of 
all ambition.  But as it was, the thing that struck me with keenest force was 
the enormous waste of labour to which this somber wilderness of rotting 
paper testified.  At the time I will confess that I thought chiefly of the 
Philosophical Transactions and my own seventeen papers upon physical 
optics. (67-68) 
 
A literary man, he suggests, would brood over the philosophical and egotistical 




concerns surrounding a “waste of labour.”  But the sense of regret is the same: the 
Traveler finds the Earth a garden, but recognizes in the decay of civilization that its 
remnants are a new form of ‘wilderness,’ and the intellectual labors that constitute the 
human devotion to self-betterment are themselves subject to the contingencies of 
deep time.  Philosophical Transactions, the journal of the Royal Society, was the 
most recognizable disseminator of scientific authority through the nineteenth-c ury; 
the Traveler’s contributions turn to dust when the social institutions that cradled his 
work are themselves pulled under.   
There is a deep chill intrinsic in the wasting that the Traveler consistently sees 
as a necessary precursor to the next system of organization; these lapses and 
subsequent articulations of a new ontology (in this case, the leap from Victorian 
positivism to Morlock predationism) demonstrate a chaotic underlying pattern to the 
evolutionary articulation of biological forms.  Though Charles Darwin remained 
faithful to Lyellian geology and argued that natural selection continually increased 
the perfection of fit between organism and environment, the Traveler’s experience 
suggests something different.  The trajectory of evolutionary ecology is unreliable 
and is demonstrably not progressive.  He implicitly argues that chance conditions and 
variations are more important to evolutionary narrative than any near-teleological 
theory of increasing perfection and complexity.  “Papers upon physical optics” are as 
useful in the world of 802,701 AD as they had been in the analogous date anterior, 
800,000 BC, when Homo erectus began to use stone tools and fire to cook their prey.  
Morlocks fear and loathe flame, the Traveler is fortunate to discover, so they eat Eloi 




The Traveler’s final great leap forward past the Morlock age into the deepest 
future cinches Wells’s vision of eternal environmental dynamism towards no 
particular endpoint.  Superficial stasis elides the changes always occurring at a 
microscopic level; these small fluctuations in genetics or environment are mostly 
erased, but a few mutants impose enduring downstream effects.  Several million years 
into the future in the algorithm of evolutionary selection, the Traveler finds his 
alienation from the surrounding life complete:   
I cannot convey the sense of abominable desolation that hung over the world.  
The red eastern sky, the northward blackness, the salt Dead Sea, the stony 
beach crawling with these foul, slow-stirring monsters, the uniform poisonous-
looking green of the lichenous plants, the thin air that hurt one’s lungs; all 
contributed to the appalling effect.  I moved on a hundred years, and there was 
the same red sun… (83) 
 
The earth has lost its axial spin, leaving its outlandish inhabitants in perpetual, chilled
twilight where the city of London used to be.  The valley, which had burst with 
sinister vitalism while the Morlocks were cultivating it, has succumbed to a long 
senescence and now imposes an aesthetic of the poisonous sublime where its 
picturesque garden had once grown for the Eloi.  From a perspective of uncanny 
similarity with the Earthlings of 802,701, the Traveler has arrived at the estranged 
state of an astronaut on an alien planet; from a paragon among Eloi, he has devolved 
into prey for enormous crustaceans.  Even though the man remains the same, his 
position in the environment of this extreme future time is relative to its condition, not 
his; he is misplaced in evolutionary time.  This final vision of utter desolation, which 
presumes human descendants are extinct, cinches Wells’s thesis that the narratives of 
the deep future are fragmented, only partially coherent, and completely subject to the 




 The Romantic quest of an inspired and desperate man pushing the limits of 
knowledge by extensive wanderings undergoes, in this novel, a crucial revision for 
the audiences of late-Victorian, industrial England.  The Traveler wanders in time and 
barely survives to bring his tale back to the comfortable lounge where his audience is 
assembled to judge the bizarre narrative.  This staged opposition of armchair 
philosophy with sinewy enterprise piques the concerns of a positivist era when 
scientific epistemology sought to engulf the colonial, evolutionary and ecological 
mysteries of the day.  So outrageous a tale is the Traveler’s that he ends his narrative 
with a philosophical disclaimer that brings his uproarious claims down into the 
controlled sphere of a gentleman’s supper:  
 I cannot expect you to believe it.  Take it as a lie – or a prophecy.  Say I 
dreamed it in the workshop.  Consider I have been speculating upon the 
destinies of our race until I have hatched this fiction.  Treat my assertion of its 
truth as a mere stroke of art to enhance its interest.  And taking it as a story, 
what do you think of it?  (87)       
 
Involved as he is in a meta-discourse with the sciences of his tutelage, Wells has used 
literary narrative to advance a creative argument about the nature of scientific 
prediction, the patterns of evolution, and the legacy of Victorian industrialism.   
One other insight from the experience of The Time Machine is that a 
prophecy is the same as a lie; most lies don’t come true, but some inevitably do; from 
the wide terrain of possibility spring a few fortuitous seeds.  Once the future has 
happened, we can trace its origins in the past and pretend that time connotes destiny.  
But this is a lie that substitutes necessary causality and design (the telos) for the mere 
necessity that something succeed among the many forces vying for success.  




mischance and the further farcical vision of a moribund Earth impossibly removed in 
future time.  The gentlemen assembled take the account as just a story, only excepting 
the withered, alien blooms the Traveler has recovered from 802,701.  This little piece 
of evidence teases narrative chicanery from demonstrated scientific fac, ef e tively 
suspending judgment indefinitely.  The Traveler brazenly disappears into another 
time, once again, and leaves his personal fate as indeterminate as the veracity of his 
first journey.  The novel ends, “as everyone knows now, he has never returned” (90).  
The unraveled narrative now only gestures to infinite possibility, something close to 
the post-modern chaotic cosmos imagined by Jefferies ten years earlier.  That sort of 
knowledge ultimately lies outside the Victorian drawing room.       
An ecological reading of these four texts reveals new outlets for theorizing the 
role of chaos in the narratives on nature.  The epistemological movement from 
balance and eternal cycles towards open-ended visions of change, ruled by 
indeterminacy, signals a nineteenth-century shift in vision after the Classical age.  
With advances in geology, epidemiology, and evolutionary theory, these authors were 
able to imagine bizarre new ecological realities as the various legacies of an industrial 
world order; each text renders a more incisive narrative than the reactionary, pastoral 
conventions of longstanding environmental conservationists.  While each of these 
works could accurately be called environmental because a dynamic stage of nature is 
pivotal in the action portrayed, fruitful readings result from the texts’ interrogation as 
works of imaginative early ecology.  Chaos permits even the most conventional 
formulations, such as Jefferies’s neo-feudal order, to raise still-vita  questions in the 




narrative fragmentation that inheres in each of these four works reminds us of 
repeating conceptual failures in linearity and periodicity when it comes to predicting 
the dynamics of a late industrial environment.   
As theorists of the twenty-first century are learning, an accurate narrative 
vision of the future that involves the reality of climate change requires our acceptan  
of chaos as a player in future scenarios.  Where Gilbert White inquired into the 
downstream effects of volcanoes and hot summers, climate scientists now look to 
mathematical tipping points that may irreversibly accelerate glacial melting.  Where 
Mary Shelley conceived a tragic drama out of scientific epidemiology, the CDC in 
America issues disaster scenarios that narrate the potentials of bioterror sm, and 
monitors the waves of disease inherent to high-density population.  Where Wells 
elaborated on the moral perils of industrial animal husbandry, innovative farmers 
have begun to shift away from concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) back 
to an emphasis, philosophical and material, on using biodynamics as an agricultural 
mantra.  Our ability to ameliorate climate change, mass extinction, disease 
transmission and agricultural pollution depends on constructing models and accurate 
narratives of the future, understanding how our activities can affect many 
environments, and modifying industrial consumption patterns. 
These four texts are not in themselves scientific works.  By invoking the 
insights and anxieties of nineteenth-century British culture they anticipate the ways 
that science would develop, theoretically, in the modern industrial state of nature.  
They may well have accomplished this anticipation unconsciously, but such is the 




using a free play of imagination, clearing more theoretical space for science to 







Chapter Three: Lyrical Microcosms of the Nineteenth -
Century 
I: Introduction  
 
One way to recover a sense of pattern in a chaotic world is draw boundaries 
around coherent subsystems in nature and study them in isolation from the larger 
cosmos.  This chapter develops a thesis that the ancient concept of the microcosm 
evolved during the nineteenth-century away from metaphysical ideals and towards 
physical applications that are in parallel with microcosm experiments in ecology.  
Literature, I suggest, was an important intellectual mediator between the philosophical 
and scientific denotations of microcosm, because writing of the nineteenth-century 
considers and revises several uses of microcosmic aesthetics in the context of studying 
nature.  The microcosm, as a kind of epitome, suggests that if parts of the world are 
knowable and are found to be synergetic, we can extrapolate those principles of 
organization onto the macrocosm, and this practice makes the wide world less 
bewildering.  Exquisite little systems appear in British literature of the last four 
centuries, ever since Renaissance metaphysics and Enlightenment science first became 
intrigued by the minute worlds just beneath our perceptions.51   
Two factors make the nineteenth-century a frontier for a new kind of microcosm 
concept that is aligned with ecology.  First, Romanticism developed a philosophy that 
the imaginative brain was its own little world that could rework the material cosmos 
                                                
51 Microscopy resulted in extensive philosophical debat  about ideas of inter-scalar correspondence in 
the cosmos, and the role of the “minute particular” as the factual information that microscopy 
produces.  Tita Chico (2006) has pointed out the paradox of epistemology that began with the writings 
of microscopist Robert Hooke, who argued that the microscope allowed a widening of perception 
because “examining the minute world actually amplifies our senses and, by extension, our reason and 




into a distinctive harmonious form.  As a redress of the prevailing empirical scence of 
the time, the High Romantics pursued the thesis that man could inform the senses from 
the mind, thus creating a utopian psychological microcosm that revels in subjective 
knowledge.  Though this may seem inimical to any scientific method based on the 
microcosm, Romantic philosophy carries a surprising affinity to future ecologial 
methods.  Both inquiries treat microcosms as theoretical (rather than literal) systems 
that can be isolated from the rest of nature.  In the twentieth-century, defining the 
ecosystem (a microcosm existing in nature) required an admission of the conceptual, 
imaginative work that foregrounds identifying self-sufficient isolates in what is actually 
a continuous landscape and an interconnected globe.  Both inquiries value the aesthetic 
pleasure and epistemological insight that results from circumscribing heterog neous, 
synergetic systems and controlling their fate.  Poets control the fates of micr cosms by 
imaginative manipulation (as when Coleridge transforms his Lime-Tree Bower from a 
wasteland to a garden); scientists control microcosms by manipulating varables 
through many permutations of experiment.  These practices are not equivalent, of 
course, but they grow out of the same conviction that a small system can be imagined, 
possessed, and managed in a way that forwards our knowledge of the natural world.      
Second, literary figures of the nineteenth-century were obliged to establish some 
of the first reactions to industrial materialism’s despoilment of the environment.  The 
microcosm was increasingly figured in poetry of utopian escapism, where small shelters 
in nature served as food for the imagination battered by the rudeness of urban life and
commercial rhetoric.  By century’s end, the disturbance of these aestheticized plots was 




in England.  The microcosm’s liminal status between objective object and subjective 
construct was a source of fascination in the nineteenth-century.  As epitomes of larger 
systems in nature, the endangerment of microcosmic landscapes became the source of 
concern and outrage.  Science has turned to microcosm experiments to evaluate both 
utopian and dystopian scenarios, for example, how agriculture is embellished by 
increasing atmospheric carbon, or how a given toxin will affect the nutrient cycling in a 
wetland.  Microcosms provide essential models for the future course of anthropogenic 
nature.                           
The microcosm originated as a philosophical trope in Ancient Greece that traced 
parallels of structure and relationship across physical scales.  As an aethetic device for 
organizing spatial relationships, cosmos was seen as the opposite of chaos, a figure of
order and harmony, and the sum of total of human experience (OED, second edition 
1989).  Our word “cosmetic” derives from the desire to beautify and harmonize 
disordered elements of our faces.  To Hippocratic medicine, the microcosm was a figure 
for the human body, which displayed in miniature the elements and energies of an 
ordered cosmos.  Illness, then, could be understood as an imbalance in this corporeal 
system, and philosophers before Socrates used the microcosm conceit to understand 
stability and variation both within the body and in relation to larger spheres, including 
human environments, the earth as a whole, and the entire cosmos.  Analogies based on 
familiar objects carried the conceit forward: Eyes are lanterns, the stomach an oven, 
veins are rivers.52  The four elements of earth, air, fire, and water corresponded with the 
four humors, and these analogical elements required a proper balance for the enjoyment 
                                                
52 Vivian Hutton’s chapter on Hippocratic medicine describes in greater detail the analogical elements 




of health both in human bodies and their earthly environments.  The monarchal 
microcosm so well known to Renaissance writers is a political version of this med cal 
conceit: the King’s body represents his dominion and the health of both spheres 
depends on the wise and self-disciplined purview of their leader.53   
During the nineteenth-century the microcosm trope evolved towards a new 
epistemological status.  The Romantic poets came to describe their brains, with 
extensive capacities for memory, imaginative recombination, and artistic production, as 
microcosms with power over the natural environments they sought to capture in verse.  
In order to preserve the memory of a place in nature, poets studied landscapes with such 
devotion that their brains were figured as half-creating the nature they knew so well, as 
when Wordsworth famously describes the mind as a “mansion for all forms,” or when 
Keats in his Ode to Psyche decorates his verse with “the wreath’d trellis of a working 
brain.”  Cognitive science applied to literature has recently shed light on the 
relationship between contemporary understandings of the brain and poetic production 
(see Richardson), but no literary critics have yet identified the Romantic conceit of the 
mind as microcosm.  This psychological microcosm, it could be argued, provides a new 
view of the Romantic sublime that relies not simply on the awesome massiveness of the 
macroscopic in nature, nor on the exquisite minuteness of the microscopic.  Instead this 
new sublime excites visions of scalar parallels between various structures in nature, and 
the brain of the perceiver serves as catalyst for the metaphysical chemistry of poetic 
epiphany.      
                                                
53 Shakespeare’s Richard II is one of the many literary works of that period that finds the monarchal 
microcosm a useful trope for exploring how failures of authority can degrade the state alongside the 
body politic.  Shakespeare develops his castle gardeners into experts on political parasitism (see the 
famous scene, III.iv), and Richard often laments the wasting of his physical body though he seems to 




Most relevant to my concerns in this study is the advent of the ecological 
microcosm during the nineteenth-century.  The first scientific work that used the 
microcosm as an experimental strategy was Stephen Forbes’s The Lake as a 
Microcosm, published in 1887.  This empirical breakthrough quickly became both a 
conceptual and instructional aid to the adolescent sciences of nature, and microcosm 
studies bloomed into the twentieth-century as the best way to reduce a complex natural 
system into an intelligible scheme without completely dissecting it into estranged parts.  
The present chapter is devoted to showing how nineteenth-century literature imagined 
the ecological microcosm before science adopted the microcosmic lens as a  
experimental strategy.   
In chapter one I described how islands became incidental microcosm 
experiments when colonists introduced disordering elements into their stable systems.  
By looking at the microcosm through a literature of environmental engagement such as 
the nineteenth-century offers, we come to appreciate how advances in concept are often 
borne on free imaginative acts before they can be formalized and fully understood a  
effective models for generating new information, as first seen with Stephen Forbes in 
1887.  Because I am searching for the ecological microcosm’s emergence before it was 
ever described as such, my examples from literature are harvested regionally (from 
nineteenth-century British poetry) rather than locally (concentrating on a specific writer 
or single school of thought).  While this may admit a sense of arbitrary textual 
selection, it provides the best way to demonstrate how widespread, if only semi-
conscious, the use of the microcosm trope became to the literature of the nineteenth-




All of the texts discussed here use the microcosm as a point of orientation 
between the writer and the natural world.  Romantic-era writers most often figured the 
microcosm cognitively and philosophically, as a new hyper-subjective lens through 
which to envision nature.  Victorian-era writers, especially women, became skeptical of 
the egotistical, brain-fetish mode of the High Romantics, and their microcosms directly 
address the industrial endangerment of ancient landscapes and the ways of living within 
them.  Many of the works I discuss have distinguished volumes of criticism devoted to 
their complexities; my aim is not to engage all of these loci of discussion, but rather to 
pour a wealth of diverse works through this very specific filter.    
Because nineteenth-century poetry so often reacts to the subordination of nature 
under industrial modernity, we can rely on its portrayal of nascent ecological mindsets, 
and we should not be surprised when these perspectives take many developmental 
forms.  Therefore I have organized the chapter under the headings of medical, 
psychological, and ecological microcosms of the nineteenth-century; these headings 
help clarify how the trope evolved from Hippocratic medical aesthetics, found an outlet 
in the Romantic psychological sublime, and invented an ecological utility over the 
course of the century.  These three iterations of microcosmology all have links to the 
ways that the natural sciences employ this trope, unlike, for example, the social 
microcosm that comments on human interrelations.54  While my argument makes no 
                                                
54 Since the social microcosm deals only tangentially with scientific knowledge, I have excluded it 
from particular consideration in this chapter; it is oo rich a topic to enter into in this specialized 
interdisciplinary study.  Certainly novels are uniquely well-suited to explore the dynamics of social 
hierarchies in microcosm, especially considering the stratified economic conditions of the British 
nineteenth-century.  One interesting angle recently developed by scholars of evolution in literature 
considers how novels in the age of Darwin use social rel tions to distill concepts like natural selection, 
sexual selection, and ecosystem dynamics.  Peter Graham’s Jane Austen and Charles Darwin (2008), 
and Joseph Carroll’s “Human Nature and Literary Meaning” (2005) both look at Austen’s novels as 




causal claims that would artificially promote an essential mediatory role for literature 
between philosophy and science, my thesis maintains that the evident fascination with 
minute natural systems in literary epistemology of the nineteenth-century represents the 
British culture’s maturation towards the holistic empirical thinking that would be 
necessary for ecological science to fledge by the turn of the twentieth-cen ury.  
Microcosmic thought generally evolves from more abstract and metaphorical inter-
scalar pairings towards more literal, material, and diagnostic ends over the course of the 
century.  For it to be useful in ecological science, the microcosm had to evolve away 
from its origin as a thought experiment in philosophy towards a controlled empirical 
scheme set within a material system.  Between these two distinct but related ideas lurks 
an interesting study of interdisciplinary epistemology.  The scientist Stephen Forbes, 
admitting that he had not the poet’s talent for ekphrasis, still adopted a poet’s 
perspective to introduce the aesthetic of the laucustrine microcosm to a scientific 
audience.  This chapter proposes several literary origins for his act of consilience.                               
                                                                                                                                          
(originally published in 1983) essentially founded this perspective on literature, and her readings of 




II: The Medical Microcosm  
Drawing equivalence between two overtly different entities, such as the human 
body and the whole world (the medical microcosm), is the act of making a metaphor.  It 
proposes a figurative truth made out of a literal falsehood.  Such poetic reasoning stems 
from a desire to make sense of a chaotic cosmos in which humans hold a mysterious 
and variable place.  Though the human body is not literally a miniature of the earth, it 
nevertheless participates in analogous chemical exchanges with the same lements, and 
each individual life is a discreet proof of the universal biological procession thr ug  
conception, ontogeny, birth, growth, climax, senescence, and death.  Science before the 
Enlightenment used the aesthetic of economic balance to guide its understanding of 
cosmic organization, and was able to provide limited evidence that the microcosm trope 
had some purchase on the physical body.  The four elements of earth, air, fire, and 
water corresponded to the four bodily humors, creating a material rationale for lit rature 
that employed the pathetic fallacy, in which nature seems to mimic human emotion.   
The medical microcosm is the trope’s earliest exposition.  In ancient philosophy, 
Plato, tutor to the more medically-inclined Aristotle, asserted in Timaeus that the 
body’s blood acted analogically to the waters of the earth, carrying nutrients and 
dispelling wastes in cyclical harmony:  
the elements besetting us outside are always dissolving and distributing our 
substance, sending each kind of body on its way to join its fellows; while on the 
other hand the substances of the blood, which they are broken up small within 
us and find themselves comprehended by the individual living creature, framed 
like a heaven to include them, are constrained to reproduce the movement of the 
universe. (80e, 81a, b; quoted in Barkan, 18) 
 
Plato’s language is deterministic; the body is “framed” and “constrained” to recapitulate 




between body and universe serves to clarify the individual’s place within the widening 
concentric circles of an ordered cosmos.55   
William Harvey would formalize this medical notion in Renaissance England 
with his proof in The Circulation of the Blood (1628).  The revolutionary study opens 
with a dedication to King Charles in which Harvey explicitly employs the classi  
figurative analogy between the king’s body politic and his monarchal domain:   
Most serene King!  The animal’s heart is the basis of its life, its chiefmember, 
the sun of its microcosm; on the heart all its activity depends, from the heart all 
its liveliness and strength arise.  Equally is the king the basis of his kingdoms, 
the sun of his microcosm, the heart of the state; from him all power arises and 
all grace stems…Placed, best of Kings, as you are at the summit of human 
affairs, you will at least be able to contemplate simultaneously both the central 
organ of man’s body and the likeness of your own royal power. (3)     
 
This dedication is a medical spin on the traditional Elizabethan sycophancy of a subject
towards his sovereign; Harvey makes it clear that the trope of the microcosm in 
contemporary discourse is sufficiently powerful to secure parallel relationships between 
heart and body, king and domain, earth and sun; each with its mutually reinforcing 
scalar equivalence.  The microcosm of political philosophy, which had proved useful in 
assigning a purpose and mutual responsibility between ruler and subjects, is by 
Harvey’s work on blood circulation translated to a medical paradigm useful in 
elucidating the mysterious revolutions of the physical body that all humans possess.  
Without the longstanding rhetorical aesthetic of the monarchal microcosm, Harvey 
                                                
55 Sharon Ruston (2005) has recently argued that the description of Earth in book I of Shelley’s 
Prometheus Unbound makes use of the ancient medical microcosm trope link d to Renaissance 
notions of the monarchal body politic, particularly evident in the lines, “I am the Earth, / Thy Mother; 
she within whose stony veins, / To the last fibre of the loftiest tree / Whose thin leaves trembled in the 
frozen air, / Joy ran, as blood within a living frame” (I, 152-156).  Ruston suggests that, rather than
forcing a political statement, Shelley’s lines explore the distinction in contemporary scientific debat s 




would not have such an easy and self-promoting entrée into his relevant physiology of 
blood circulation.   
 Walter Pater’s aesthetic observations in The Renaissance (1873) benefit from 
the trope of the medical microcosm, which he adopts in order to conceive of the forces 
(as opposed to stases or cycles) of senescence that render human physical beauty 
handful of dust.  Pater identifies the poignant aesthetic of aging as a series of parallels 
between body and biome, and his melancholy rhapsody becomes a celebration of 
natural dynamism, the kind that in the Renaissance under girded the carpe diem 
imperative.  Pater’s formulation of carpe diem is modern, however: his rosebuds are 
rust and corn, and the forces of this biological world partake in contemporary 
evolutionary discourse.  He writes,  
What is the whole physical life in that moment but a combination of natural 
elements to which science gives their names? But those elements, phosphorus 
and lime and delicate fibres, are present not in the human body alone: we detect 
them in places most remote from it. Our physical life is a perpetual motion of 
them -- the passage of the blood, the waste and repairing of the lenses of the 
eye, the modification of the tissues of the brain under every ray of light and 
sound -- processes which science reduces to simpler and more elementary 
forces. Like the elements of which we are composed, the action of these forces 
extends beyond us: it rusts iron and ripens corn. Far out on every side of us 
those elements are broadcast, driven in many currents; and birth and gesture and 
death and the springing of violets from the grave are but a few out of ten 
thousand resultant combinations. That clear, perpetual outline of face and limb 
is but an image of ours, under which we group them -- a design in a web, the 
actual threads of which pass out beyond it.  This at least of flamelike [sic] our 
life has, that it is but the concurrence, renewed from moment to moment, of 
forces parting sooner or later on their ways. (234-235) 
 
The human body is merely a cistern within which our organizing brains can arrange the 
elements that belong to the universe.  To ignore the commonality between elements in 
nature and those that comprise the physical body is to misunderstand the common 




forces, electricities, and flames that animate biological life.  For Pater, the medical 
microcosm is much more than a set of physical indicators that, by correspondence, aid 
in the treatment of illness.  His suggestive image allows a conception of the human 
condition as indivisible from nature’s condition; though there may seem to be 
boundaries between human and nature, those boundaries are all too dissoluble, and the 
elements we seem to possess are in fact the possessions of the macrocosmos; we only 
borrow them for our day.  The body is not God-given, it is a transient gift of nature.  
Pater’s philosophical moment, borne on the medical microcosm, brings our 
understanding of life towards an environmental ethical conviction: There is no ‘other’ 
in the universe, no boundary between human and nature, and circumferences are always 
conceptual, provisional, and permeable.         
In evolutionary theory, Ernest Haeckel’s theory that “ontogeny recapitulates 
phylogeny” held powerful implications for the temporal and material relationships 
between individual and species, and emphasized the power of the analogical reasoning 
that grounds microcosmic philosophy.56  He theorized that the prenatal development of 
an individual, from the fertilized gamete through infant birth at nine months, rapidly 
revisits each stage of evolutionary development attained by the human species as a 
whole.  Herbert Spenser extended this notion to include cultural evolution, as Spenser 
envisioned the educational trajectory of children as a stage-wise recapitulation of the 
historical advances in knowledge (1861: 5).  Haeckel’s doctrine that ontogeny 
                                                
56 In 1866 Haeckel coined the term ‘ecology,’ the study of the oikos (Greek for home or dwelling-
place), a word that emphasizes the importance of circumscribed and inter-contained systems in our 
studies of the natural world.  The word has evolved, etymologically, into ecosystem, ecotopia, 
ecoregion, ecocide, ecophene, ecoconscious, etc; th prefix eco- is now a mainstream handle for 
‘green’ versions of everything we buy, even though these products are often, on the uptake, less 




recapitulates phylogeny has been debunked on the literal level, but it is still taught in 
college biology courses as a revealing metaphorical thought experiment that places the 
temporal depths of phylogenic evolutionary change within the conceivable timescale of 
individual growth.  The ontogeny/phylogeny relationship was the subject of major 
investigation in nineteenth-century science, stirring extensive debate on the ultimate 
origins of life.   
The related concept of the protoplasm, a theoretical unit of primitive life that 
laid the foundation for many subsequent theories of developmental and evolutionary 
biology, was of intense interest to Erasmus Darwin, Richard Chambers, Charles 
Darwin, and Thomas Huxley.57  The protoplasm went hand-in-hand with a belief in 
unifying, ubiquitous forces in nature, particularly evolution.  It served as a concept for 
how all life could be contained in a single, archetypal unit, a microcosm that by its own 
developmental energy created the biological macrocosm, of which it, in turn, became 
the epitome.  This “atom of life” made its way into the imaginations of nineteenth-
century writers, as well: among others, George Eliot and Richard Jefferies adopted the 
aesthetic of biological minutiae to contain the symbolism of their literary imagery, and 
present the richness of the micro-scale world at the eye level of their readers.    
                                                
57 Erasmus Darwin’s Zoonomia (1803) enthusiastically speculates on the prototypical filament as a 
rationale for biological origins in life, a notion made especially appealing under the light of early 
evolutionary theory.  Darwin writes, “…would it be too bold to imagine, that in the great length of 
time, since the earth began to exist, perhaps millions of ages before the commencement of the history 
of mankind, would it be too bold to imagine, that all warm-blooded animals have arisen from one 
living filament, which THE GREAT FIRST CAUSE endued with animality, with the power of 
acquiring new parts, attended with new propensities, directed by irritations, sensations, volitions, and 
associations…delivering down those improvements by generation to its posterity, world without end!” 
(I, 509).  Tertius Lydgate is Eliot’s persona of the early nineteenth-century scientist for whom “too 
bold to imagine” was an anathema represented by small-minded, old-fashioned, often determinedly 




By the middle of the nineteenth-century, sciences of evolution and biological 
origins were at the center of empirical intrigue.  George Eliot’s tragic physician in 
Middlemarch, Tertius Lydgate, is a man with a mission to elucidate the mysteries of the 
theoretical protoplasm.  Lydgate’s downfall results from his disastrous social de sions 
rather than his science, which Eliot characterizes as his greatest passion and virtue.  He  
longed to demonstrate the more intimate relations of living structure, and help 
to define men’s though more accurately after the true order…What was the 
primitive tissue?...He counted on quiet intervals to be watchfully seized, for 
taking up the threads of investigation – on many hints to be won from diligent 
application, not only of the scalpel, but of the microscope, which research had 
begun to use again with new enthusiasm of reliance.  Such was Lydgate’s plan 
of the future: to do good small work for Middlemarch, and great work for the 
world. (139)    
 
Lawrence Rothfield (1992) has argued that Eliot’s focus on early cell biology in 
Middlemarch serves as a critique of biological science’s ability to generate unifying, 
conciliatory information across biological scales.  However effectively c lls and 
organisms were studied individually as their own clear biological units of scale, 
Rothfield argues that “retaining some faith in an ultimate unity, or at least some
hierarchical relationship, among the sciences” was elusive in Eliot’s time (99). But in 
important ways, intact relations of scale are essential to this novel’s several thr ads of 
argumentation.  Though there are episodes of despair and frustration in which the 
unintelligible prevails, the illustrative case or exemplary narrative is still Eliot’s 
heuristic.  Small experiments in Middlemarch translate into great advances in national 
science; the movements under the microscope perhaps hold the key to all higher-order 
life forms; individual couples reveal the varied challenges of the larger quest to attain 
happiness.  Middlemarch is a microcosm of English social dynamics, and readers h v  




structures and interrelations of English society through a discrete epitomic case study 
such as the village of Middlemarch affords.   
Lydgate’s timely scientific passion to find the universal protoplasm gestures to 
the scientific future, and Eliot balances his relevant inquiry with the obsolete ambition 
of Casaubon to find the key to all mythologies.  Mythology, in this new age of the 
biosciences, grew into a fresh body of knowledge based on primordial affinities, 
energies, biotic webs and nerves rather than the legends of the ancient Gods.58  Though 
the sciences of the 1860s did not yet possess the power of inter-scalar translation, from 
cell to organism, or from individual to nation, the potential of the illustrative microcosm 
was tantalizing enough for Eliot to write her most intelligent character, Lydgate, into 
the small circle of a cell, while promising him greatness and renown as the scientific 
ascetic’s prize.     
In one of his later essays, “Hours of Spring” (c. 1887), Richard Jefferies 
indicates the intrinsic value of genetic essence that is captured by the protoplasm 
concept.  Twenty years beyond Darwin’s evolution, the environmentally-minded 
Jefferies describes ontogeny using microbiology, which updates his John Clare-like 
eco-valuation for a contemporary audience.  He writes, “…the eggs of the starling are 
laid in the knot-hole of the pollard elm – common eggs, but within each a speck that is 
not to be found in a cut diamond of two hundred carats – the dot of protoplasm, the 
atom of life” (2001: 123).  This moral moment, which prizes life of any kind over 
mineral wealth, comes among a series of observations about the mutualisms between 
various bird species and their biotic environments.  The essay is one step short of a lyric 
                                                
58 Poets such as Keats would find common ground between these diverse traditions of telling deep 




on the ecosystem (not yet a defined concept), an entangled web in which the starling 
relies on the elm to cradle its atoms of life, and each successive bird species holds 
similar conventions with reciprocal trees.  Jefferies’s high valuation of the protoplasm 
as a biogenetic key to myriad adult forms previews the high value that twenty-first 
century medicine places on stem cells, those potential-filled undifferentiated units that 
we can coax into many useful specialty cells to treat disease.  The stem cell is more 
precious than gems because all of its ontogenetic portals are still wide open, and so 
quite literally it contains all adult cell forms in one microscopic puck suspended i 
developmental abeyance.                               
The congruence between microcosm and macrocosm is an aesthetic aid to 
conceiving the hierarchical ranks of the biological world, and it has many literal
applications in medicine.  Each microcosmos may be coherent within itself, but none 
could exist without inter-scalar linkages.  A key modern revelation follows: any little 
world is vulnerable to pollution by association.  An individual organism may be 
polluted by a mutation in genes, an ecosystem by community imbalance, a biosphere by 
large-scale regional shifts, such as massive deforestation and glacial melting.  The 
congruent scalar aesthetic is so fully integrated into scientific thought that taking this 
step back, realizing that the imaginative trope of the microcosm roots this commonplace 
of biology, makes it worthy of further inquiry.  In addition to the medical microcosm, 
two other iterations of the microcosm are relevant to nineteenth-century literature and 
the biological sciences that inherited holistic schemes of thought: microcosms of the 




III: The Psychological Microcosm  
 
The psychological microcosm, a figure that seeks to engulf nature’s macrocosm 
into the folds of brain and imagination, is a central unifying principle of poetry in the 
early nineteenth-century.  Though literary critics have never used the microcosm trope 
to theorize this inter-scalar, reciprocal relationship between lobe and globe, a sampling 
of the most interesting, complex, and important passages of early Romanticism reveals 
the ubiquity and power in the microcosmic construct of mind-as-world, a kind of 
intense philosophical subjectivity.59  In order to show the scope and prevalence of 
microcosmic ideas of the brain in nineteenth-century poetry, my readings are brief and 
somewhat provisional; this strategy of surveying the territory of an idea is consistent 
with my treatment of both tropes.  While I do not pretend that my readings are 
exhaustive, I trust that the appearance of this trope in some of the most celebrated 
passages of High Romanticism supports the claim that psychological microcosm 
aesthetics served an important intermediary role in the evolution of the idea.  The brain-
as-worldmaker notion of Romantic philosophy established how the alchemical action of 
poetic production might reverse the traditional “senses inform mind” into “mind directs 
senses.”  Coleridge was familiar with the microcosm in philosophy, which was enriched 
by his reading of the German Romantics Shelling and Novalis.  Nicholas Halmi’s essay
“Mind as Microcosm” (2001) demonstrates how Coleridge’s commitment to the 
                                                
59 Alan Richardson’s British Romanticism and the Scien e of the Mind (2001) investigates the 
development of neurological sciences in the early nineteenth-century, and the ways in which Romantic 
psychologies developed around these new scientific ins ghts.  The enormous pace of discoveries 
between 1790 and 1830, including definitive evidence that the brain was the seat of thought, that 
portions of the brain took on specific tasks, and that psychosomatic affect could have a non-dualistic 
basis, aided in the development of a literature that was cognitively modern (1-2, 6).  Psychology 
became of central interest among the sublime mysterie  of existence; my treatment of the 
psychological microcosm in literature reinforces the Romantic notion that brains exchange impressions 




microcosmic man (as seen in the eleventh of his Philosophical Lectures, delivere on 
March 8, 1819) was based in his desire for “the recuperation of nature in a meaningful 
relation to humanity” (49).   
By the second half of the nineteenth-century, a humorous and somewhat cynical 
view of the Romantic psychological microcosm was expressed on the pages of female 
Victorian poets May Kendall and George Eliot.  The psychological sublime, which had 
supported Romantic visions of inter-scalar connection and the synthesizing power of 
imagination, became by the end-of-century a comical conceit that exposed the egoism
of a masculine intellect imposing his visions on the natural world.  These claims and 
trends will be spelled out in this section on the psychological microcosm.       
The Romantics sympathized with Milton’s Satan, who reasoned in a fit of self-
empowerment that “The mind is its own place, and in itself / Can make a Heav’n of 
Hell, a Hell of Heav’n” (PL, I, 254-255).  Blake’s moonlit river bank in The Marriage 
of Heaven and Hell is a landscape regained, by force of imagination, from the angelic 
nightmare of a subterranean mill; his harper sings, “The man who never alters his 
opinion is like standing water, & breeds reptiles of the mind” (plate 19).  Blake’s 
Urizen, a figurative subset of reason divided from the infinite cosmos, finds himself 
shackled to his solipsistic psyche; the poet’s Orc cycle is a whirlpool of psychological 
figures (Los, Urizen, and Orc) that is recapitulated in Freud’s ego, superego, and id.  
Blake recognized that some of the most pernicious aspects of British society wer  borne 
on rails of institutional religion, and institutional science held a complement of hazards; 
Los, the imagination, balances these frames of mind and, unlike Justice, Los is not 




individual’s reality reinforces subjectivity in perception.  Realizing the tyranny of 
institutional “reality” as the kind of social interpellation that endangers every 
individual, Blake identified mind as the main agent of both imprisonment and 
emancipation.         
Wordsworth’s epiphanic moments, his spots of time, appear when emotion is 
recollected in tranquility, when blizzards of experience are distilled by the brain into 
symbolic representative episodes.  Wordsworth’s realizations are the offspring of “a 
mighty Mind, / Of one that feeds upon infinity” (13, ll. 69-70); this central formulation 
follows from the earliest parts of the Prelude,  
The mind of man is framed even like the breath 
And harmony of music.  There is a dark 
Invisible workmanship that reconciles 
 Discordant elements, and makes them move 
 In one society… (I. 352-356) 
 
In her celebrated study of literary Darwinism, Gillian Beer observes the use of “lyrical 
materialism” by the elder Romantics, which leads to secular-spiritual way of knowing 
nature: “Wordsworth’s emphasis upon the congruity of the inner and the outer worlds 
allows harmony and development without the need to insist upon a preordained design” 
(45).  In Tintern Abbey, the poet recognizes in nature a spiritual energy that is “anchor 
of my purest thoughts” (110), and wishes for Dorothy to grow, intellectually, to 
resemble himself:  “thy mind / Shall be a mansion for all lovely forms, / Thy memory 
be as a dwelling-place / For all sweet sounds and harmonies” (140-143).  Later in this 
chapter I will demonstrate how Dorothy’s mind and memory did indeed form itself 
around her nature-infused experiences with William and others, and how she was more 




The philosophical foundation of the Intimations of Immortality ode is contained 
in the preamble: Wordsworth as a boy was overwhelmed by the solipsistic “abyss of 
idealism” that his imagination continually created, and he sought escape by graspin  at 
“a wall or a tree,” something material in nature that was definitively outside of his 
mind.  This memory leads to the poem’s philosophic occasion: “Archimedes said that 
he could move the world if he had a point whereon to rest his machine.  Who has not 
felt the same aspirations as regards the world of his own mind?”  Poetry is the vehicl
that moves the whole cosmos of the psyche.  Unlike religion, which appeals to spirit 
and soul, and science, which appeals to reason, poetry for the Romantics was a 
wellspring for moving the mind all at once, never dispensing with or reducing the 
whole into a ration of spirit, imagination, intuition, emotion, memory, and reason.  Over 
the course of his epic poem, which was to rival the world-wandering heroic epics of 
past ages, Wordsworth sought his alternate title in a microcosmos: “The growth of a 
poet’s mind.”  Wordsworth’s brain is invested in molding the external world to 
imagined schemes of harmony with the help of the harmonizing rhythms of blank verse.  
 His work with Coleridge demonstrates how individual minds could coordinate 
in philosophy with the psychological microcosm, and yet starkly diverge in practice.  
Wordsworth’s genius usually led him to flights of fancy on mountain peaks in memory; 
Coleridge’s mind circled around more macabre foci, like the desperate psychologial 
worlds of the Mariner and Christabel.  The two poets parted ways over these 
dispositional discrepancies.  But Coleridge’s notion of the poetic symbol identifies a 
common focal point.  The symbol is that which “is characterized by a translucence of 




general; above all by the translucence of the eternal through and in the temporal.  It 
always partakes of the reality which it renders intelligible; and while it enunciates the 
whole, abides itself as a living part in that unity of which it is the representative” (The 
Statesman’s Manual).  Coleridge’s idea supported the realization, in poetry, of little 
worlds that reflected the true nature of things in the larger patterns of the universe.  This 
denotation of symbol is itself a Romantic epistemology, and it is microcosmic.    
High Romanticism is equipped with powerful lenses of the imagination; these 
lenses navigate the scales of nature through their rhapsodic panning into particulars, and 
out to universals.  Traversing scales in nature, in effect, prepares the poetic mind for its 
moment of enthusiastic insight.  There is cognitive chemistry involved in transforming 
the mundane quotidian into the illustrative symbolic.  In Kubla Khan, Coleridge’s 
laudanum-driven brain envisions the ideal, circumscribed space of paradise: 
So twice five miles of fertile ground 
With walls and towers were girdled round: 
And there were gardens bright with sinuous rills, 
Where blossomed many an incense-bearing tree; 
And here were forests ancient as the hills, 
Enfolding sunny spots of greenery.  (6-11) 
 
We will see how the ecological microcosm relies on diversity of landscape and life-
form within a small circle; here, Coleridge’s “psychological curiosity” atains an 
ecological vision of a paradisiacal place by using the dreaming imagination and the 
pharmacological muse as vehicles.  Famously, Coleridge lost his memory of the rest of 
the poem, he claimed, because he was interrupted in his frenzied composition by a 
knock at the door.  This Xanadu existed only in his mind, and only during the intensive 




vanished, as Coleridge describes in the poem’s preamble, like “images on the surfac of 
a stream into which a stone had been cast.”      
Coleridge’s poem This Lime-Tree Bower my Prison is set on firmer ground.  
The poem wrestles with the mundane until it finds its moment of insight, but the poet 
has no need to climb a mountain peak (or take laudanum) for his eventual perspective.  
Simply by dwelling in the same small, complex, natural place and thi king through his 
mood, Coleridge transforms blindness and separation into a vision of interconnection.  
Imagining his friends’ progress on their walk, the poet is moved to empathy and 
transposes their experience into his own circumscribed location:   
    A delight  
Comes sudden on my heart, and I am glad   
As I myself were there! Nor in this bower,   
This little lime-tree bower, have I not marked  
Much that has soothed me.  Pale beneath the blaze   
Hung the transparent foliage; and I watched   
Some broad and sunny leaf, and loved to see  
The shadow of the leaf and stem above  
Dappling its sunshine!     (43-51)           
 
Coleridge finds, in the sun patterns on a single leaf, a recursive view of an entire grove 
of sunbathed trees; he harnesses his imagination into a labor of deep empathy with 
Charles Lamb’s experience:   
     So my Friend 
 Struck with deep joy may stand, as I have stood, 
 Silent with swimming sense; yea, gazing round 
 On the wide landscape, gaze till all doth seem 
 Less gross than bodily;  (37-41) 
 
Though his body is passive, his active brain transforms the scene into a vision of 
nature’s ubiquity, even downscale:   
Henceforth I shall know  




No plot so narrow, be but Nature there,  
No waste so vacant, but may well employ  
Each faculty of sense, and keep the heart  
Awake to Love and Beauty! (59-64)    
 
This famous passage has moral as well as ecological resonances; the “wise and pure” 
are those who dwell in patient contemplation of nature, and are rewarded for their 
imaginative sophistication; the initially-perceived vacant wastes ar tr nsformed into 
minute gardens and wildernesses.  Since Coleridge is forced, by physical injury, to stay 
put beneath the lime tree, his imagination delves deeply into the scene, and he emerges 
with the microcosmic epiphany that is unavailable to those hikers contemplating a 
broader range.  Again, circumscription is crucial to a vision of the microcosm, and the 
imagination successfully performs the enzymatic activity that makes  minor paradise 
out of a vacant waste.   
 Percy Shelley’s poetry develops the trope of mind-as-universe by fully 
subsuming one into the other.  These cycles of shifting congruence between inner and 
outer worlds are approached by Shelley’s almost immaterial phraseology:  
“unentangled intermixture” and “unremitting interchange” are the products of a p etic 
language straining to capture his imagination’s information, which is derived from a 
lifetime of studying forms in nature.  Mont Blanc is the apex of Shelley’s abstract 
philosophical formulations:   
 Dizzy Ravine!  and when I gaze on thee   
I seem as in a trance sublime and strange   
To muse on my own separate fantasy,   
My own, my human mind, which passively  
Now renders and receives fast influencings,   
Holding an unremitting interchange   
With the clear universe of things around;   
One legion of wild thoughts, whose wandering wings   




Where that or thou art no unbidden guest,  
In the still cave of the witch Poesy,   
Seeking among the shadows that pass by,  
Ghosts of all things that are… (ll. 34-46) 
 
Shelley’s verse seeks to contain the vastness of material nature in some coherent parcel 
of cognitive space; he carves a cave in which poetry dwells so as to delimit the thoughts 
themselves from their source of inspiration (“the clear universe of things around”); this 
circumscription, however, is necessarily incomplete and the interchange of mind and 
mountain is a continual process enabled by their mutually active energies.   
 These major poets of the Romantic period demonstrate how the world of the 
mind is a laboratory that can be used to recombine the elements of nature and formulate 
a distinct epistemology based on imagination.  Mental microcosms have a philosophical 
basis in desiring to understand the natural world as a system of materials and energies 
that is congruent and complementary with a human brain that evolved from the self-
same processes.  An ambition to know nature deeply by delving into the stores of the 
imagination, by forcing the brain to recombine sense elements into the secondary, 
higher-order capability of inspired perception (and thereby to derive the sublime fro  
the hum-drum), is the epistemological belief that guided these natural supernaturalists 
beyond the knowledge-avenues of traditional religious faith (which spurns both the 
senses and reason) and strict empiricism (which disavows imagination).  The 
psychological microcosm personalizes the world-at-large, permitting, as Ke t  would 
imagine of Galileo, new planets to swim into our ken.  With these acts of close, open-
minded observation, habitats grow in the brain, and the shadows of nature lighten to the 




Later writers of the nineteenth-century, particularly those in dialogue with the 
minds directing Victorian science, would become suspicious of the paradises offered up 
by the Romantic imaginations of poets and utopian techno-scientists.  In particular, 
women poets would make comical figures out of the earlier generations’ deeply s rious 
epistemology of imagination and the egotism of the hyper-subjective, world-
commanding psychological microcosm.  Cautionary Victorians distrusted the popular 
belief that paradise, if imaginable, could be created as a material reality using recent 
advancements in the sciences and technology.  George Eliot’s A Minor Prophet (1874) 
satirizes the ideas of a “vegetarian seer” named Elias Baptist Butterwor h, ho 
philosophizes “Somewhat too wearisomely” on the uneasy evolution of Christianity 
into a new technical age (ll. 1, 16).  Butterworth’s physiognomy makes him physically 
fit to absorb the world of “Transatlantic air and modern thought” (23); his hair is 
brushed back “to show his great capacity -- / A full grain’s length at the anglof the 
brow / Proving him witty…/ his doctrine needs / The testimony of his frontal lobe” (28-
30, 32-33).  A cognitive analogue to spiritualism’s notion of the collective soul, 
Butterworth subscribes to the highly industrial image of a “Thought-atmosphere,” made 
of  
  a steam of brains 
In correlated force of raps, as proved  
By motion, heat, and science generally;  
The spectrum, for example, which has shown  
The self-same metals in the sun as here;  
So the Thought-atmosphere is everywhere. (ll. 38-43)  [italics in the original] 
 
Eliot’s fun with her sardonic indictment of the Victorian kings of ideas is measured by a 
serious concern for the environmental endpoints of their actions.  The self-admiring, 




the psychological microcosm comes to show how privileged English industrial ideals
come to be stamped upon the body of “our infant Earth”: 
 When it will be too full of human kind  
 To have the room for wilder animals. 
 Saith he, Sahara will be populous 
 With families of gentlemen retired 
 From commerce in more Central Africa, 
 Who order coolness as we order coal, 
 And have a lobe anterior strong enough 
 To think away the sand storms.  Science thus 
 Will leave no spot on this terraqueous globe 
 Unfit to be inhabited by man, 
 The chief of animals: all meaner brutes 
 Will have been smoked and elbowed out of life. (ll. 66-78) 
 
The chilling accuracy of this semi-comical passage, as we look back on the long 
century since its composition, makes Eliot’s poem a serious and inspired environmental 
claim that values ‘wildness’ over the intellectual cult of idealistic beauty-worship.  The 
speaker, who dubs herself “Colin Clout,” identifies how “every change upon this earth / 
Is bought with sacrifice” (ll. 145-146); a technological purchase, we have learned, that 
comes at the cost of biological heterogeneity as well as intellectual richness (remember 
the idiocy of Wells’s Eloi from my analysis in chapter two).  Clout takes a position 
against the eugenic ideal that raged in the wake of evolution by natural selection:   
 A clinging flavour penetrates my life –  
 My onion is imperfectness: I cleave 
 To nature’s blunders, evanescent types  
 Which sages banish from Utopia.  (ll. 173-176)   
 
Surely the human mind is yet an inadequate vessel for containing all perfection and all 
imperfection it views in the natural world; when we design the future around a Utopia 




and predictable telos for the wild vitality of nature’s ongoing experiments with life.  
Recall Richard Jefferies’s prophetic quote from late in his career:  
When at last I had disabused my mind of the enormous imposture of a design, 
an object, and an end, a purpose or a system, I began to see dimly how much 
more grandeur, beauty, and hope there is in a divine chaos – not chaos in the 
sense of disorder or confusion but simply the absence of order – than there is in 
a universe made by pattern…this machine-made world and piece of mechanism; 
what a petty, despicable, microcosmos I had substituted for the reality…I look 
at the sunshine and feel that there is no contracted order: there is divine chaos, 
and, in it, limitless hope and possibilities. (2001: 163)   
 
Written at the same time, Eliot’s poem and Jefferies’s essay are pointed critiques of a 
Romantic vision that had been streamlined for more businesslike times.  By the 1870s, 
the imposition of synergetic order over nature, both conceptually and technologically, 
had become a noticeable threat to the wild vitality that the Romantics had celebrat d 
half a century earlier.  Eliot’s “steam of brains” and Jefferies’s “machine-made world 
and…petty, despicable microcosmos” reveal a moral problem with an imagined 
perfection of the mind becoming manifest in nature.  We will see in chapter five that 
some ecologists of the twenty-first century have analogous concerns with the degree to 
which scientists conceptualize nature as a mechanism we can model using microcosms, 
and therefore disrespect the element of chaotic creativity as a continual and crucial 
factor in natural systems.   
 May Kendall, a late Victorian poet, was as cheeky as George Eliot when it came 
to the great advances in technology borne on scientific advance.  Her Lay of the 
Trilobite (1887) sounds a pastoral trope of desirable simplicity in life, a blissful state of 
ignorance that has been shattered by the monstrous cerebral cortex of Homo sapiens 
(the sapient ones).  Thinking is tortuous trouble, and in this ballad the evolved brain 




 A Mountain’s giddy height I sought 
  Because I could not find 
 Sufficient vague and mighty thought 
  To fill my mighty mind; 
 And as I wandered ill at east, 
  There chanced upon my sight 
 A native of Silurian seas, 
  An ancient Trilobite. (ll. 1-8)     
 
This image of the Romantic wanderer directly addresses the Wordsworthian mind 
feeding upon infinity, and, like Cleopatra, this mind makes the man hungry where he is 
most satisfied.  Here, the potential for a psychological microcosm is itself a weary 
notion, and all the complexities of philosophy, poetry, religion, science and politics 
become forms of delusional self-enslavement, rather than avenues through which the 
natural world can be better captured in the world of neurons.  The poem becomes a lyric 
of Paleolithic theriophily (animal love):  
 I wish our brains were not so good, 
  I wish our skulls were thicker, 
 I wish that Evolution could 
  Have stopped a little quicker; 
 For oh, it was a happy plight, 
  Of liberty and ease, 
 To be a simple Trilobite 
  In the Silurian seas! (ll. 64-72) 
 
The comical adolescence of this ballad verse, (its easy and obvious rhymes, its 
exclamations of simple emotion) exhibits more than just the intermediary role betw en 
children and men that women’s writing was slotted to play in Victorian culture.  
Kendall’s caution cuts at the heart of her ambitious age, which produced so many 
mammoth, world-swallowing studies of nature and culture.  Her poem adopts a Quaker 
ethic, aligning simplicity with freedom, and divests itself of the heavy garments of 




hero feels no compulsion to defend his ignorant ways, or his meager means, they 
simply are.  There is no need to force them into becoming something greater.  He 
concludes,  
I didn’t grumble, didn’t steal, 
I never took to rhyme: 
Salt water was my frugal meal, 
And carbonate of lime. (ll. 53-56) 
 
As Victorians looked ahead to Modernity, many of them also looked back to the 
Romantic ideal of the world-reflecting mind.  A small percentage of humanity, 
particularly the British upper-class, had attained relative liberty fromhunger, disease, 
and physical oppression; these liberties cultivated further philosophical and scie tific 
advance in the networks of educated minds.  A larger percentage of the British people 
lost the freedom and health of their formerly agrarian lifestyle as a compulsory sacrifice 
to mammon, the industrial, material beast, which closes windows on the natural world.  
Kendall’s poem also speaks for the masses who have enjoyed no increase in their 
standards of living as a result of the modern industrial state, and whose comparative 
freedom had been based on simplicity and non-materialism.   
The psychological microcosm carried a whiff of idealism into a practical age, 
thus wedding the metaphysical concept of holistic containment with myriad 
mechanisms that might realize such coherence in physical terms.  What the brain 
contained, nature reflected, and technology and mechanics might eventually 
manufacture.  The brain-as-world trope can be linked to the biogeochemist Vladimir 
Vernadsky’s concept of the noosphere (dating from the 1920s), which he defined as a 
new inheritance of cosmic organization, after the geosphere and biosphere phases.  




Earth; Vernadsky drew the corollary of the human brain coming into command over the 
biological world.  His mechanism, based on nuclear physics, theorizes how humans 
could transmute elements to create whatever matter they desired, from the basest of 
inputs.  As a speculative hypothesis, the noosphere is an epitome of metaphysics, but 
like the most self-absorbed versions of the psychological microcosm, it has a ration l 
limb that strikes at the physical world. 
An alternative concept of the microcosm was to rise to centrality during the 
nineteenth-century.  This ecological microcosm brought the little worlds of the mind 
out of the cranial cavity and onto the terrain of investigable biological phenomena.  
More than a trope, less than a truth, the ecological microcosm straddles epistemological 
territories, thus opening space for fresh equations of human involvement with nature.  
The final section of this chapter investigates ways in which literature accommodated, 
and translated, earlier microcosms in order to address the ecological concerns of 




IV: The Ecological Microcosm 
 
With the increasing industrial stresses on natural environments, nineteenth-
century writers were in a position to actuate the power of the ecological microcosm as a 
material construct built upon an imaginative conceit.  These literary encounters actively 
recombined some parcel of physical nature with the writer’s imagination of her place 
within the cosmic network; I distinguish these readings from the earlier instances of the 
psychological microcosm by virtue of their locus within nature, rather than in the mind 
of the seeker of nature.  There is no hard-and-fast distinction that imperviously 
separates the world-of-mind trope from the world-of-nature or oikos; if there were, we 
would be some way towards addressing the insoluble debate still surrounding 
subjectivity in science.  The mind always partakes of the reality which it renders 
intelligible, and the works I select here and promote as epistemological ancestors to 
modern ecological science are, indeed, works of art.  Art since at least the eighteenth-
century has negotiated with scientific theories about the way nature behaves.  In chapter 
two we observed the chaotic narrative dynamics of rapid environmental change as 
evoking a signal pattern in ecology.  The present chapter is involved not merely in 
showing the symbolic sense of control afforded by a simple and small system tha 
models the global macrocosm, but also the vulnerability to utter dissolution that models 
can exhibit, portending global upheaval.  
In 1935 the American ecologist Arthur Tansley sought a formal definition for 
the new scientific concept of the ecosystem, which is one scientific way to 
conceptualize an ecological microcosm.  Ecosystems, though not literally isolated from 




and energy exchange patterns.  Tansley was bothered by the muddiness of boundaries 
in ecology, and yet he recognized that circumscription in nature was often as much a 
matter of theory and imagination as it was an extant reality that could be studi d.  To 
this end, he writes:     
[Ecosystems] are of the most various kinds and sizes.  They form one category 
of the multitudinous physical systems of the universe, which range from the 
universe as a whole down to the atom.  The whole method of science…is to 
isolate systems mentally for the purposes of study, so that the series of isolates 
we make become the actual objects of our study, whether the isolate be a solar 
system, a planet, a climatic region, a plant or animal community, an individual 
organism, an organic molecule or an atom.  Actually the systems we isolate 
mentally are not only included as parts of larger ones, but they also overlap, 
interlock and interact with one another.  The isolation is partly artificial, but it is 
the only possible way in which we can proceed.  (299-300)      
 
The boundaries of ecosystem ecology, then, are systems “we isolate mentally.”  The  
are half-imagined for the sake of coherent study, and they half-exist as disinct sub-
structures of organization in nature.  To imagine their existence is a necessary precursor 
for theorizing how they might work: how inclusive to be in the model, how to measure 
the impalpable entities, and to account for contingent events set in time.  The ecologist 
dwells in a liminal terrain between theory and material entity, and the dimensions of 
this meta/physical space are largely subject to her own definition (though the terms and 
rationale of ecosystem boundaries will inevitably be vetted by the scientific 
community).  Ecology’s hope for simplifying enormously complex natural systems falls 
to isolating a small portion of nature from all the rest for the purpose of studying it in a 
kind of intellectual vacuum.  Tansley admitted “the isolation is partly artificial, but it is 
the only possible way in which we can proceed.”   
The word “artificial” might be substituted with intellectual or imaginative or 




nature will require its observer to define the boundaries of inquiry and make a series of 
subjective decisions about what is within the lens and what must be excluded for 
intelligibility’s sake.  These decisions of empirical circumscription become more 
difficult in the middle, ecological, scales of inquiry: solar systems and atoms are 
conceptually more isolated than climactic regions or animal and plant communities 
because they are closer to infinite largeness and minuteness.  Because of the muddy 
middle scale, the scale of every day human life, ecological science has had to theorize 
its terms and methods of circumscription in order to make empiricism at these scales 
actionable.  The microcosm concept performed the much-needed labor of clarification 
for ecologists in the twentieth-century.  In this section I will sample early literary uses 
of the ecological microcosm, circling around the notion that imagination is essential to 
theorizing a distinct, austere system in nature that can be studied empirically as though 
it were an isolate.   
  A commonplace of Romantic aesthetic theory lies in the observation of the 
picturesque as a selective subset of nature’s scenes; this vogue could be understood as 
an industrial mass population’s desire to recuperate the Edenic bower.  In 1794, 
William Gilpin’s essay on “Picturesque Beauty” formalized the notion of the 
picturesque composition as “uniting in one whole a variety of parts; and these parts can 
only be obtained from rough objects…the picturesque eye is to survey nature; not to 
anatomize matter…It examines parts, but never particles” (508) [italics in the original].  
Contrasting the reductionism of the empirical sciences, yet still seeking a frame for his 
formal vision of the picturesque, Gilpin requires the partition of Nature for aesthetic 




restraint of rules…[the painter must] remove little objects, which in nature push 
themselves too much in sight, and serve only to introduce too many parts into your 
composition” (510).  Simplicity, variety, and synergy became the requirements for 
viewing a landscape properly and for choosing a subset of nature that was to becomean 
idealized representation of the sampled whole.60   
 Almost a century later, William Morris would criticize this detached vision of 
nature as a lamentable inheritance of the “Century of Commerce.”  In The Beauty of 
Life (1880), Morris politicizes Gilpin’s austere doctrine with a simple question:  “How 
can you care about the image of a landscape when you show by your deeds that you 
don’t care for the landscape itself?” (chapter 3 page 10).  It had become clear near the 
end of the nineteenth-century that the picturesque aesthetic was an effective way to 
summarize nature, but that art did not always play the role of preserver and, along with 
the general commerce of industrialism, many works of art had come to exploit natural 
scenes for capital gain.61  Other methods of aesthetically partitioning a system of nature, 
                                                
60 Edmund Burke (1756) was soon to raise the ante on Romantic aesthetics by theorizing the sublime 
as a counterpoint to the picturesque and the beautiful; h s idea of sublimity was based on its defiance of 
circumscription, including the characteristics of terror, obscurity, power, privation, vastness, infinity, 
difficulty.  To contrast, he somewhat tersely captured the essence of beauty by associating it with 
exquisite smallness: “in most languages, the objects of love are spoken of under diminutive epithets” 
(503).             
  
61 Tim Morton’s recent study Ecology without Nature (2007) critiques the reveries of literary 
ecocritics, whom he believes demonstrate “a refusal to engage with the present moment” by their 
“vision of the text as a pristine wilderness of pure meaning” (122).  He is working from a critique of 
‘wilderness’ established by Bill Cronin.  Morton’s present moment addresses the late industrial, post-
wilderness condition that has been brought about by science and technology in the years intervening 
since the Romantic period, which he identifies as a“negative awareness” quite estranged from 
ecofeminist and Gaian images of holism (84).  He state : “Ecology derived from the Enlightenment 
view of the economy of nature.  This economy is an organization to the mutual cost and benefit of its 
participants.  But ecology had begun to appear rathe  fuzzy and even spiritual, a superorganism 
composed of all organisms.  Despite its connotations of the theoretical, at least to reactionary ears, the 
idea of environment as a system rules out critical anomalies.  The ecosystem becomes an immersive, 
impersonal matrix…Systems theory is holism without the sticky wetness, a cybernetic version of the 
ecological imaginary” (103).  Rather than supporting Morton’s argument based on the antithesis 




particularly aquariums and greenhouses, flourished over the course of the nineteenth-
century; these lead to massive nationalistic undertakings such as Kew Gardens an  the 
Great Exhibition of 1851.  Colonial England needed architectural structures to contain 
the ecological worlds they were scavenging from the edges of Empire.62  One hundred 
years before Arthur Tansley theorized the ecosystem for the sciences, poets were 
noticing how their natural dwellings could, in effect, become subjects through the 
imaginative, partially-artificial work of microcosmic circumscription.   
 Wordsworth’s Home at Grasmere is a rewarding study in the context of an 
ecological microcosm as an oikos, or dwelling place.  The long poem was meant as a 
first section to his unfinished epic “The Recluse,” but the introductory fragment was not 
published until 1888, long posthumous.  Wordsworth felt he had failed on the much-
contemplated “Recluse” project, but “Home at Grasmere” and “The Excursion” (the 
epic’s second section) together form an appealing rejoinder to his finished epic “The 
Prelude” (or, the growth of a poet’s mind).  In “Home at Grasmere,” Wordsworth set 
out to establish a philosophy of organicism between the mind and its natural dwelling.  
Coleridge recalled that “Wordsworth should assume the station of a man in mental 
repose, one whose principles were made up, and so prepared to deliver upon authority a 
system of philosophy.  He was to treat man as man, --a subject of eye, ear, touch, and 
taste, in contact with external nature, and informing the senses from the mind, and not 
                                                                                                                                          
science, I contend that his thought is more constructively aligned under mutual, progressive historical 
influence: “Spiritual” holism as a Romantic philosophy is predecessor to biological systems theory, 
and systems take part in irreducible biosynergetic wholes that are best approached through a more-
than-mechanical understanding.  Where Morton undercuts ecocritical readings as naïvely eco-spiritual 
and implies that its practitioners are unaware of highly quantifiable theories and matrixes of systems 
ecology, I counter that the quasi-spiritual naturalism of Romantic poetry is conceptually continuous 
with its twenty-first century outlets in the scienc of ecological complexity.      
 
62 David Allen (1976) has a useful discussion of thisvogue and the mechanical ingenuity necessary to 




compounding a mind out of the senses” (Darlington 1977: 3).  Wordsworth’s verse 
précis of this philosophical occasion is more inclusive of a two-way exchange of 
influence: 
   my voice proclaims 
How exquisitely the individual Mind 
(And the progressive powers perhaps no less 
Of the whole species) to the external World    
Is fitted; and how exquisitely, too – 
Theme this but a little heard among Men – 
The external World is fitted to the Mind;  
And the creation (by no lower name  
Can it be called) which they when blended might 
Accomplish; this is our high argument.  (ll. 815-824) 
As philosophers who so deeply valued the imagination’s contribution to our perception 
of the material world, the pair of poets set out to reverse the conventional order of a 
plastic mind molded by its concrete habitat, substituting (without fully eliminating the 
obverse) an ecological habitat created by an active brain.  The cognitive subjective was 
to be master for the day, and more was to be known of nature by virtue of its 
recombination with imagination than could be known by classically scientific, subject-
subtracting objectivity.  As Milton’s high argument had been to “justify the ways of 
God to men,” Wordsworth performed the more secular, modern task of justifying the 
ways of nature to men (and women), and in fact to elevate humans’ agency in the 
natural world by implicating the power of a vital, cultivated imagination.  
 Wordsworth’s habitat, his adopted home from the middle years to his death, was 
the microcosm of Grasmere vale.  Though Wordsworth was what Schiller called a 
sentimental poet, a non-native who is aware of the rift between real and ideal, there is 
very little irony to the Wordsworthian sense of dwelling and belonging in Grasmere’s 




counterpart to the heavens reflected in its waters, and Grasmere isolated the p rplexing 
excesses of all nature down to a clarifying unity in which the mind could dwell, and 
make daily exchange: 
    feeling as we do, 
How goodly, how exceeding fair, how pure, 
From all reproach is yon ethereal vault 
And this deep Vale, its earthly counterpart, 
By which and under which we are enclosed 
To breathe in peace; we shall moreover find… 
The Inmates not unworthy of their home, 
The Dwellers of their Dwelling.  (ll. 639-644, 647-648)       
A dwelling must have dwellers truly to exist, otherwise the dwelling is merely a 
physical symbol standing in for a narrative of what has been, a notion Wordsworth 
explored in “The Ruined Cottage.”  Grasmere is a dwelling both physically and 
cognitively, and is vital by virtue of the inmates (human and otherwise) who make 
themselves worthy of their place in nature by their awareness of its exquisite 
organization.  The work of achieving congruence between mind and nature, in effect, 
settles and coheres both entities; the thesis and antithesis are mutually enabling towards 
a desired synthesis in which nature and the mind are mimeses of one another, and 
neither holds precedence.  The mind without a proper object of study can be monstrous, 
as Wordsworth develops in his mode of the cognitive sublime: 
   Not Chaos, not 
The darkest pit of lowest Erebus, 
Nor aught of blinder vacancy scooped out 
By help of dreams can breed such fear and awe 
As fall upon us often when we look 
Into our Minds, into the Mind of Man,  
My haunt and the main region of my Song.  (ll. 788-794) 
 
However, the poet continues,  




 When wedded to this goodly universe 
 In love and holy passion, shall find these [Elysian fields] 
 A simple produce of the common day. (ll. 805-808)   
 
“Simple” and “common” are not yawn-worthy endpoints from the lyrical study of 
nature, they are the epitome of the Romantic project to re-infuse the building-blocks of 
quotidian experience with the sublime revelations of the poetic mind wedded to its 
natural dwelling place.  The human mind, which can become more awful and 
frightening than mythical chaos, finds sublime transcendence in these nuptials recorded 
line-by-line in Home at Grasmere.  Wordsworth is self-consciously performing his own 
intellectual wedding:  “Embrace me then, ye Hills, and close me in; / Now in the clear 
and open day I feel / Your guardianship; I take it to my heart; / ‘Tis like the solemn 
shelter of the night…” (ll. 110-113).  Now husband to his desired portion of all nature, 
Wordsworth’s mind and Grasmere’s vale make each other nobler by deep appreciation, 
and the microcosm gains the emergent personable qualities of nurturer, companion, 
instructor, guardian.   
 The ecosystem was to become the conceptual theatre in which the drama of 
daily existence played out; in ecosystem science became the medium in which 
individuals grew, strove, learned, found provision and in their turn provided.  
Wordsworth anticipates the scientific drama of evolutionary ecology with his own 
lyrical drama of cognitive evolution set within a natural compass.  Though the voice is 
necessarily anthropocentric, he frequently consults the seeming ecstasy of other figures, 
birds, birches, ungulates, who reflect his personal joy back with their own effusions.  
Whether these subjects are themselves part of the nature he is studying or are in some 




Unity entire” (l. 151).  He arrives at this phrase very early in the poem, as though it is 
an ideal that he will seek for the whole work as a mantra is inherently reinforcd by its 
very repetition.  The phrase is a keystone to a long philosophical perambulation: 
What want we?  Have we not perpetual streams, 
Warm woods and sunny hills, and fresh green fields, 
And mountains not less green, and flocks and herds, 
And thickets full of songsters, and the voice  
Of lordly birds – and unexpected sound 
Heard now and then from morn to latest eve 
Admonishing the man who walks below 
Of solitude and silence in the sky? 
These have we, and a thousand nooks of earth 
Have also these; but no where else is found – 
No where (or is it fancy?) can be found – 
The one sensation that is here; ‘tis here, 
Here as it found its way into my heart 
In childhood, here as it abides by day,  
By night, here only; or in chosen minds 
That take it with them hence, where’er they go.   
‘Tis (but I cannot name it), ‘tis the sense  
Of majesty and beauty and repose,  
A blending of holiness of earth and sky, 
Something that makes this individual Spot, 
This small Abiding-place of many Men, 
A termination and a last retreat, 
A Centre, come from wheresoe’er you will, 
A Whole without dependence or defect, 
Made for itself and happy in itself, 
Perfect Contentment, Unity entire.  (ll. 126-151)          
A wealth of Wordsworthian aporia pushes this passage carefully to its conclusion.  The 
inquisition of his own happiness (“have we not?,” “is it fancy?,” “I cannot name it”) are 
places of pause in which his intuition comes to terms with his perception before the 
wedding can move on.  Though “a thousand nooks of earth” are microcosms possessing 
equivalent natural virtues, we sense that Grasmere is unique to Wordsworth (though he 
“cannot name it”) because it holds the center and circumference of his cognitive, 




vale that pales all others.  In nature, the unique is the nearly extinct; the epitom , 
however, is the illustrative case that permits the elucidation of all similar cases.  
Wordsworth’s Grasmere carries the cognitive microcosm into the biological realm, but 
instead of sacrificing imagination for the sake of objectivity, it so infuses th  
imaginative that reality itself is constituted by the union of thought and material.  In 
science, such weddings (when well-corroborated) grow to the status of theory.  
Wordsworth’s microcosmic theory, borne on the bilateral but chiastic phrase “Perf ct 
Contentment, Unity entire,” aids all of his considerable philosophical offspring in their 
thinking of how a nook of nature might be conceived as coherent, self-sufficient, 
reducible without splintering into atomies, capable of providing both contentment 
(emotional) and unity (conceptual).  Wordsworth’s microcosm is a utopian vision, 
embellished by a mind set in reverie and drawn along by iambs, but it is more than 
mere lyrical idealism.  It sets a theoretical system around the mystical alchemy of the 
mind-in-nature, and foregrounds the formalization of insular, unified systems in 
empirical studies of ecological science.           
Dorothy Wordsworth has been known to history mostly as a companion to her 
more famous brother and his devoted chronicler, whose observations on nature would 
emerge, reformulated and lyricized, in William’s poetry.  Dorothy’s self-effacing titles 
often draw attention to self-perceived formal inadequacies of her verse, but the q ality 
of imagery and its symbolic circumspection bring her poems alongside the established 
writers of the period.  Feminist literary criticism has recovered Dorothy’s efforts, which 
reveal notable ecological visions often based on the desire for insulation within the 




bioregionalism, the valuation of self-sustaining and autonomous ecosystems driven by a 
deep human investment in place.63   
Dorothy is a more successful observer of nature without imaginative 
embellishment, as her notebooks from Grasmere prove.  Her empirical eye for detail in 
conjunction with a Romantic’s imaginative energy render two of her poems as poignant 
reflections on microcosmic ecology, and both are ubi sunt perspectives of lost worlds.  
The first, “Irregular Verses,” addresses the daughter of Dorothy’s close hildhood 
friend, to whom the poet describes the life she had imagined living with Jane Pollard 
before the women were “by duty led” down separate paths.  Their lost “scheme” 
involves a self-enclosed, self-sustaining feminine space of nature:64 
A cottage in a verdant dell, 
A foaming stream, a crystal Well, 
A garden stored with fruits and flowers 
And sunny seats and shady bowers, 
A file of hives for humming bees 
Under a row of stately trees 
And, sheltering all this faery ground, 
A belt of hills must wrap it round… 
Such was the spot I fondly framed 
When life was new, and hope untamed. (ll. 21-28, 35-36)   
 
This highly-idealized, pastoral-agricultural vision is informed by a picturesque 
aesthetic, with the observer having “framed” a subset of nature as the salubrious 
balance of sustenance and attractiveness.  Importantly, this human-wrought ecosyst m 
is an imagined world, never having been realized in Dorothy’s life.  It remains through 
                                                
63 Kenneth Cervelli’s Dorothy Wordsworth’s Ecology (2007) is a major new study of the author’s 
strategies for depicting the natural world, though microcosms and circumscription are not part of 
Cervelli’s argument.   
 
64 Microcosms need not be “feminine”: Robinson Crusoe’  island leaps to mind as an early 
Enlightenment masculine symbol of nature’s self-suficient bounty, which becomes domestic when 
properly cultivated.  Crusoe’s primary hazard is the various other humans who might invade his island; 




perpetuity a figure of thought; the “faery ground” of an ecological microcosm is a way 
of thinking about nature’s schemes of organization that can then be read onto various 
landscapes.  In effect, Wordsworth’s domicile of the cottage merely broadens its circle 
to include the immediate natural surroundings, and her study of a dwelling place (an 
oikos) enlarges to the vision of a bioregion; this widened circle of synergetic inclusion 
invokes Coleridge’s doctrine of beauty as multëity in unity.         
 The second of Dorothy’s relevant poems is entitled “Floating Island at 
Hawkshead, An Incident in the Schemes of Nature,” which was published in a volume 
of William’s poetry in 1842.  The “Scheme of Nature” to which she refers is the 
phenomenon of a disjoined portion of shore breaking free and sailing on the lake; 
William had observed it happen at his school in Hawkshead, and he likens himself to 
this indolent and undirected subject in his Prelude of 1805 (13, ll. 339-343).  Dorothy 
takes the natural figure quite differently: she allows the island to remain its own entity, 
as a proof of how “Harmonious Powers with Nature work” (l. 1).  Her descriptive 
powers demonstrate the coherent vitality of the microcosm.  Anyone might view this 
island, 
 Dissevered float upon the Lake,  
 Float, with its crest of trees adorned 
 On which the warbling birds their pastime take. 
 
 Food, shelter, safety there they find 
 There berries ripen, flowerets bloom; 
 There insects live their lives – and die: 
 A peopled world it is; --in size a tiny room.  (ll. 10-16)   
 
The incident is another illustration of the importance of perspective when attempting to 
understand how natural systems work.  The island is transient, soon to be “Buried 




which it is possible for nature to retain her character of holistic interdependence.  By 
reduction, the microcosm makes natural systems intelligible to humans, but by retaining 
the heterogeneity intrinsic to a healthy system, the microcosm also preserves the whole.  
The floating island’s inevitable mortality likens it to an organism, simultaneously self-
sufficient and vulnerable as one.  Wordsworth ends her work with an assertion of the 
island’s literal materiality, which makes concrete its empirical legitimacy as a figure of 
thought: though “Its place [is] no longer to be found, / Yet the lost fragments shall 
remain, / To fertilize some other ground” (ll. 26-28).  Considering how long this island 
has floated in the subconscious of the poet (William attended Hawkshead in the 1780s, 
and Dorothy’s poem is thought to have been written in the late 1820s, and published in 
1842), this ballad is important in the history of ecological ideas: it lies at the 
convergence of poetic imagination with nature’s material systems by framing itself at a 
conceivable microcosmic scale.  As the island of Mauritius was to demonstrate fragility 
to Darwin in 1836 by virtue of the exotic species that flourished (and native species 
therefore under threat), Dorothy Wordsworth reads into her model that only its 
remnants will survive into the future.  Her solace lies in its potential to grow as another 
form.     
 The Wordsworths were precursors to poets who shared their enthusiasm for 
nature in detail, and found in the close study of natural forms a way to approach the 
imaginative transcendence of the quotidian.  The rural, naïve poet John Clare composed 
according to his doctrine of “taste,” an individual susceptibility to the small delicacies 
of nature that he believes few people possess.  From his early poem “A Ramble,” Clar  




Nameless enthusiastic ardour thine, / That ‘wildered ‘witching rapture ‘quisitive, / 
Stooping bent, genius o’er each object – thine / That longing pausing wishing that 
cannot pass / Uncomprehended things without a sigh / For wisdom to unseal the hidden 
cause…” (ll. 42-49).  Clare’s romance with the minutiae of nature continually appeals 
to the opening of individual perception, and his favorite subjects are self-contained, 
such as the series of bird nest poems and the returning theme of a healthy, 
heterogeneous village commons.  Enclosure, a fabricated method of circumscription 
that forces economic stratification onto natural boundaries, is Clare’s anathema.   
His devotion to nature in the wild makes for an ambivalent view of the work of 
scientists in nature, and Clare’s ambivalence addresses our inquiry into the 
microcosmic worldview as distinct from the reductionist practices of normal science.  
The poem “Shadows of Taste” is crucial to understanding Clare’s opinion of scientifi  
epistemology, and the equation of natural taste or susceptibility is understood through 
minutiae.  When compared to the avaricious “vulgar hinds” who look to nature only 
with “self-interest and the thoughts of gain,” Clare’s “man of science and of taste”
works with a genius borne on the pleasure principle, and this instinctual enthusiasm for 
nature is largely redeeming in the poet’s mind:65 
  The man of science and of taste, 
 Sees wealth far richer in the worthless waste 
 Where bits of lichen and a sprig of moss 
 With all the raptures of his mind engross 
 And bright-winged insects on the flowers of May 
                                                
65 The common ground held between knowledge-gaining and enjoyment recalls Wordsworth’s “grand 
elementary principle of pleasure…We have no sympathy but what is propagated by pleasure…[the 
man of science] feels that his knowledge is pleasure; and where he has no pleasure he has no 
knowledge” (Lyrical Ballads 361 of Longman).  Wordsworth characterizes the poet as a man 
representing the people, whereas the scientist is an i olated thinker.  Clare follows this lead, with 
isolation close to his own sensibilities; “Shadows of Taste” continues: “He [the scientist] loves each 
desolate neglected spot / That seems in labour’s hury left forgot, / The warped and punished trunk of 




 Shine pearls too wealthy to be cast away – 
 His joys run riot mid each juicy blade 
 Of grass where insects revel in the shade. 
 And minds of different moods will oft condemn 
 His taste as cruel – such the deeds to them,  
 While he unconscious gibbets butterflies 
 And strangles beetles all to make us wise. (ll. 107-118)     
 
Clare is drawing a tricky distinction here between the scientist’s deep consciousness of 
his surroundings and his “unconscious” execution of the insects of his interest; again 
Wordsworth’s philosophy is tacitly invoked with the moral statement “we murder to 
dissect,” but Clare’s lines have no accusatory tone, especially when the scientist is 
heralded as avatar of Clare’s coveted “taste.”  The gibbeting and strangling of which the 
scientist is guilty come off like a child’s loving enthusiasm for the insect world, in the 
vein of Wordsworth’s “Nutting,” more than they invoke images of the reign of terror or 
other politically-charged allusions.  Clare is a lover of nature in context, partaking of all 
the wondrous interconnection that makes the study of ecology necessarily sensitive to 
holism.  The scientist without taste, it follows, is the one who extracts portions of the
system under reductionist conventions:  
But take these several beings from their homes, 
Each beauteous thing a withered thought becomes, 
Association fades and like a dream 
They are but shadows of the things they seem; 
Torn from their homes and happiness they stand 
The poor dull captives of a foreign land. (ll. 147-152)     
 
The foreign lands of laboratories and cabinets of curiosities become the reductiv , and 
lamented, counterpart to the in situ study of nature; Clare’s subtle allusion to colonial 
botanical discoveries indicts the practice of collecting in general; in his view wisdom 
without artifice or delusion comes from the open participation in nature’s rhythms.  The 




to destroy a holistic entity that we don’t yet understand.  His final image, an animation 
of abstract “wisdom” based on taste, is concentric: 
 Such are the various moods that taste displays, 
 Surrounding wisdom in concentrating rays 
 Where threads of light from one bright focus run 
 As day’s proud halo circles round the sun. (ll. 161-164)        
 
Every lover of nature inhabits a little world in which taste illuminates yet-undiscovered 
wisdom, and these small encounters with nature accrete in increasing concentric scales 
to envelop the macrocosm of the inner solar system.  Congruence between small and 
large becomes an epistemology of true circumspection, fully differentiated from the 
tasteless, detractive acts of avaricious men.    
 In Prometheus Unbound, Shelley’s use of microcosmic imagery goes beyond 
the cognitive calisthenics of the psychological microcosm by delving into an 
imaginative global system of intelligible order and interchange.  In effect, Shelley 
pushes his metaphysical ideals into a lyrical exposition of modern science.  Shelley 
based his vision of the ‘intertranspicuous orb’ in book IV loosely on Ptolemaic theories 
and on contemporary ideas of matter and electricity, as critics of Shelley and science 
have shown.66  Less attention has been drawn to the deep-seeded theme of organicism 
                                                
66 Carl Grabo’s classic study A Newton Among Poets (1930) traces affinities between Shelley’s poetic 
visions of the earth and the contemporary scientific theories of Erasmus Darwin and Humphrey Davy.  
Darwin’s radical equation of matter with energy (rather than mere substance), and Davy’s development 
of a theory of particle matter revolving around axes in his Elements of Chemical Philosophy, Grabo 
argues, informed Shelley’s modern theory of cosmic organization based on inter-contained spheres 
(141-142).  Grabo’s citation of Davy’s work leads to his remark, “This is the dance of matter, incessant 
in motion, a microcosm of involved orbits, yet seemingly at rest.  So Davy has conceived it to be and 
so Shelley, with a scientist’s grasp and the imagery of a poet, describes it in terms of color, sound, and 
movement” (142-143).  Neil Fraistat observes how “Shelley critics have located a plethora of sources 
and analogs for the earth orb, ranging from Ezekiel, Bacon, and Milton to contemporary scientific 
theorists.  Perhaps the most complex and syncretic of all symbols in ‘Prometheus Unbound,’ the orb 
seems to substantiate most of these critical hypotheses” (The Poem and the Book (1983) 218, n. 36).  It 
is evident that this fantastic image weaves together strands of diverse origin, as Fraistat continues, 




and biology in this passage, on one hand, and to the industrial conceit of the machine 
that is a submerged metaphor sustaining motion throughout.  Together, the organic 
richness and the mechanical rigor of Shelley’s image create an epistemological balance 
evocative of ecological conceits like the “earth-system” or “biosphere,” ways in which 
we have come to comprehend global dynamics in the twenty-first century.  Shelley’s 
vision runs as follows, spoken by Panthea, one of the Oceaniades: 
A sphere, which is as many thousand spheres, 
Solid as crystal, yet though all its mass 
Flow, as through empty space, music and light:  
Ten thousand orbs involving and involved, 
Purple and azure, white, and green, and golden,  
Sphere within sphere; and every space between 
Peopled with unimaginable shapes, 
Such as ghosts dream dwell in the lampless deep, 
Yet each inter-transpicuous, and they whirl  
Over each other with a thousand motions, 
Upon a thousand sightless axles spinning,  
And with the force of self-destroying swiftness, 
Intensely, slowly, solemnly roll on, 
Kindling with mingled sounds, and many tones, 
Intelligible words and music wild. 
With mighty whirl the multitudinous orb  
Grinds the bright brook into an azure mist  
Of elemental subtlety, like light;  
And the wild odor of the forest flowers, 
The music of the living grass and air, 
The emerald light of leaf-entangled beams 
Round its intense yet self-conflicting speed,  
Seem kneaded into one aerial mass 
Which drowns the sense.   (IV, ll. 238-261)   
The dualistic nature of this vision pushes our understanding of the earth sphere beyond 
mechanically-minded chemistry into something organized under higher-order, emergent 
biological principles.  Of mechanism and industry, we have “sightless axels” moving in 
“self-destroying swiftness,” and this structured momentum “Grinds the bright brook 
                                                                                                                                          
also modeled after Renaissance conceptions of the cosmos” (165).  My reading aims to contribute an 




into an azure mist / Of elemental subtlety.”  Set within this engine, like an ambrosial 
fuel for the earth-system, are organic elements “Kindling with mingled sounds” 
including “The music of the living grass and air.”  Synaesthetically, Shelley includes 
kindling for the other senses: “the wild odour of the forest flowers,” “The emerald light 
of leaf-entangled beams,” and the aforementioned “bright brook [grinded] into an azure 
mist.”  Though the momentum is “self-destroying,” it is also eternally creative; the 
azure mist condenses back to brook form, we imagine, and the “intense yet self-
conflicting speed” of the system holds both acceleration and retardation within its 
grasp.    
 Though intensely abstract, this system, highly-organized, perched on the edge of 
chaos but assuredly under control, is an inspired vision of ecological complexity.  The 
interlacing of mechanical structure with organic sensuous energy lends the vision a 
corporeal symmetry at the forefront of Romantic scientific ideas of the glob .  Earth is 
not merely an exquisite Swiss watch set into motion, neither is it an intensely a -
aesthetic morass of biomass with obscure origins and indecipherable purpose.  It is an 
intelligible construct, “inter-transpicuous” from one scale to the next, reducible to 
components for the purposes of description.  Yet the whole of the macrocosmos, 
conceived as “one aërial mass,” inevitably “drowns the sense” (we imagine Shell y’s 
readers crying Blake’s “Enough!  or, too much!”).   
 It is almost too much; the density of imagery at times obscures the clarity of 
Shelley’s vision.  Calming the fervor of his visionary inspiration, he locates the infant 
“Spirit of the Earth” asleep, a symbol of our trust in the self-sustaining properties of 




star on the Spirit’s forehead, a light that penetrates the geological and historical secrets 
that recent Enlightenment science had revealed.  Continuing the conceit of machination, 
the beams “like spokes of some invisible wheel / …Make bare the secrets of the earth’s 
deep heart” (ll. 274, 279).  What they reveal is mineral wealth, “Infinite mines of 
adamant and gold,” (l. 280), but more importantly, geological extinctions both human 
and primordial.  The canceling of ancient cycles, Shelley seems to suggest, is es ential 
to the sphere’s ongoing creativity.  This innermost layer of the orb, where the past is
condensed into a vision of all life’s future under a mortal fate, acts as a lodestone 
anchoring the center of ten thousand layers of biochemical activity.  This evidence of 
death is the essential counterpoint to life, as silence itself gives sound the possibility of 
meaning.  Shelley ends the extended metaphor of the orb with the extinguishing words 
of a comet/God: “’Be not!’ And like my words they were no more” (l. 318).  The fourth 
book of Prometheus Unbound is regenerative in nature, and this euphoric and utopian 
passage demonstrates the power of a scientifically-driven imagination rendering old 
ideas (Ptolemy, Bacon, Newton, Milton) and new theories (Darwin, Davy) into 
something truly prescient.   
 Up to now I have discussed the ecological microcosms of poets in the Romantic 
era.  Deeper into the nineteenth-century, concerns about fundamental changes in nature 
for the worse were part of Victorian anxieties about modernity.  In the folds of the
world’s largest metropolis, Matthew Arnold developed his sense of nature in 
microcosm using the resource of London’s great parks.  In some ways a revisitation of 
Coleridge’s lime tree bower, Arnold’s “Lines Written in Kensington Gardens” (1852) 




vitality that is usually forgotten in this urban world of getting and spending.  Arnold’s 
lamentory voice draws from his perception of alienation amid the industrial Victorians; 
famously, he found his generation caught “Wandering between two worlds, one dead, / 
The other powerless to be born”; the Christian creation story seemed obsolete, but an 
acceptable secular or scientific worldview had yet to succeed (Chartreuse, ll. 85-86).  
In Kensington Gardens, however, the poet finds a world for himself in the subtle webs 
of nature that endure despite a cultural hegemony of capitalist production:   
 In this lone, open glade I lie, 
 Screened by deep boughs on either hand; 
 And at its end, to stay the eye, 
 Those black-crowned, red-boled pine-trees stand! … 
 
Here at my feet what wonders pass, 
 What endless, active life is here! 
 What blowing daisies, fragrant grass! 
 An air-stirred forest, fresh and clear. … 
 
In the huge world, which roars hard by, 
 Be others happy if they can! 
 But in my helpless cradle I 
 Was breathed on by the rural Pan. … 
 
 Calm soul of all things! make it mine 
 To feel, amid the city’s jar, 
 That there abides a peace of thine, 
 Man did not make, and cannot mar.  (ll. 1-4, 13-16, 21-24, 37-40)    
 
The peace that abides in this insulated, idealized slice of nature (London’s parks are 
highly cultivated) reminds the poet of mightier forces performing their labors eneath 
the notice of all but the most susceptible, and tasteful, of humans.  By looking at 
Kensington Gardens as a microcosm of nature, coherent, interactive, heterogeneous, 




finds a place in the epicenter of industrial modernity, both beneath and above the scales 
of modern human consciousness.  
 Where Arnold tapped a well of hopefulness from the resource of London’s 
parks, counseling himself all the way to feel good and keep at bay the hounds of 
modernity, Gerald Manley Hopkins, to the obverse, focused on the disasters of new 
development.  Like social philosopher William Morris, Hopkins held moral outrage in 
the destruction of stately natural places for capital gain.67  His famous extemporaneous 
poem, the 1879 “Binsey Poplars,” laments the felling of a stately row of poplars on the 
Thames between Oxford and Binsey.  This poem is less of a microcosm poem (he 
speaks mostly of the trees, hardly including their natural milieu) than it is an illustrative 
example of the more-than-aesthetic treacheries of manhandling the monarchs of the 
natural world.  Of course, the row of trees, like the well-planned Kensington Gardens, 
is the product of human stewardship rather than “wild” nature, but the destruction of 
anthropogenic nature can be a more poignant event than the human colonization of 
wilderness, which does not benefit from participating in human history.  Hopkins refers 
to “country” as an antithesis to “city”; country is the locus of human agriculture and 
national identity and is decidedly not wilderness.  Its callous destruction, nevertheless, 
                                                
67 William Morris’s essay “The Beauty of Life” (1880) is best known for its domestic advice, which 
can be isolated to a thesis that connotes ideals of aesthetic utility during an era of rampant 
consumption: “Have nothing in your houses which youd  not know to be useful or believe to be 
beautiful.”  In reference to landscaping in the new suburbs of London, Morris defends the trees planted 
along the river both as natural and artistic gifts: “I must ask what do you do with the trees on a site that 
is going to be built over? do you try to save them, to adapt your houses at all to them? do you 
understand what treasures they are in a town or a suburb? or what relief they will be to the hideous 
dog-holes which (forgive me!) you are probably goin to build in their places?  I ask this anxiously, 
and with grief in my soul, for in London and its suburbs we always begin by clearing a site till it is as 
bare as the pavement: I really think that almost anybody would have been shocked, if I could have 
shown him some of the trees that have been wantonly murdered in the suburb in which I live 
(Hammersmith to wit), amongst them some of those magnificent cedars, for which we along the river 
used to be famous once.  But here again see how helpless those are who care about art or nature amidst 




is the large-scale environmental pattern epitomized by the small-scale act of felling the 
poplars: 
 Since country is so tender 
 To touch, her being so slender… 
  even where we mean 
 To mend her we end her,  
 When we hew or delve: 
 After-comers cannot guess the beauty been… 
 The sweet especial scene, 
 Rural scene, a rural scene, 
 Sweet especial rural scene.  (ll. 12-13, 17-19, 22-25)      
 
The hazard of this legacy of felling trees is that the “after-comers,” thosegenerations 
who will inherit the earth, will have no ties of sentiment to its beauties.  The “scene” 
that Hopkins lyrically circumscribes is an endangered landscape; the trees are both 
center and circumference of a moral argument borne on this minor landscaping event.  I 
would call Hopkins’s poem more environmental than ecological (though he includes a 
Darwinian entangled bank image of the trees’ shadows “that swam or sank / On 
meadow and river and wind-wandering weed-winding bank” (ll. 7-8)); his poem, like 
Seuss’s Lorax of a century later, speaks for the trees who have no tongues.  With their 
deaths dies a small, riparian ecosystem, perhaps insignificant in itself, but holding 
ample information about the insidious transformation of values that accompanies any 
act of violence against nature.               
This chapter has been dominated by poetic works that develop conceits around 
small natural systems.  These microcosmic conceits afford perspective on the patterns 
inherent to nature on a larger scale.  It is not surprising that poetry would be a favored 
medium for exploring such inter-scalar congruence; one of the celebrated features of 




order to gain deep perspective on a discrete subject.  Lyric poetry’s lens focuses in 
close to the subject, the lime-tree bower or floating island, before drawing back into the 
placement of this little world in the larger cosmos.   
 By the turn of the twentieth-century, ecology was an established international 
discipline and Stephen Forbes had drafted the microcosm trope into his experimental 
designs.  A tropological reading of literary works during this time provides some
perspective on the versatility of microcosm figures.  Originally a convention that served 
as an aesthetic scheme of cosmic inter-scalar organization, placing each individual body 
within a coherent network of reciprocating structures, the microcosm trope evolved into 
several distinct philosophical offices, eventually to be adopted as a tool of ecological 
science.  British poetry of the nineteenth-century, written in the context of 
industrialization and the large-scale transformation of natural landscapes, was provided 
with an occasion to push the potential of the microcosm towards the elucidation of 
nature’s systems.  Ecology would subsequently use the microcosm literally as n 
empirical strategy; environmentalism drew argument and energy from the notion that 
small, individual acts aggregate to large affects, and from this alignment of micr cosm 
with macrocosm environmentalists drew the popular mantra, “Think globally, act 
locally.”  Chapter five, the final chapter of this study, will concentrate on how te 
microcosm’s enduring relevance to ecological inquiry relates to the modeling strategies 
we employ to understand climate change.  Another aspect of climatological mode ing is 
the difficulty of anticipating the emergent effects and random behaviors that 
characterize meteorology; these bring microcosmic epistemology into play with chaos, 




Before moving to the twenty-first century, however, I would like to concentrate 
more in-depth on a single author who, perhaps unconsciously, integrated both tropes 
into his poetry.  John Keats’s legacy as a genius whose potential was undermined by 
tuberculosis elides the well-developed ideas that his diverse poems realized in spite of
his short years.  In fact, his life’s brevity makes for greater coherenc in the small body 
of his works.  I hope to show that Keats’s deepest ontological moments evolved from 
an understanding of history as a chaotic narrative into what might be called a 





Chapter Four: Keats’s Ecological Visions: A Tropolo gy 
 
“There is a delicate empiricism which makes itself utterly identical with the object, 
thereby becoming true theory. But this enhancement of our mental powers belongs to a 
highly evolved age.” 
-- Goethe68  
I: Introduction  
 
Keats has been an appealing figure for the focus of literary critics interested in 
science largely due to his early medical education, hints of which are abundant in his 
poetic images, and the convalescent psychology that impacted his later works.  His 
biography supports book-length studies of this intellectual synthesis: the born poet is 
forced by financial necessity into a medical education during an age rife with science 
and literature as dual, legitimate epistemologies.69  The youngest of the high 
Romantic poets has always inhabited a liminal space between scientific pract e and 
humanist philosophy, and his ambivalence on the subject of his occupation only 
heightens the potential for interdisciplinary insight in his poetry.  The medical Keats, 
however, I wish to leave behind in this study.  For this chapter, I will look at specific 
ways in which Keats’s poetry is thoroughly ecological.   
                                                
68 “Es gibt eine zarte Empirie, die sich mit dem Gegenstand innigst identisch macht, und dadurch zur 
eigentlichen Theorie wird. Diese Steigerung des geitigen Vermögens aber gehört einer hochgebildeten 
Zeit an” (Maximen und Reflexionen 509).   
 
69 Studies that consider Keats and his poetry in a medical context include Goellnicht’s The Poet-
Physician: Keats and Medical Science (1983), De Almeida’s Romantic Medicine and John Keats 
(1991), Richardson’s British Romanticism and the Scien e of the Mind (2001), Bewell’s Romanticism 
and Colonial Disease (1999), and Allard’s Romanticism, Medicine, and the Poet’s Body (2007).  
Richardson’s essay on “Keats and Romantic Science” is devoted almost exclusively to the aesthetic 
influence of Keats’s medical training at Guy’s hospital, but Richardson gestures to the ecological spirit 
of the age:  “With the mechanistic scientific paradigm associated with Newton giving way to a 
biological emphasis typified by Darwin, science and medicine took on a “Romantic” character, 
featuring a naturalistic ethos, an attention to “organic form,” and developmental and ecological models 




By calling Keats’s poetry ecological, I mean more than his setting poems in 
nature or immersing his subjects in a Keatsian, sensuous natural world.  His works 
contain at least two proto-scientific ecological visions that I will explore in depth: the 
first is the theme of contingency in the narratives of natural history, which finds a 
prosodic outlet in two of Keats’s prominent epic fragments.  My reading of Hyperion 
argues that critics have overemphasized Keats’s use of coherent succession from 
Titans to Olympians in order to highlight its precocious use of evolutionary theory 
and to reinforce the Romantic theme of political revolution;70 i stead, I argue that a 
radically contingent environmental dynamic catalyzes the fall of the Titans, and this 
narrative catastrophism can be traced to Keats’s knowledge of French geology and his 
belief in the governance of ‘chance’ rather than classic religious Providence.      
The second innovation in ecological vision involves Keats’s circumscription 
of natural spaces into observable, intelligible systems.  The lyrics preview a 
conceptual strategy for isolating and simplifying parts of nature for the purpose of 
study, and anticipate the ecological microcosm introduced to science by Stphen 
Forbes in 1887.  I will also suggest that Keats’s Odes anticipate the ecosystem theory 
that Arthur Tansley would define in the early twentieth-century.  With Tansley’s 
advance, an ecosystem came to mean a natural unit or area consisting of biotic and 
abiotic factors in synergy, but whose isolation is at least party conceptual.  By reading 
several of Keats’s prominent lyrics as epistemological advances in the science of 
ecology, I hope to show that these aesthetic successes are more useful than pure art 
                                                
70 Hyperion has often been read as a teleological evolutionary poem, with Oceanus’s speech that 
invokes the “beauty” principle governing the defeat of one ruling class by another as a “law of nature.”  
Keats’s knowledge of science and theories on how his medical training influenced Hyperion are 
detailed in DeAlmeida (1991); Bewell (1999) reads Hyperion as an allegory of political revolution at 




for the sake of beauty.  I organize Keats’s spread of ideas, from the early lyrics to the 
fragmented narratives of his Hyperion poems, and ending with the systemic 
wholeness of his celebrated Odes, using this bivalent relationship between narrative 
chaos, chance, and evolution, on one hand, and lyrical cosmos, coherence, and stasis, 
on the other.  This chapter will show how Keats’s ideas about the individual agonist 
in the natural world evolved during his career through an openly inquisitive mediation 
between chaos and the microcosm.71                  
Criticism of the last twenty-five years has emphasized Keats’s political 
engagement in order to touch up the older portrait of an aesthete interested only in 
pure literary production.  Jerome McGann began this type of revisionism by claiming 
that Keats’s renowned poem To Autumn should be read in the context of the Peterloo 
massacre rather than as simply a beautiful lyric of escapism (1985: 58).  Jeffrey Cox 
has argued that even in the early lyrics of 1817 the influence of Leigh Hunt is evident, 
revealing “the self-consciously ideological content of his poetry…[that] demands to 
be read not as weak apprentice work for the future odes but as a key statement in 
1817 of the Hunt circle’s project and self-definition” (85).  The Keats figured as 
Cockney, these critics contend, allows us to read his political and ideological 
maturation alongside the evident growth in style and prosodic mastery.  Keats 
certainly deserves such attention since the biting criticism levied at his early work 
                                                
71 The sub-dividing of Keats’s brief career into distinc  phases of composition style is common in his 
biographies.  Christopher Ricks’s Keats and Embarrassment (1974) demonstrates how the poet’s social 
rank made him hyperconscious of failure and prone t make large shifts in his poetic strategy.  James 
Chandler adds to this periodic patterning that “A particularly recurring occasion of embarrassment for 
Keats was the thought of his own prior work and of the conditions in which it was produced.  It was a 
response in which we can imagine Keats identifying,  effect, with the posture of superiority struck by 
the notoriously hostile reviewers of his early published work.  Through a succession of embarrassed 
disavowals of his own prior writings, Keats effectively created a sense of staged progress in his literary 




was often politically-calculated to embarrass and exclude the lower classes from 
literary success.   
My ecological readings of Keats, which often rely on the aesthetics of his
imagery, might seem to fray off that recent thread of politicizing Keats and figure him 
again in the older light of the poetic genius living in a socio-political vacuum.  
Instead, I aim to engage the Keats-in-his-context critical frame by appealing to his 
knowledge of science, which was one of the major forces providing thrust to political 
reform in the tumultuous eighteen-teens.  Keats was forced by his social standing into 
medical studies, and though he vacillated between the necessity of a practical medical 
education and the gravitational pull of a literary one, many of his poetic works are 
doubtless enriched by his knowledge of geology, chemistry, and biology.  While the 
Keats of this chapter is not particularly political or Cockney, I consistently 
contextualize the poet by figuring him as an innovator in biological concepts.  As 
innovator, he participates in the same cause of reform as enlightenment “political” 
scientists so well-known to this era, Joseph Priestley, Erasmus Darwin, Humphrey 
Davy, and young Percy Shelley who conducted chemistry experiments in his rooms at 
Eton and Oxford.  Keats’s experiments in verse are interdisciplinary, effecting 
recombinations among canonical literature (Chaucer, Spencer, Shakespeare, and 
Milton especially) and contemporary scientific understandings of the world.  The 
revolutionary chaos envisioned in Hyperion, and the several microcosms described in 
his lyrics, are attempts to create systems of understanding the world using the 
complementary tools of science and literature.  The applicability of Keats’s verse to 




contemporary scientific-industrial innovations and links his intuitive ideas about 
organization of the natural world to twenty-first century ecological theory.  Hyperion 
was likely influenced by Keats’s reading of Buffon, the French natural historian who 
wrote voluminously about the importance of environmental catastrophe.72  Criticism 
that touts the physiological Keats, the blushing Keats, the gustatory Keats, is part of 
the same project of reclaiming the poet from the idealisms of New Criticism and 
planting him firmly in his environment, and our own.                   
Keats’s letters can fruitfully be read in dialogue with his verse, permitting a 
thread to be drawn between the poet’s quotidian experiences, his prose-based 
distillation of life-guiding philosophies, and his articulation of these insights in his 
poetry.  Before involving his poetical works, it will be useful to discuss a few turns of 
thought that Keats developed in a long 1819 letter to his brother George, who had 
ventured into the wilds of the young United States.  Written from February to May of 
that crucial year of intellectual development, the letter lies at the juncture between 
Keats’s abandonment of the epic Hyperion and his rejuvenation under the Ode form.  
Late in 1818 Keats lost his youngest brother Tom to consumption, and the poet had 
been struggling with chronic ill health since his early return from a walking tour of 
Scotland in summer 1818.  From these misfortunes among other social and financial 
hardships, Keats was to revise his tepid faith in Providence towards a new evaluation 
of the power of Chance, a word that frequently appears in his letters and poetry after 
                                                
72 Peter Bowler has pointed out that Victorians like Samuel Butler, a critic of Darwin, argued that 
Buffon had identified all the major components of evolutionary theory a full century before The Origin 
of Species was published (2003: 75).  Buffon’s encyclopedic Hstorie Naturelle (1749-1788) was 
translated into English and Keats read the copy in Guy’s Hospital library.  Its vacillations on crucial 
topics like species definition and fixity versus mutability make a clear interpretation of modern 
evolutionary theory difficult.  However, Buffon’s materialism, his interest in environmental upheaval, 
and his struggles to accommodate these ideas into the Classical hegemony of predetermined design in 




the death of ‘poor Tom.’  He writes to George, recalling an opening image from the 
abandoned Hyperion,  
Circumstances are like Clouds continually gathering and bursting.  While we 
are laughing the seed of some trouble is put into the wide arable land of 
events.  While we are laughing it sprouts, it grows and suddenly bears a 
poison fruit which we must pluck…There is an ellectric [si ] fire in human 
nature tending to purify, so that among these human creatures there is 
continually some birth of new heroism.  (Scott 270-271) 
 
This agricultural allegory plays out on the stage of environmental contingency.  
Keats’s metaphor involves both the unpredictable weather events of storm clouds 
“gathering and bursting” as well as the pernicious seeds that germinate as a r sult.  
Circumstance, then, involves both the contingencies of weather and of the presence or 
absence of the organic matter responding to these conditions: the seed, the wide 
arable land, the poison fruit.  His chemical opposition between ill circumstance 
(poison) and fiery heroism (purification) is the alchemy of epic agony, and Hyperion 
grasps after different modes of self-empowerment exhibited by the Titans, gods 
dwelling in the common misfortune of obsolescence.    
John Kerrigan’s (1995) essay “Keats, Hopkins and the History of Chance” 
pursues the reasoning behind the stochastic aesthetic demonstrated in the Hyperion 
poems.  He writes, “As Keats’s faith in ‘providence’ was sapped by Tom’s and his 
own ‘misfortune,’ he became, on the contrary, less ‘orthodox’ and more convinced of 
the power of ‘chance’” (289).  In the same letter of spring 1819, Keats’s chance 
comes to inform his notion of an individual’s robustness in the natural world.  Unlike 
Millenarian philosophers like William Godwin, Keats does not believe in the 
complete improvement of nature through idealistic philosophy or technological 




The whole appears to resolve into this; that Man is originally ‘a poor forked 
creature’ subject to the same mischances as the beasts of the forest, destined 
to hardships and disquietude of some kind or other.  If he improves by degrees 
his bodily accommodations and comforts, at each stage, at each accent there 
are waiting for him a fresh set of annoyances…in truth I do not believe in this 
sort of perfectibility.  The nature of the world will not admit of it; the 
inhabitants of the world will correspond to itself.  Let the fish philosophise the 
ice away from the Rivers in winter time and they shall be at continual play in 
the tepid delight of summer…suppose a rose to have sensation; it blooms on a 
beautiful morning, it enjoys itself.  But there comes a cold wind, a hot sun; it 
can not escape it, it cannot destroy its annoyances.  They are as native to the 
world as itself.  No more can man be happy in spite, the worldly elements will 
prey upon his nature.  (Scott 289-290)  
 
To suffer life is to grow into one’s own potential, if the experience does not kill one 
first.  Using this modern, post-Providence convention of history as chance, Keats has 
opened an avenue for his materialist spiritualism, which he describes using a 
scientific trope that had recently been envisioned by John Dalton (in 1808), the 
ultimate chemical unit of the atom: 
Call the world if you Please ‘The vale of Soul-making.’  Then you will find 
out the use of the world…I say ‘Soul-making,’ Soul as distinguished from an 
Intelligence.  There may be intelligences of sparks of the divinity in millions, 
but they are not Souls till they acquire identities, till each one is personally 
itself.  Intelligences are atoms of perception; they know and they see and they 
are pure, in short they are God.  How then are Souls to be made?  How then 
are these sparks which are God to have identity given them so as ever to 
possess a bliss peculiar to each one’s individual existence?  How, but by the 
medium of a world like this?  This point I sincerely wish to consider because I 
think it a grander system of salvation than the chrystian [sic] religion, or 
rather it is a system of Spirit creation.  This is effected by three grand 
materials acting the one upon the other for a series of years.  These three 
Materials are Intelligence, the human heart (as distinguished from intelligence 
or Mind) and the World or Elemental space suited for the proper action of 
Mind and Heart on each other for the purpose of forming the Soul or 
Intelligence destined to possess the sense of Identity.  I can scarcely express 
what I but dimly perceive, and yet I think I perceive it…Do you not see how 
necessary a World of Pains and troubles is to school an Intelligence and make 
it a soul?...This appears to me a faint sketch of a system of Salvation which 





Keats’s “faint sketch” is a metaphysical anticipation of evolution by natural selection.  
The atom of perception is animated by a spark of intelligence, and the individual 
charged atom is pushed towards a state of soul through the unpredictable 
circumstances of life, both natural and social.  Though mischance and circumstance 
are lamentable for the woes they bring, natural extremes are essential to a life 
experience of depth and quality.  Though the meaning of life is a grandiose phrase, 
nothing else captures what Keats is grasping at through this series of rhetorical 
questions.  It is for each individual to use her intelligence to vie with the vicissitude  
of circumstance, and with success that individual will grow into something more 
complete: an intellect guided by a soul of survived experience.  Finding an identity is 
the heart of salvation; it is a personal acquisition achieved by the few possessing 
enough pith and energy to survive the chance-driven world of elemental space.   
These ideas have evolved from Keats’s more famous formulation of the mind 
as a mansion whose corridors and apartments are brightened by trial and experience, 
which he articulated in a letter to Reynolds from a year earlier (May 3, 1818).  The 
above passage goes beyond cognitive architecture (whose ideas clearly re ate to the 
psychological microcosm of chapter three); Keats’s “vale of Soul-making” is a 
dwelling place in which each atom of individuality comes to reckon with its existence 
in nature.  The essential components of Keats’s system are the atom of being (which 
models all other beings), comprised of the intelligence and the soul, and the narrative 
of unforeseen circumstance that plays out in the elemental world.  Our tropes come 
clearly into the foreground:  Keats’s subjects and ode-spaces can be viewed as 




chapter will explore the poetic routes by which Keats approached his naturalist 
system of salvation: the fragmented narrative and the modeling lyric epitomized by 




II: The Early Poems 
 
 Before moving into an analysis of Keats’s best-known verse, it will be useful 
to take a brief look at some of his earliest lyrics as a primer for his later work with the 
Odes.  These early poems were written with a casual, exploratory confidence and are 
unencumbered by the emotional drag of his life’s misfortunes and the weight that 
poetic production would come to bear on Keats.  They show which images and tropes 
the young poet found most appealing from the start, when he was first exploring his 
affinities.  His visions quite often benefit from the clarifying nature of 
circumscription that we have seen in the many microcosmic poems analyzed in 
chapter three; again, islands, coves, and lakes become figures of thought as well as 
intelligible, material subsets of nature.    
Lyric poetry in the English tradition possessed, from the time of the 
Renaissance metaphysicians, a potential for scientific exposition.  JamesW. Johnson 
(1974) notes how “the new geographical concerns of the Renaissance supplemented 
the pastoralism of the traditional lyric to produce an imagery that enforced a fusion of 
the scientific and poetic perspectives” (468).  Though scientific tropes were essential 
to Keats’s perspectives on nature, beneath the imagistic level the lyric possesse  an 
inter-referential structural coherence based on its musical origins; Johnson identifies 
this inherent quality of the modern lyric as poetry that is “mechanically 
representational of a musical architecture and which is thematically representational 
of the poet’s sensibility as evinced in a fusion of conception and image” (462).  
Highly formal lyrics are literary prosodic structures built around the parameters of 




effectively shelters and contextualizes the images (or themes) the poet seeks occasion 
for.  Though Keats would eventually find his métier in his personal evolution of the 
Horatian Ode, his early lyrics based on Spenser have a similar virtue of dwelling in a 
small, highly organized system of language.  Keats found his natural subjects within 
the little worlds that lie at the junction of form and theme.  
His “Imitation of Spenser,” which dates from 1814 and is his earliest known 
composition, uses a “little lake” as the medium of reflection for “woven bowers,” the 
king-fisher and the swan overhead, the fish they eat, and “in its middle space, a sky 
that never lowers” (ll. 7-14).  In these figures of nature Keats clears a conceptual 
space from the anxiety of influence that so often stamped his youthful work (and the 
title of this poem):  
Ah! could I tell the wonders of an isle 
That in that fairest lake had placed been, 
I could e’en Dido of her grief beguile; 
Or rob from aged Lear his bitter teen: 
For sure so fair a place was never seen, 
Of all that ever charm’d romantic eye: 
It seem’d an emerald in the silver sheen 
Of the bright waters; or as when on high, 
Through clouds of fleecy white, laughs the cerulean sky. (ll. 19-27)  
 
By way of clearing space from earlier literary genius, Keats discovers th  
quintessential Romantic subject in the vision of nature’s heterogeneous coherence.  
This is clearly a song of innocence, where the fish may laugh in the gorge of the 
kingfisher, where grief and tears are exposed as human distractions from a larger 
harmony.  The lyric, guided by the demanding rhythmic and rhyme requirements 
invented by Spencer for the Fairy Queen, quite naturally circles around its figures and 




in an intelligible relationship with space; they are an idealized model of nature.  
Though Keats’s virtuosity with the Spenserian form remains uneven, the stanzaic 
structure nonetheless opened an avenue for modeling nature within lyrical prosody.  
Keats’s visions would grow morally more complex, particularly regarding predation 
and evolution, but for the eighteen-year old poet, the pure symbolic model of natural 
synergy is a starting place, and a jumping-off point into murkier waters. 
 He would continue similar inquisitions into nature as an escape from human 
agony in his poetry through 1817.  The long, couplet-driven “Sleep and Poetry” was 
the dramatic finish to his first published volume; in it, Keats distances himself from 
the verse nested “in the bosom of the leafy world” in preference for “a nobler life, / 
Where I may find the agonies, the strife / Of human hearts” (ll. 119, 123-125).  But 
the true aim of poetry, to give pleasure and comfort, acting as “a friend / To sooth the 
cares, and lift the thoughts of man” (246-247) lies somewhere between harmonious 
enervation and realist violence.  Keats finds imagination to be the key, and the 
following passage shows a debt to Wordsworth, while establishing a telescopic vision 
that he would develop with greater success in future years:   
  Is there so small a range 
 In the present strength of manhood, that the high 
 Imagination cannot freely fly 
 As she was wont of old? … 
   Has she not shown us all? 
 From the clear space of ether, to the small 
 Breath of new buds unfolding?  From the meaning 
 Of Jove’s large eye-brow, to the tender greening  
 Of April meadows?  Here her altar shone, 
 E’en in this isle; and who could paragon 
 The fervid choir that lifted up a noise 
 Of harmony, to where it aye will poise 
 Its mightly self of convoluting sound, 




 Eternally around a dizzy void? (ll. 162-165, 167-177)                 
 
Small adjustments of his images, such as the ‘fervid choir’ soundtrack for this vertigo 
vision, would be mellowed into a ‘mournful choir’ of gnats in his final “Ode to 
Autumn.”  Keats is gesturing at the largesse of his imagination and his desire to tame 
it without compromising its brilliance; the successful zoom-in from infinite clear 
ether to the opening bud is succeeded by an ill-realized fusion of Jove’s eyebrow with 
an April meadow, and the reader carries the sense that the poet was forced by rhyme 
into this sticking place (he would smooth out and develop that particular image in the 
second stanza of the “Ode on Melancholy”).  Despite the somewhat bewildering 
conjunction of images in this passage, the theme of imagination as an adjustable lens 
on the natural world at all scales, from the bud to the planet and beyond, comes to be 
essential to Keats’s poetic vision.  Like the metaphysical poets of the Renaissance, 
Keats sought the elucidation of his subjects by looking deeply at the organization of 
the material world, whose scalar correspondences inform emotional affinities by way 
of physical, chemical, and biological conceits.  
 The continuum between poetic form and nature’s organization continued to 
interest Keats.  In February of 1817, he extemporaneously composed a sonnet 
inspired by a Chaucer tale, “The Flower and the Leaf,” in the margins of his friend 
Charles Cowden Clarke’s volume.  The Petrarchan sonnet, entitled by its first line, 
creates a lyrical world for the reader to inhabit just as though it were a literal space in 
nature: 
 This pleasant tale is like a little copse: 
 The honied lines do freshly interlace, 
 To keep the reader in so sweet a place, 




 And oftentimes he feels the dewy drops 
 Come cool and suddenly against his face, 
 And by the wandering melody may trace 
 Which way the tender-legged linnet hops.  (ll. 1-8) 
 
In this lyric with intimations of indolence yet to be realized, Keats finds comfort in 
dwelling in Chaucer’s pleasant woods distilled from worries of the wider, epic world.  
After the volta, he acknowledges how the tension of striving after some monstrous 
narrative can be eased within these moments of microcosmic lyricism: 
 What mighty power has this gentle story! 
 I, that do ever feel athirst for glory, 
 Could at this moment be content to lie 
 Meekly upon the grass, as those whose sobbings 
 Were heard of none beside the mournful robbins.  (ll. 10-14)    
 
The poem is an ecological vision not only in the natural setting composed by 
Chaucer, but also in Keats’s use of synaesthetic interlacing among setting, sensation, 
and sonnet.  The reader/poet is entangled in honied lines, dewy drops, and wandering 
melodies, each of which informs him of some material or process active within the 
little copse.  This microcosm also gives the gift of greater self-awareness to the 
pitiful, sobbing, restless agonists of a larger troubled world; here a small place is 
exchanged for a small moment of peaceful balance.  The copse is a model ideal.  This 
sonnet is utterly self-contained, within its bounds lyrically as well as philosophically, 
and it anticipates the somewhat broader terrain of the Ode that Keats was to inhabit 
with such assurance in a few crucial years.  But first, his epic ambitions required a 
series of trials with the narrative form, which opened his visions of a darker, more 




III: Narrative Chaos in Hyperion 
 
 Keats versified his idea of the elemental world as a vale of soul-making with 
his narrative fragment Hyperion, an epic that successfully depicts the agony of 
circumstance for both the vanquished and the victor in an ontological study of 
evolution.  Because the poem commences with a series of truly superlative images
supported by strong and stoic blank verse, Hyperion has gained the admiration of 
readers from its public beginnings in Keats’s best published volume: Lamia, Isabella, 
The Eve of St. Agnes, and other poems (1820).  The ‘other poems’ included all of 
Keats’s Odes (save Indolence) and the unfinished Hyperion.  The concentrated 
brilliance of his last two years of writing demonstrates his open experimentation with 
epistemology in the poetry of nature.  The story of Hyperion’s abandonment due to 
the poet’s fear of his blank verse being too Miltonic is well known; what my reading 
of Hyperion contributes is evidence that this ‘finished fragment’ effectively animates 
the chaotic narrative patterning that ecologists have theorized as endemic to 
evolutionary history.  Readers usually view the scheme of evolution expounded in 
Oceanus’s philosophy as teleological, the doctrine that “first in beauty must be first in 
might” (II. 229), and critics have linked the narrative to the patterning of political 
revolution so pertinent to the Napoleonic era and its end in 1815.73  I will show that 
the Olympian’s accession is by no means the result of Providential causation or 
political succession, and that ecological degradation is an equally compelling cause 
                                                
73 Alan Bewell has argued that Hyperion is, in part, a poem about political agency and succession 
during the time of Napoleon; he cites the noticeabl imagistic links to Egyptian culture in Keats’s 
descriptions of the fallen Titans (1986: 220-229).  Marjorie Levinson picks up on Bewell’s lead by 
describing the aborted book III of Hyperion as “an expression of ambivalence toward the progressiv  




for the Titans’ downfall.  The quixotic character of the natural environment is 
essential to a modern understanding of atelic evolution; Keats’s Hyperion is a modern 
poem, and a coherent fragment, because a learned faith in the narrative of Providence 
quakes under an instinctual fear that chaos and contingency are rulers of nature’s 
changes through time.   
 The poem takes place during the interregnum between the rule of the ancient 
Titans and that of their offspring and successors, the Olympians.  The narrative rests 
in the wedge of punctuation between two stable states, and yet Keats’s scenes of 
action depict not the desperate battles between two world orders, the new and the old, 
but instead in the desperate but passive ontological self-questioning that both Titans 
and Olympians face as a consequence of their new realities.  Rather than utterly 
differentiating the two classes of gods, Keats is careful to draw parallel scenes 
between the Titans, Saturn and Hyperion, and the new Olympian sun god, Apollo.74  
Perhaps the most important of these parallels comes at line 103 in books I and III of 
the epic, when Keats’s colliding heroes seek to understand the office of holding 
power over nature.  The fallen Saturn asks in book I, 
     Who had power 
 To make me desolate?  Whence came the strength? 
 How was it nurtur’d to such bursting forth, 
 While Fate seem’d strangled in my nervous grasp?  (I. ll. 103-106) 
 
The soon-to-rise Apollo asks in book III, 
 
     Where is power? 
                                                
74 In her study of narrative Keats, Judy Little (1975) suggests that these “similar incidents and images 
emphasize an evolutionary, genealogical relationship rather than one strictly of combat and 
conquest…this repetitive structure of parallel incident was creating a poem that stood monumentally 
still” (140).  In common with other critics, Little views Hyperion’s stasis as fatal to its narrative 





 Whose hand, whose essence, what divinity 
 Makes this alarum in the elements,  
 While I here idle listen on the shores 
 In fearless yet in aching ignorance?  (III. ll. 103-107) 
 
The locus of power lies in controlling the chaos of the elements, and Saturn’s family 
has spontaneously lost this power that was a temporary gift of circumstance; Apollo 
receives power by having the disparate elements of history driven into his brain by 
Mnemosyne, the goddess of memory.  Again we have contrastive parallels that help 
us locate contingent dynamics in evolutionary time.  In his eagerness to re-mold his 
lost identity from a Deist’s understanding of how nature works, Saturn asks, 
   But cannot I create? 
 Cannot I form?  Cannot I fashion forth 
 Another world, another universe, 
 To overbear and crumble this to nought? 
 Where is another Chaos?  Where?  (I. ll. 141-145)    
  
 
Apollo, the child of fortune for this era, has the ambiguous power of historical 
knowledge thrust upon his brain, 
 Knowledge enormous makes a God of me. 
 Names, deeds, gray legends, dire events, rebellions, 
 Majesties, sovran voices, agonies, 
 Creations and destroyings, all at once 
 Pour into the wide hollows of my brain, 
 And deify me…  (III. ll. 113-118) 
 
The chaos of elemental creation that Saturn desires for his workshop is effectiv ly 
translated into the chaos of contingent history in Apollo’s brain, a history that 
requires acts of destruction before a new creation can find its form articulated in the 
elements.  Apollo leaves the Titanic world of prehistory when Mnemosyne renders 
him a god for modern times.  And so the poem ends, mid-air, in this truncated leap 




famed and celebrated endings in a literary period known for fragmented narratives.75   
Though history may appear to have patterns and linear causations that lend 
information and purpose to our actions in the world, those patterns may be as illusory 
as the stellar constellations around which humans have woven legends from our 
evolutionary beginnings.  Where we seek purpose and design, we are cognitively 
predisposed to find it; this is an evolutionary inheritance because it conscribes 
advantages to its possessor.  But Keats leaves the design of history incomplete in 
Hyperion, and the question of indeterminacy reigns paramount in the minds of his 
readers because Apollo’s apotheosis is cryptic.  Some readers would argue that the 
history imposed on Apollo by Mnemosyne effectively sullies the perfect new god and 
makes him into a more earthy, knowledgeable, pragmatic figure (and “Lo,” the stars 
fall from his limbs).  But knowledge of history fails to make either class of gods more 
powerful; if anything, mnemonic history and the wisdom contained in Titanic tomes 
is humbling to its possessor because it fails to explain the present circumstances.       
 With so little agency afforded to his major characters, we are set to 
wondering, along with them, where power lies in the universe.  Though critics have 
identified the non-combative nature of the Titanic overthrow in Hyperion, not enough 
emphasis has been placed on the ecological malaise that sows the seed of their 
                                                
75 Marjorie Levinson’s book The Romantic Fragment Poem (1986) analyzes the period’s romance 
with indeterminate endings according to several categories of fragmentation.  She creates the term 
‘dependent fragment’ to categorize the two Hyperion poems in relation to one another, and she reads 
through biography: “the dependent fragment figures as the produce of an episode or interval in the 
poet’s or persona’s career; the fragment thus invites the reader to rationalize its irresolution with 
reference to its situation within a continuum of episodes, moments, and their respective 
objectifications.  The formal determinacy of such poems depends on the reader’s propensity to relate 
the fragment to relevant precursors or successors in the author’s canon” (172-3).  I would like to retain 
Hyperion’s cogency independent of Keats’s later revision in The Fall of Hyperion, which is by no 
means a more successful poem despite its later date of composition.  I will address The Fall later in 





downfall.76   Rather than the battles that rise to near-fetish levels in the great epics of 
Homer, or the angelic foment of Lucifer’s minions against God in Milton, Keats 
keeps his poem gore-free, and instead infuses his characters with existential agony.  
This is a passive, rather than active, downfall, which leaves us to locate action and 
agency in Nature, whose organisms make what they can of their capricious 
environment.  The tide of natural circumstance has turned before the first, quiet line 
of Hyperion, which locates Saturn  
Deep in the shady sadness of a vale, 
Far sunken from the healthy breath of morn, 
Far from the fiery noon, and eve’s one star…  
  No stir of air was there, 
Not so much life as on a summer’s day 
Robs not one light seed from the feather’d grass, 
But where the dead leaf fell, there did it rest.  (I. ll. 1-3, 7-10) 
 
This somnolent and beautiful vision of a new seed sown in a natural tomb, which 
holds the remnants of extinction, is subtly geological.77  But the poet must animate his 
doomed fossil race so they can testify to their fate.  Thea, wife of Hyperion, wakes 
Saturn by telling him of his lost control over the elements: 
     the earth 
 Knows thee not, thus afflicted, for a God; 
 And ocean too, with all its solemn noise, 
 Has from thy sceptre pass’d; and all the air 
 Is emptied of thine hoary majesty.   
                                                
76 I am referring to Bate, Little and De Almeida’s readings of Hyperion.  Alan Bewell (1999) mentions 
the ecological poisoning that sickens the Titans’ evironment in his study of epidemiological fear in 
the Romantic period, and he relates it to early nineteenth century visions of America that deeply 
interested Keats, who had lost one brother to tuberculosis, and the other to the hazardous New World 
(169).       
 
77 Keats had overtly alluded to the ontological shocks afforded by geological science in his epic 
Endymion, which implicates extinction as a necessary event preceding new creation; environmental 
catastrophe set in deep time is the author of these sudden changes:  “skeletons of man, / Of beast, 
behemoth, and leviathan, / And elephant, and eagle, nd huge jaw / Of nameless monster.  A cold 
leaded awe / These secrets struck into him” (3.133-137).  See also Richardson’s (2001b) discussion 




 Thy thunder, conscious of the new command, 
 Rumbles reluctant o’er our fallen house; 
 And thy sharp lightning in unpractised hands 
 Scorches and burns our once serene domain.  (I. ll. 55-63)      
 
Since they have no notion of the “hands” that brought their fate to bear, the unguided 
elements of sea and storm merely haunt their consciousness of vulnerability.  Nature
becomes a curtain of adversity that shades them from viewing the enemy they believe 
must be in the “new command,” but later we learn that Apollo has no hand in 
directing this sea-change of circumstance.  Instead, Apollo is thoroughly 
incapacitated, with “half-shut suffused eyes,” “melancholy numbs [his] limbs,” and 
feeling “curs’d and thwarted” (III. 44, 87, 92).  Agency is left with Nature.   
Keats hints that what specifically has weakened the Titanic grasp over the 
elements is a twofold coherent catastrophe of environmental pollution and 
apocalyptic upheaval.  Evidence for the first contingency of disease comes when 
Hyperion burns ceremonial incense, “his ample palate took / Savour of poisonous 
brass and metal sick” (I. 188-189); he describes his fallen comrades as “lank-eared 
Phantoms of black-weeded pools” (I. 230); from these pools “A mist arose, as from a 
scummy marsh” (I. l. 258); the Titans’ hearts are “Heaving in pain, and horribly 
convuls’d / With sanguine feverous boiling gurge of pulse” (II. l. 27-28); Saturn’s 
blanched face reveals that “Fate / Had pour’d a mortal oil upon his head, / A 
disanointing poison” (II. l. 96-98).  Apollo was to become god of medicine; he is an 
unlikely candidate for sickening the old gods.  Denise Gigante has theorized from 
these passages in Hyperion that Keats was developing an “allegory of taste” in which 
the Titans as tragic heroes are predisposed to feel disgust rather than pleasure (149).  




“gusto,” an intensive, synaesthetic image set for depicting epic agony in a specifically 
revolting setting.  The Titans’s environment, independent of will or purpose, has 
degraded into a toxic habitat; it infects their conscience as well as their bodies as they 
contemplate the new condition of mortality.   
The concept of pollution was first used in English around the fourteenth-
century; since then it has subtly evolved from its earliest denotation as spiritual or 
ceremonial desecration, as when the conscience is polluted by an evil act or the ears 
are polluted by blasphemy.  Pollution soon came to be linked to physical 
contamination, and by the eighteenth-century it came to have what we consider the 
most relevant definition to modern concerns: to pollute the natural environment with 
the effluvia of industry, petroleum emissions, and waste disposal (OED online).  By 
the nineteenth-century, especially in Keats’s environment of London, water and air 
pollution were quotidian observations.  His battle with tuberculosis, previewed by the 
deaths of his mother and brother, forced him to develop an industrial-era concern that 
spiritual and physiological contamination are related.78  Especially considering 
Keats’s recent trauma with the death of his brother and the miasmic theories of 
disease transmission circulated in the early nineteenth-century, Keats would have 
ample reason to be apprehensive about the dangers of unhealthy, damp environments 
and the people who fall sick within them.  Saturn, the real tragic hero of the Hyperion 
fragment, is a pre-modern God polluted by sudden environmental changes.  He and 
his family fall by maladaptation to the cruel new conditions.     
                                                
78 Alan Bewell discusses Keats’s anxiety about miasmic places, and usefully points out how Keats was 
worried that his remaining brother George had gone t  a disease-ridden place by emigrating to 
America (1999: 169).  Bewell reads the Ode to Autumn against the eco-critical grain (see, for example, 




Further undermining the infirmities of the vulnerable race of Titans are the 
environmental cataclysms that overthrow their civilization.  Huge disasters that 
change the face of the landscape like earthquakes, meteors, and tsunamis (to name 
only a few) are distinct from plagues and pollution, which are often wrought by the 
habits of the denizens.  The Titans seem to be suffering from a coherent catastrophe 
involving both.  Keats’s use of simile to describe the feelings of the Titans obscures a 
clear causal relationship between, for example, an earthquake and the toppling of 
Hyperion’s palace.  But his use of natural apocalyptic parallels to capture the 
condition of the Titans is consistent, and it ingrains our sense that environmental 
contingency is not just the metaphorical vehicle that drives the plot forward, but also 
the conceptual foundation around which Keats organizes evolutionary change: 
Blazing Hyperion on his orbed fire 
Still sat, still stuff’d the incense, teeming up 
From man to the sun’s God; yet unsecure: 
For as among us mortals omens drear 
Fright and perplex, so also shuddered he –  
…horrors, portion’d to a giant nerve, 
Oft made Hyperion ache… 
His winged minions in close clusters stood, 
Amaz’d and full of fear; like anxious men 
Who on wide plains gather in panting troops, 
When earthquakes jar their battlements and towers.   
(I. ll. 166-170, 175-176, 197-200) 
 
The blindness of dire apprehension is horrific to a class of gods who have no history 
to consult beyond the stability of their own long reign.  Therefore the Titans seek 
deeper historical knowledge to understand their place in the order of things (order is 
assumed), using two distinct methods: Saturn’s ‘old spirit-leaved book’ and 




theology, provides no perspective; he finds no reason why the Titans “should be thus 
[fallen]”: 
  Not in the legends of the first of days, 
 Studied from that old spirit-leaved book 
 Which starry Uranus with finger bright 
 Sav’d from the shores of darkness… 
  the which book ye know I ever kept 
 For my firm-based footstool: --Ah, infirm! 
 Not there, nor in sign, symbol, or portent 
 Of element, earth, water, air, and fire, -- 
 At war, at peace, or inter-quarreling… 
   not in that strife, 
 Wherefrom I take strange lore, and read it deep, 
 Can I find reason why ye should be thus: 
 No, no-where can unriddle, though I search, 
 And pore on Nature’s universal scroll 
 Even to swooning, why ye, Divinities, 
 The first-born of all shap’d and palpable Gods, 
 Should cower beneath what, in comparison, 
 Is untremendous might.  (II. ll. 132-135, 137-141, 147-155) 
 
Nothing in the recorded natural history of the Titans prepares them for extinction, 
because their existence is relative to nothing else, they are “first-bo n.”  History is to 
make an example with their sad case rather than providing them a context for 
evolutionary succession.  Apollo subsequently inherits this history, but to little use in
a poem that consistently chagrins progress, and that truncates with Apollo’s 
apotheosis.   
Oceanus, whose speech is often viewed as the locus of Keats’s philosophy in 
the poem, is more circumspect than Saturn.  He chooses (like Wordsworth’s speaker 
in “Expostulation and Reply”) to lift his face out of books and scrolls and look deeply 
into the nature of power as an aesthetic, rather than muscular, competition.  In an 
epistemological image that reminds us of Keats’s “Chamber of Maiden-Thought” 




 We fall by course of Nature’s law, not force 
 Of thunder, or of Jove.  Great Saturn, thou 
 Hast sifted well the atom-universe;  
 But for this reason, that thou art the King, 
 And only blind from sheer supremacy, 
 One avenue was shaded from thine eyes, 
 Through which I wandered to eternal truth.  (II. ll. 181-187) 
 
The light at the end of the tunnel is a backwards perspective on Titanic origins, from 
“Chaos and parental Darkness came / Light,” and the “atom-universe” fell into 
increasing order and articulation in which each earlier stage clears the foundation and 
outlines the primitive form of the next (II. 191-192).  Oceanus’s reassuring, if 
humbling, teleology spans the many forms of biological life: 
   Say, doth the dull soil 
 Quarrel with the proud forests it hath fed, 
 And feedeth still, more comely than itself? 
 Can it deny the chiefdom of green groves? … 
 We are such forest-trees, and our fair boughs 
 Have bred forth, not pale solitary doves, 
 But eagles golden-feather’d, who do tower 
 Above us in their beauty, and must reign 
 In right thereof: for ‘tis the eternal law 
 That first in beauty should be first in might… 
 Receive the truth, and let it be your balm.  (II. ll. 217-220, 224-229, 243) 
 
This breath of wisdom falls like a lead balloon among the Titans, who are in no 
humor to swoon, or abdicate under the light of Apollonian beauty.  Though its 
teleology towards ever-greater beauty (easily accommodated in evolutionary terms as 
‘fitness’) is provisionally comforting, gods of might are not likely to fall without a 
fight, and no direct fight has ever been realized.  The Titans spend many of their 
words fantasizing about a battle, but their number has fallen by the mediation of 
Nature, which is not an entity that can be battled with.  Their environment falls to 




to be recycled back into the atom-universe.  Though Oceanus’s speech deserves the 
critical attention it has received, in many ways his teleological, constructive principle 
of beauty is a red herring that distracts from the chaotic contingencies of environment 
that punctuate evolutionary history.  Unable himself to buy into “nature’s law” and 
fall in love with Apollo, Keats sloughs off 135 mediocre lines of book III before 
splintering his new god in the sky, “Celestial * * *...”.  A manuscript revision 
continues this line as “Celestial glory dawned: he was a god!” but this conventional 
plot elaboration was not kept in the published poem. 
 In a letter to his brother one month after the Peterloo massacre in Manchester 
(September 1819), Keats is struggling with a theory of historical progress that heds 
off the superstitions of Christianity.  Noting the recent marches in London after 
Peterloo, Keats continues, “I know very little of these [political] things.  I am 
convinced however that apparently small causes make great alterations.  There are 
little signs whereby we may know how matters are going on” (Scott 367).  His 
appreciation for historical chaos, where “apparently small causes make great 
alterations,” bears resemblance to modern chaos theory.79  In 1819 this small, violent 
incident in Manchester mushroomed into a defining moment of the age and a rallying 
cry for reform.  Far from steady upward progress towards comprehensive human 
rights, Keats finds the narrative of history to be surprisingly contingent.  SinceKeats 
found contingency to be the pattern of history that narrative can not quite capture, 
how was Keats to weave verse around the dynamics of natural systems?  What role 
could poetry play in elucidating nature holistically, so that it plays a different and 
                                                
79 James Chandler (1998) notices Keats’s interesting observation and links it to chaos theory, but does 




complementary part to reductionist science?  The next section will consider Keats’s 




IV: Microcosmic Odes 
  
 Earlier in this chapter I introduced the idea of an intensive poetic structure like 
a lyric as an interconnected system of words predisposed to support ecological 
dynamics in the poem’s imagery.  The ode, as the most complex and ornate of the 
forms with which Keats tested himself, represents the lyrical high water mark for his 
flood of inspiration in 1819.  From spring to autumn of that year, Keats’s brain had 
ripened into readiness, and he had found his oeuvre in this tangled, energetically self-
organized poetic form of ancient praise. Odes don’t move like narratives do; they stay 
in a comfortable dwelling place and draw at the strings of the world around them.   
 New criticism often praised the Odes’ formal perfections by finding the 
prosodic structure and gallery of images in synergy with the philosophical occasi ns 
of the work; this organic whole was seen as an object of aesthetic self-containmet 
that kept the poems austere from their context in Keats’s society, his politics, and his 
views of history.  These reverent close readings from critics like W.J. Bate, Helen 
Vendler, and Geoffrey Hartman have been complicated in the last twenty-five years 
by Romanticists interested in the historical and political valences at the edges of the 
odes.  Jerome McGann began the historical infusion of To Autumn by suggesting that 
the poem is contextualized by the Peterloo Massacre of 1819, which occurred four 
days after Keats’s arrival in Winchester (1985: 58).  McGann calls the poem “an 
active response to, and alteration of, the events which marked the late summer” (61).  




sufficiency of the imagination” exclusive of other ways of knowing the world (60).80  
James Chandler continues with this line by suggesting that the Ode can be read as a 
poem about death (thanatopsis) that is very much engaged with the broiling history of 
1819 (427, 430).  Chandler makes analogous points about historical engagement in 
other great Odes of 1819: the extinction of the Urn’s civilization, the tears of 
historical Ruth and her bird-song link to the emperor and clown and to Keats himself 
(408).  With these poems, Chandler argues, Keats is testing out his idea of the world 
as a “vale of soul-making” by studying permanent symbolic objects as evidences of 
the transience of any one life, any one civilization.  These are not poems breathing in 
their own rarefied, atemporal atmosphere; they allude to Keats’s concerns about his 
own time in history.  Chandler notes that the Ode to Psyche is “implicitly 
characterized by a skeptical empiricism” because the goddess is intractably curious 
and visual, insisting on a “show-me brand of empiricism” (414).   
 My reading of the Odes is distinct from Chandler’s political, spirit of the age 
treatment without being contrary to his points.  In my readings, the empirical eye of 
these poems is trained on the material, natural surroundings the poet describes in such 
careful detail.  By studying natural systems acutely and in partial isolation, Keats is 
able both to create and describe a series of microcosms in verse.  He repeats the 
                                                
80 In McGann’s reading, this primacy of imagination delimits the work of poets from that of 
contemporary scientists and industrialists because the latter created conditions that “only exacerbated 
suffering and social injustice,” whereas the “Romantic manoeuvre…was to turn to poetry and the fine 
arts as the only available instrument of human meliorat on” (1985: 57).  Either poetry was used as a 
direct public attack on targeted social structures, or it created an “alternative geography, [where] 
personal and social tensions could be viewed with greater honesty and intellectual rigour” (57).  Such 
alternative geographies are colonized by imaginative acts and recombine external “reality” with 
elements of history, myth, and universality (Keats’s To Autumn animates all three).  Science, however, 
continually uses natural history and imaginative spculation (hypothesizing) to seek universal laws and 
theorize truths about the material world.  The microcosm is perhaps the epitome of an empirical object 
that is universalizable, and requires a strong influence from imagination; its utopian potential often 




microcosm experiment six times in a single year, keeping relative controls over the 
prosody (only Psyche varies greatly in formal structure), and varying by subject, 
season, and personal mood.  If one definition of Romanticism is that it is a literature 
that resists the contemporary hegemonies of Christian doctrine and Enlightenment 
ordered empiricism, we find in Keats’s work a theory of secular salvation in the“vale 
of soul-making,” and a theory of epistemology by scientific but non-reductive clos
study.  Such devotion is the work of a chameleon poet who studies so stridently that 
he annihilates himself and grows into the color of his subject; this is Keats’s uniquely 
intimate empiricism.               
Keats’s odes represent a clutch of related but distinct episodes that delve into 
relations between perceiver and environment.  Since Keats self-identified as a 
chameleon poet, ready to blend into his surroundings and subjects to become one with 
them, there are frequently passages that erase the speaker altogether, permitting a 
vision of the relations among nature’s many selves.81  The words become an oikos, a 
dwelling place.  The identity of the dweller is unimportant; simply being there is the 
occasion for the ode.  Readers of Keats are easily able to squeeze themselves into his 
“I,” and his frequent use of dream and drugged states of consciousness loosens 
identity from I to We, the we experiencing the poem.  We’re not certain we can trust 
                                                
81 Keats’s capability for intense empathy with his subjects is known to be one reason he found medical 
surgery of his day, performed without real anesthesia, to be intolerable in spite of his high aptitude for 
the work.  The poet-scientist Goethe, one of contine tal Romanticism’s great figures, theorized an 
empathic, non-invasive science he called “delicate empiricism, which makes itself utterly identical 
with the object, thereby becoming true theory.  Butthis enhancement of our mental powers belongs to 
a highly evolved age.”  Keats’s close attention to the forms and developments in nature could be seen 
as delicate empiricism for poetic ends, and some of his odes, particularly Autumn and Nightingale, 





what we see, smell, hear, feel, and taste, but the impression of being in these aesthetic 
little worlds is so strong that truth may as well be the same thing as beauty.   
These are dwelling places that are inhabited with pleasure by the subject and 
the reader: Psyche and Cupid are “couched side by side / In deepest grass, beneath th  
whisp’ring roof / Of leaves and trembled blossoms, where there ran / A brooklet, 
scarce espied: / ‘Mid hush’d, cool-rooted flowers, fragrant eyed…” (ll. 9-13); the 
lover of the nightingale sits, “in embalmed darkness” with “The grass, the thicket, and 
the fruit-tree wild; / White hawthorn, and the pastoral eglantine; / Fast fading violets 
cover’d up in leaves; / And mid-May’s eldest child…” (ll. 43-48); the Grecian urn 
depicts “marble men and maidens overwrought, / With forest branches and the 
trodden weed” (ll. 42-43); the melancholy escapist is told to “glut thy sorrow on a 
morning rose, / Or on the rainbow of the salt sand-wave, / Or on the wealth of globed 
peonies” (ll. 15-17); the indolent soul becomes “a lawn besprinkled o’er / With 
flowers, and stirring shades, and baffled beams” (ll. 43-44);82 and, in perhaps the 
best-measured natural system of the whole clutch, the autumn afternoon holds the 
hum where “the small gnats mourn / Among the river sallows, borne aloft / Or 
sinking as the light wind lives or dies; / And full-grown lambs loud bleat from the 
hilly bourn; / Hedge-crickets sing; and now with treble soft / The red-breast whi tles 
from the garden croft; / And gathering swallows twitter in the skies” (ll. 27-33).  
Finding sensuous spaces in Keats is an easy task; what my argument suggests is that 
                                                
82 In the Indolence ode Keats rejects his role as a cockney poet among hau hty critics, the “pet-lamb in 
a sentimental farce” (54).  He would, he claims, rather remain in bed with a black eye and convert his 
soul into a wildflower field, where any lamb would be delighted to nibble and grow, by the time of 
autumn, into a full-grown lamb that “loud bleat[s] from hilly bourn” (Autumn, l. 30).  By pointing out 
clichés of the pastoral genre that emphasize its past-ness and relegation to sentimental farce, Keats 
clears new ground for his own deep identification with nature involving a human consciousness of 
complexity, namely a soul with “flowers, stirring shades, and baffled beams” instead of outworn 




these spaces are not merely beauty for beauty’s sake, or the escapist aesthetic 
idealisms of adolescence, but that they gesture towards a new way of understanding 
organizational scale in nature.  The odes are ecological microcosm experiments of the 
mind, meted out by the line and the rhyme.  
This thesis is defensible partly because Keats’s odes are much more complx 
in their views of nature than the simple time-honored pastoral (or sylvan, or great-
house) eclogues of his literary ancestors.  Confusion, dissolution, and mortality play 
indispensable roles in Keats’s visions of nature, and even the most vapid-seeming of 
celebratory lines (“More happy love! more happy, happy love!”) can be drawn into 
more penetrating light with an ironic reading.  On the other hand, though joy and 
sadness have complex relations in these poems, Keats has no desire to engage in what 
he calls consequitive reasoning, an epistemology of the “sciential brain” that seeks, as 
he says in Lamia, “To unperplex bliss from its neighbor pain; / Define their pettish 
limits, and estrange / Their points of contact” (I. ll. 191-194).  His odes hold the 
wholeness of existence in nature as a dear value of the en-souled individual, whose 
atoms of intelligence have been schooled by experience in the world he calls 
“elemental space.”  I am alluding again to the spring 1819 letter to America with 
which I opened this chapter, in which Keats sought to describe his “system of 
Salvation.”  Nowhere in his works does he seem closer to saving himself from 
oblivion in death, the great fear he had engraved on his tomb, than when his final ode 
closes with an atomic pattern of organization, where “gathering swallows twitter in 




afternoon’s walk in Winchester in autumn 1819 are embedded in the consciousness of 
Keats’s epistemological inheritors. 
These poems succeed because they lend us an intense vision of how nature 
can be perceived, without reducing our experience to its literal components or 
overwhelming our minds with diluted universalities.  Each ode finds its proper scope, 
then stays there to ponder a while.  Part of this all-important scope, which elsewhere I 
have called circumscription, is assignable to form: ten or eleven line stanzas with 
sonnet-like rhyming, and the whole between thirty and eighty lines.  But the imag s 
superadded to the formal system of prosody are also sheltered, veiled (vale-), drawn 
within semi-theoretical boundaries.  The odes are poetic ecosystems, turned and 
gently manipulated by the voltas of mood and inspiration.  Ecosystem science of the 
twentieth-century would negotiate its terms with remarkably similar methods.  Here I 
return to Arthur Tansley’s theory of circumscription in ecology, discussed more 
thoroughly in chapter three.  Ecosystems 
are of the most various kinds and sizes.  They form one category of the 
multitudinous physical systems of the universe, which range from the 
universe as a whole down to the atom.  The whole method of science…is to 
isolate systems mentally for the purposes of study, so that the series of 
isolates we make become the actual objects of our study, whether the isolate 
be a solar system, a planet, a climatic region, a plant or animal community, an 
individual organism, an organic molecule or an atom.  Actually the systems 
we isolate mentally are not only included as parts of larger ones, but they also 
overlap, interlock and interact with one another.  The isolation is partly 
artificial, but it is the only possible way in which we can proceed.  (1935: 
299-300)     
 
The boundaries of ecosystem ecology are half-imagined for the sake of coherent 
study, and they half-exist as distinct sub-structures of organization in nature.  To 




how inclusive to be in the model (including the inorganic components of the system 
as well the organic), how to measure the impalpable entities (like energy exchange), 
and to account for unpredictable events set in time (droughts, storms, human impacts, 
climate shifts).  The ecologist dwells in a liminal terrain between theory and material 
entity, and the dimensions of this meta/physical space are largely subject to h r own 
definition (though the terms and rationale of ecosystem boundaries will inevitably be 
vetted by the scientific community).   
Keats was thoroughly aware that his little worlds of isolation were stolen from 
larger places, often temporarily or arbitrarily.  He cleared semi-theoretical 
contemplative space away from, for example, “busy common-sense” (I dolence, l. 
40), he diverted from the path of emotional oblivion to stay in the experiential world 
(“go not to Lethe,” Melancholy, l. 1), he often set himself up for loss in the end when 
the theoretical circumscription melted back into the wide world outside of his ode-
system, as it does at the end of Nightingale: “Forlorn!  the very word is like a bell / 
To toll me back from thee to my sole self / …adieu! thy plaintive anthem fades / Past 
the near meadows, over the still stream, / Up the hill-side; and now ‘tis buried deep / 
In the next valley-glades” (ll. 71-72, 75-78).  The next valley over is someone else’s 
enclosed terrain, and the poet has no choice but to give freely what he never truly 
possessed.  His surroundings have changed and the vision is gone, but thankfully the 
ode holds the moment in energetic stasis, mimicking a stable ecosystem.   
The imagination, or theory, of a natural space delimited from larger places is a 
repeating theme of Keats’s odes.  It suits that a poet seeking to weave a soul using the 




gods of his imagination.  A building is a place in which to dwell, and Keats’s 
imagined temples and fanes clear space for a worship and study set apart from the 
Whole of nature.  Keats wrote the earliest Ode to Psyche in a “more peaceable and 
healthy spirit” that would guide future writing efforts, and further delineates the Odes 
period from the dark mood that drove the epic Hyperion (letter to George Keats, April 
30th 1819, see Scott 294).  Though this first Ode to the “hethen Goddess” is one of his 
more uneven in structure and image, it sets the stage for this series of poems, each of 
which delineates a microcosm as the locus of attention.  Keats usually populates thes  
small spaces with mysterious and powerful females, welcoming the interpretation that 
nature’s dark workings are just beyond the ken of the inquiring male, but must be 
strived after.  This time, rather than dressing himself as a Galilean scienti t, or a 
miner with an avaricious eye for veins of gold, the poet is a priest and a gardener at 
once.  The strongest stanza in Psyche is the final one: 
Yes, I will be thy priest, and build a fane 
 In some untrodden region of my mind, 
Where branched thoughts, new grown with pleasant pain, 
 Instead of pines shall murmur in the wind: 
Far, far around shall those dark-cluster’d trees 
 Fledge the wild-ridged mountains steep by steep; 
And there by zephyrs, streams, and birds, and bees, 
 The moss-lain Dryads shall be lull’d to sleep; 
And in the midst of this wide quietness 
A rosy sanctuary will I dress 
With the wreath’d trellis of a working brain, 
 With buds, and bells, and stars without a name, 
With all the gardener Fancy e’er could feign, 
 Who breeding flowers, will never breed the same… (ll. 50-63)     
 
Keats seeds his mind within concentric layers of the garden, the sanctuary, the fane, 
the dark-clustered trees, and the wild-ridged mountains.  A close reading of the stanza 




“pleasant pain” facilitates the extended development of bio-diverse components 
before the pain is assigned to the “working brain” of creativity; these natural elements 
created between uncharted “mind” and “working brain,” in effect, colonize a new 
ground and cultivate a garden of pantheistic, and psychological, worship.  Its 
consistent pentameter, which Keats would vary more in later odes, has the breath to 
support this rich excess of cognition, the “zephyrs, streams, and birds, and bees,” the 
“buds, and bells, and stars without a name,” and of course the evolving flowers.  It is 
an active stanza; the limp passivity that often weighs down Keats’s subjects is pas ed 
on to the Dryads, and the poet/gardener exudes creative energy and control over the 
system.  Pain is only pleasant to Keats when it is productive; like the sensual image of 
“aching Pleasure nigh” in the Ode on Melancholy, this enviable state of striving and 
accomplishing (by “breeding flowers” and “burst[ing] Joy’s grape”) yields an 
emotional and intellectual apex.  The union of conscious effort with progress aligns 
with Keats’s admission that this was the first poem that required “even moderate 
pains.”  The cognitive ecology of the passage, which is its own sonnet, demonstrates 
how a brain might be worked into a self-sustaining, heterogeneous ecosystem that 
celebrates all the virtues of the human mind, just as a natural microcosm embodies 
the general dynamics of Nature.   
 Alan Richardson’s cognitive science reading of Keats theorizes that the brain 
has greater potential and power than the mind for Keats, it “reveals its capacity in 
moments when consciousness fails just at the point of revelation” (2001a: 148).  
Richardson develops the idea that Keats’s medical knowledge allowed his poetry to 




as the “dim-conceived glories of the brain” in effect “broach something new in 
British poetry, a sense of the embodied mind’s unconscious and ineffable magnitude 
that might be termed the ‘neural sublime’” (148).  By the time of the Odes, Keats was 
able to theorize the physiology of brain to such an extent that it became its own 
ecological-evolutionary system within the cranium, a distinctive advance in the trope 
of the psychological microcosm.   
 Keats has found a theoretical place for dwelling with Psyche, and he seeks to 
cultivate its potential both as an insulated, prosperous niche and as the seed of all 
natural potential yet unrealized, selectively breeding new flowers into futurity.  He 
succeeds: we might name those flowers Odus nightingalus, O. Urnus, O. 
Melancholus, O. Indolencus, and O. Autumnus.  Each poem finds a slightly different 
way to organize the same general prosodic scheme in genus, but the spots and stripes 
and colors of species contrast, highlighting the virtues of thematic variation.  I will 
discuss two of these odes using this notion that a small natural system can be modeled 
in a stanzaic scheme, where meter and rhyme exercise control and draw on affinities 
among the components of the image.  
The Nightingale ode uses its first four stanzas, fully half of the long poem, to 
nudge away the sorrows and annoyances of life in the mainstream so as to settle in a 
self-contained space of nature and the bird, the promised “melodious plot” (l. 8).  The 
poet will not escape using opiates or wine, agents of enervation and forgetting that 
work decidedly against perceiving any veritable reality.  Instead, he pushes his 




nightingale (l. 34).  This enables an alchemical nsight that draws his visions from the 
clean celestial expanse down to the perplexing haven of biological life on earth: 
  tender is the night, 
And haply the Queen-Moon is on her throne, 
 Cluster’d around by all her starry Fays;  
  But here there is no light, 
Save what from heaven is with the breezes blown 
 Through verdurous glooms and winding mossy ways.  (ll. 35-40) 
 
With this ambiance set by the enclosed, welcoming gloom of a bower, the poet is 
positioned to recreate a microcosm of the natural world using his imagination.  
Between theory and reality, Keats articulates a haven of heterogeneous life borne on 
the boughs of ode-verse, and his musical bower becomes a resting place where he 
would be perfectly content to “become a sod,” and forever remain (60).  He writes, in 
this complacent, dark stanza, 
 I cannot see what flowers are at my feet, 
  Nor what soft incense hangs upon the boughs, 
 But, in embalmed darkness, guess each sweet 
  Wherewith the seasonable month endows 
 The grass, the thicket, and the fruit-tree wild; 
  White hawthorne, and the pastoral eglantine; 
   Fast fading violets cover’d up in leaves; 
    And mid-May’s eldest child, 
  The coming musk-rose, full of dewy wine, 
   The murmurous haunt of flies on summer eves.  (ll. 41-50) 
 
Time passes; this stanza marks the floral continuum from early spring all the way to 
full summer; and the fixed position of the speaker keeps his observations of the 
seasons coherent.  Though the whole stanza is framed in negative sensory terms 
(“cannot see” precedes “guess”), the speaker’s familiarity with the “seasonable 
month” helps with the accuracy of his guesses about how nature is developing around 




entangled elements fills the sestet from “grass” to “summer eves,” and “mid-May’s 
eldest child,” set alone in trimeter, sounds backwards by rhyme to “the fruit-tree 
wild” and forwards by consonance to the “coming musk-rose” and the “murmurous 
haunt.”  This wild eldest child, which is the musk-rose and an allusion to Keats 
himself, mumbles the infantile M and enters a transcendent state of meditation.  It is a 
world the poet knows well enough to see without seeing it because the other senses 
are enough; he has turned the bower into a concept.   
 His ecosystem has its essential three components: an observer (the poet), an 
occasion or subject (the nightingale), and its biotic and abiotic medium (the flowers, 
the leaves, the light, the sod).  Without the nightingale, Keats would have no reason 
to focus on this place; it is the charismatic fauna that so often focuses conservation 
efforts on a particular place.  Though this suburban plum-tree bower is not 
endangered in the modern sense, it is assuredly a little haven set amid the slightly 
larger haven of Hampstead, which lies within sprawling industrial London.  Self-
sufficient and yet vulnerable, the nightingale bower occupies real and symbolic 
worlds simultaneously, and Keats is able to deal between these realms using free play 
between his senses and imagination.  The specifics, the flora and fauna of this space 
and their particular interactions, are accessible by scale and enable extrapolation onto 
larger places like the near meadows and the next valley-glades.  The nightingale is a 
fleeting visitor, and the poem’s final seam is sewn with the bird’s flight and the poet’s 
wakening back to the quotidian world.  The circle of song is broken, and the poet is 
forlorn; so forlorn that we carry a sense that the entire complex scene has fallen away 




records his vision, which has become an archetype of the contemplative lyric.  A 
plum-tree bower has enough space to balance a complete little world, for a moment. 
 The final ode, To Autumn, is known as the most perfect of the odes, the one 
that leaves the fewest open questions, the most balanced in stanza, movement, image, 
the most settled in its contentment with place.  It is a fitting work to finish the clutch, 
a paused balance between life and death that celebrates a season turning back to 
darkness.  It is a poem that prizes natural processes as indefinite rather than finite, and 
it impresses images of real, material nature more than the other Odes that circle 
around escapist ideals and abstractions.  As an embedded, earthy, oozing lyric, it 
reveals itself as the product of the poet’s experience over the course of a y ar of
writing about small-scale nature.       
 To Autumn has already roused the attention of ecocritical scholars as, in 
Jonathan Bate’s words, “a well-regulated ecosystem” and “an image of ecological 
wholeness which may grant to the attentive and receptive reader a sense of being-at-
home-in-the-world” (ll. 106, 109).  Bate’s reading traces the string of good weather in 
relation to Keats’s moods and his enthusiasm for the riparian walk out of Winchester.  
Finding respite from the perpetual internal chill of a mid-tubercular patient, as well as 
delighting in the best weather since the Tambora volcano had caused the year without 
a summer in 1816, Keats delights in the easy overabundance of nature that draws 
humans into its open rhythms rather than sequestering them in man-made, fire-
warmed, smoky inside spaces.  One way this ripe overabundance is attained is by his 
addition of an eleventh line to each stanza; all three eleventh lines are images of 




watchest the last oozings hours by hours” [l. 22]; “gathering swallows twitter in the 
skies” [l. 33]).  Though the stanzas are highly self-contained, one rhyme threads 
through the whole work, joining “core” and “more” (in the first stanza) to “store” and 
“floor” (in the second) to “mourn” and “bourn” (in the final); this affinity of sound 
escorts the poem through three stages of production (core/more), inventory or 
possession (store/floor), and depletion (mourn/bourne).  These seasonal movements 
shadow the three-part mood of the Ode, the triptych of mid-year dissolving into end-
year, and nature and the poet’s resistance to this inevitable dissolution.   
 Human figures only half-exist in the poem: Autumn herself is the addressee 
who takes the various forms of “bosom-friend” and conspirer with the sun, winnower, 
reaper, and gleaner; humans share the scene equally with bees, birds, gnats, lambs, 
crickets (l. 2).  The somnolent state that transposes imagination over reality is here 
exported to his figures of nature, and the observer remains austere like the ideal 
scientist, acting only as observer behind the lines that conjoin at rhymes and part 
ways by stanzaic decree.  The speaker asks important rhetorical questions (“Where 
are the songs of spring?”), and his position remains that of a reader of a pleasant 
chapter from the book of nature because the setting has an infused instinct for call-
and-response.  The songs of spring are gone, but the music of autumn is a symphony: 
a wailful choir of gnats, loud-bleating lambs, singing crickets, whistling red-breasts, 
and twittering swallows.  The atmosphere circulates from “mists” to “barred clouds;” 
the fields from “sweet kernel” to “stubble-plains,” and the poet vividly observes these
evolutions while preserving the static suspension of a realized natural entity, one that 




 Though the poem is the product of a walk on a single afternoon, it possesses 
the wisdom of a full cycle of life where another year has been fostered by birth, 
growth, production, and reproduction.  Seasonally it joins with the spring-time Ode to 
Psyche, where the poet vowed to build a fane to his brain and breed flowers of 
insight, as he has now done.  The autumnal system is pitched on the edge of 
dissolution, but Keats’s treatment is so gentle that we hardly notice the ominous 
moments, like when the fat bees “think warm days will never cease,” when “barred 
clouds bloom the soft-dying day,” and when “in a wailful choir the small gnats 
mourn” (ll. 10, 25, 27).  Because he does not push autumn over the equinoctial edge, 
Keats’s poem stays living in this state of dynamic suspense, “gathering” its energies 
like a cloud of swallows in the “skies” (l. 33).  The final word recalls its rhyme-pair 
from where “the light wind lives or dies” (l. 29), and the skies, like the ode itself, 
cradle life and death in the same cornucopia.  The scene that is suspended in the last 
line draws a trophic link between swallows, who partake of the gnats, who feed off 
the mature fruits from the first stanza.  Swallows invoke the global implications of 
this small scene: they migrate from northern Europe to southern Europe and Africa in 
yearly patterns.  Their gathering in the skies is harbinger of the population’s ex dus 
to warmer climates for the coming winter season.  But the rupture of this ecosystemic 
circle is forever suspended, and the scene auditorily sustained by rhyme and mter is 
ecologically sustained by the cosmic balance of Keats’s images, flora with fauna, 
light with darkness, life with death.  The swallows are forever going, but they are 




V: Frayed Epics and Reconciliations 
 
 By the time he turned back to the Hyperion endeavor, Keats may have learned 
from his Odes experience that his systemic lyrical vision had a strengthening effect 
on poetic synergy.  The first Hyperion assured that a narrative form supported chaotic 
stories of succession in the natural world, but it suffered from eschatology fatigue, the 
labor of finding purpose and telos in a world that he believed was guided largely by 
circumstance.  The Odes escaped time by focusing on a time-transcending subject 
(the urn, the nightingale), by deifying an eternal mood (melancholy, indolence), or by 
suspending unidirectional process in a solution of cyclical, ongoing interconnection 
(psyche, autumn).  When Keats made the decision to have another try at the Hyperion 
story, he obviously integrated these conceptual successes into his new lyrical scheme 
of epic narrative.  The Fall of Hyperion attempts to harness its narrative inertia on the 
shoulders of the poet-agonist, who, as the new Apollo figure, struggles to find place 
and purpose in the fallen world of history.   
The Fall of Hyperion earns its readers through an earnest attempt to engage 
with the problems of being a worthy poet in a scientific, industrial, profit-oriented 
modern world.  By placing himself as the central subject in a post-Edenic garden, the 
poet is positioned to look realism in the face.  His desire to re-work a long mythical 
narrative into a personalized allegory about the offices of poets and dreamers 
demonstrates an anxiety about the value, including fiscal value, of literary effo t in 
his time.83  Where Keats was bothered by the contrary concerns of “busy common-
                                                
83 Marjorie Levinson has discussed the Hyperion dyad in terms of “their common subject matter 
and…antithetical ways of framing this material…Roughly, then, we find in Hyperion and The Fall a 
concrete expression of a familiar epochal dualism: naïve – sentimental, ancient – modern, mimetic – 




sense” in the Ode on Indolence, here he is seeking a positive response from his mere 
hope that valuable work can still come from literary minds.  Value, here, goes beyond 
remuneration for successful publications; the poet asks his prophet to be assured 
against his own nagging fears: “sure not all / Those melodies sung into the world’s 
ear / Are useless: sure a poet is a sage; / A humanist, physician to all men” ( l. 187-
190).  But Moneta the blind prophetess gives no direct answer that would align the 
work of a poet with the progressive theories of political humanists or the practical 
treatment of physicians - a profession that Keats might well have advanced.  I stead, 
Moneta draws a contrast between poets and dreamers by calling them “antipodes,” 
but ironically this contrast actually likens them because she fails to clarify any true 
distinction.          
Aspiring to a grand epic but in a state of trepidation from the start, the poet 
sketches and erases his philosophies on the horrific blank face of Moneta.  He seeks 
to behold “What in thy brain so ferments to and fro” (l. 290), and Moneta, who 
represents memory, brings the poet into the world of her mind by placing her 
companion in the cold comfort of his old poem, “Deep in the shady sadness of a vale” 
(l. 294).  Memory draws the features of this fallen environment, and the old opening 
lines have an uncanny, haunting effect on the reader familiar with Hyperion.  We feel 
as though the original work, which described a degraded natural environment, has 
been transformed into a psychological relic of a place (or a Keats) that used o be, but 
                                                                                                                                          
is similar to Bloom’s Hegelian reading of the paired poems, Levinson argues that “by its truncation, 
The Fall interferes with the two-text dialectic, or with the rationally progressive, self-totalizing 
teleology promoted by that intertextual model…The object of the latter work is to effectuate the 
earlier, not escape it.  The irresolution of The Fall, a foreclosure, executes a refusal of the form to 
which both works allude: that of the progress poem” (192).  Levinson’s reading reinforces the view 
that The Fall provides a fresh angle by which Keats approached t same form, the narrative epic.  
Though the framing is antithetical, the subject matter is revisionary; both poems end in literal narrative 




that is no longer.  Keats’s self-consciousness about the relation between material 
place and neural spark is palpable, as when he calls the request to see Moneta’s vision 
a “conjuration”; an invocation of magic and spirits.  Once given Moneta’s vision, the 
poet’s body wastes away under the energetic demands of his “burning brain” (l. 393), 
and the distinct tension between the material and imaginative worlds pulls him 
towards the desire for “death [to] take me from the vale and all its burthens” (l. 397-
8).  The cognitive architecture that might have organized and clarified the vision has 
instead become a forbidden threshold for the poet/dreamer: 
  [Moneta] spake on, 
As ye may read who can unwearied pass 
Onward from the antechamber of this dream, 
Where even at the open doors awhile 
I must delay, and glean my memory 
Of her high praise: perhaps no further dare. (ll. 463-468) 
 
Indeed, he does not much further dare; the poem delays with the angry Hyperion for 
60 more lines before disintegrating in the anti-climax of the sun god’s escape from 
existence.  Here, rather than finding a synergy in which material nature and 
imaginative cognition are mutually-enriching, as they had been with the Odes, the 
poet and his characters are consumed in the fire.  The narrative drive seems to be 
incommensurable with the lyrical linger.  Why should we integrate this aborted poem 
into a reading of Keats’s great successes in imagining and advancing proto-ecological 
concepts?   
 W.J. Bate’s classic biography points to Keats’s increased poetic maturity 
during the late summer Winchester visit (where Keats officially abandoned the Fall of 




a central premise of the first Hyperion had been the widening of human 
consciousness throughout history…there had been a real struggle against the 
anxiety that little was left for the modern poet to do…We can hardly help 
feeling that by the summer of 1819 Keats had really outgrown the first 
Hyperion, and that he was searching his way to a fundamentally different 
poem. (587)   
 
Taking a similar tack of identifying Keats’s anxieties as he turned to the work of 
revising, Michael O’Neill argues that in the Fall of Hyperion, “the poet-dreamer 
exists in a world of leavings…a state of epistemological doubt…worried about the 
role of poetry in the modern world…For all its wish to believe in the usefulness of 
poetry, the poem also believes – and herein lies its modernity – that the utilitarian and 
the imaginative are likely to be in tension with one another” (161).  This charged 
atmosphere of circumstance, where use and imagination are at odds, provides Keats’s 
readers with an enticing study of the imagination put to use in the natural world.  The 
history of nature must be written with an involved imagination, because the physical 
evidence provides only shambles of the past, or “superannuations of sunk realms” 
(Fall, I. l. 68).  The Fall of Hyperion is Keats’s final poetical effort to synthesize 
chance with progress, effectively replacing religious Providence with naturalist 
evolution based on opportunity.   
 Keats’s revision is fundamentally different because it focuses on the poet’s 
struggles in the context of the fallen Gods; the two plots play out on the same stage, 
or, perhaps more accurately, the poet’s evolutionary play occurs on the lapserian 
stage of the fallen Titans.  It remains with the poet to render an object in verse that 
will aid in secular human salvation, something of true value to humanity rather than 




letter from September 21 attempts to schematize this failure, but with limied 
patience: 
I have given up [the Fall of] Hyperion…I wish to give myself up to other 
sensations…It may be interesting to you to pick out some lines from Hyperion 
and put a mark X to the false beauty proceeding from art, and one ↕↕ to the 
true voice of feeling.  Upon my soul ‘twas imagination – I cannot make the 
distinction…The fact is I must take a walk… (Scott 345) 
 
Haunted but still enticed by the specter of Milton, the poet is chary of the “fals
beauty” that emerges from mimesis and detached art, but his imagination is so 
involved in the project as to frustrate his own strong powers of distinction.   
What we can derive from this failed revision is evidence that Keats could not 
fully answer the question of a poet’s role in a business and science-oriented world.  
He could not call the poet the representative of social man, Wordsworth’s idea, nor 
the legislator, as Shelley had claimed.  He felt that he could not find the artistic t uth 
about history, even mythological history that relies on the proper emotional queues to 
be successful.  Within the world of Hyperion, the lost realm cannot be made over 
anew by the same actors; nature in shambles must be adopted by a new species for its 
metamorphosis to take place, and both the species of gods (the Titans) and that of 
poets (Milton and Keats) had grown obsolete in that fallen environment.  Keats, never 
a successful avatar of Apollo in the context of the Titans, did not get to the point of 
introducing the new god to his terrain in the Fall, and so the later poem is left 
uninhabited, in a perpetual punctuation between the ancient species and the modern.  
Species narratives in nature most often do end, sooner or later, in a state of extinction, 
so perhaps Keats’s * * * * * * * ending is the most poignant truth the Fall of 




to insert himself in the action, Keats allows the Hyperion series to lie down in its 
proper fossil layer.  Where his conscience demanded answers about the praxis of 
poetry in the industrial and colonial nineteenth-century, he emerged with an 
impression about which of his works arrived at some “truth” about the world (an aim 
also shared by philosophy and science), and which were merely the veils of artifice.  
To his credit, he could not live with merely producing what he called “the false 
beauty proceeding from art,” seeking instead “the true voice of feeling” (Scott 345).  
The letter in which these personal standards are established was written on the 
autumnal equinox of 1819, from Winchester: the scene of his great success with the 
final Ode.  With the ecological vision of discrete, synergetic systems observale in 
nature, intelligible in scale, and provisionally balanced, Keats and many generatio s 
of his readers have located a use for his poetry in the modern world.      
These poems display an open inquisitiveness with contingent narrative and 
self-enclosed modeling schemes of the natural world.  Keats’s genius for verse 
allowed him to push the narrative and lyric forms, partly by mimesis, partly th ough 
his own ingenuity, to intriguing new stases on the page.  The strength of the Odes, 
renowned as parcels of artistic truth, is borne on their scope, their organization, and 
their accomplished theory of lyricism, which might synaesthetically be call d the 
poet’s light touch.  Tearing at the seams of the Fall of Hyperion is a conceptual 
struggle with what constitutes progress, purpose, and valid knowledge, and an 
aesthetic struggle with how to tell a tragedy and a comedy in one continuous 
narrative.  These themes anticipate the epistemological trials that ecological science 




role of ecology, superadded atop biology, geology, chemistry, and physics?  If 
ecosystems are necessarily partly conceptual, how do we justify the arbitrary 
elements inherent in the science, and translate an ‘objective’ knowledge set?  How do 
we overlay a narrative onto an experimental plot or model?  When dealing with 
complex, irreducible systems that change over time (both coherently and 
incoherently), what is the proper perspective or level of analysis?  Who is the 
perceiver?  Is the poet-scientist justified in taking center stage, since the boundaries of 
the ecological stage are his own definition?  Are ecologists just dreamers of inter-
biotic holism who use the tropes of science, and not scientists at all?  I will address 
some of these questions in the next chapter, as I take a look at narrative chaos and the 





Chapter 5: Models and Narratives in the Ecological 
Sciences 
 
“Chaos theory is practically impossible to test outside microcosm, because of the 
large number of generations required.  Because chaotic dynamics are possible in 
many population-dynamic models, empirical work is desperately needed to discover 
whether real systems are governed by initial conditions and transient dynamics or by 
equilibrium dynamics.”   




 This study’s scope has been defined by its close attention to the use of two 
tropes in British literature of the nineteenth-century.  Fictional narratives about 
chaotic events in nature were inspired not only by biblical eschatological traditions, 
but more relevantly by a new concern that the force of environmental disasters could 
be catapulted from the levers of human industry.  These concerns grew into a genre of 
science fiction that focuses on extreme but tantalizingly possible future scenarios, 
often borne on the scientific-industrial devolution into a moral and ecological 
wasteland.84  The new anti-teleological vision of history was also enabled by 
science’s elucidation of geology and biology, since neither deep geo-history nor 
evolutionary theory needed the support of a Providential deity and both inquiries 
suggested that random rupture and dissolution play major roles in the natural history 
of Earth.  Philosophers of science continue to identify the crucial conceptual and 
                                                
84 The nineteenth-century narratives I read in Chapter Two are models for more recent proleptic 
apocalypse fiction like George Stewart’s Earth Abides (1949), which uses the plague device to 
envision a founder community in twentieth-century California, Stephen King’s related novel The Stand 
(1978), Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake (2003), and Alan Weisman’s The World Without Us 
(2006), a scientifically-driven thought experiment about how human infrastructure would decay in a 
post-human era.  Mary Shelley’s The Last Man (1826) is often cited as the founding work of the genre, 
which repeatedly explores the dynamic between utopia and dystopia in post-modern, post-industrial 




methodological issue in ecology of whether nature’s processes are governed more by 
laws or by historical contingency, and “Chaos Ecology” has become an important 
paradigm in the last few decades (Craig 2008).      
 As a complement to chaotic environmental narratives, nineteenth-century lyric 
poetry became fascinated with nature’s minutiae as potential models and 
recapitulations of much larger, even global, environmental dynamics.  With the use of 
the microcosm as a figurative and literal tool for understanding the complex natural 
systems that the science of ecology was to serve, Romantic poetry reveals its crucial 
work as a facilitator between the individual imagination and the existing natural 
world that is the object of the poet’s intimate scrutiny.  Betty and Theodore Roszak’s 
idea of “Deep Form” suggests that the Romantics pushed individual consciousness 
towards the intuition that higher powers operate mysteriously behind the forms of 
material nature:  
From the Romantic perspective, a landscape by Constable makes our 
knowledge of nature bigger; art adds to what we learn from any combination 
of physics, biology, geology, and chemistry.  It tells us the world is 
magnificent, perhaps sacred, therefore deserving of reverence... recognizing 
this congruency between creativity in art and in nature was not a mere 
subjective reflex; it was as much a fact as anything a botanist tells us about 
photosynthesis or a geologist about continental drift.  Deep Form offers us the 
knowledge that an authentically deep ecology requires in order to place us in a 
respectful, sustainable relationship with nature.  (In Coupe 2000: 224)  
 
Readers of Romanticism see this poetic epistemology in complement with scientific 
knowledge, but with an inherent moral ingredient that often chastens the scientific 
imperative of forwarding factual knowledge.  As we will see in this chapter, moral 
environmentalism and scientific ecology have a fraught relationship, but they shar  




indispensable to ecological empirics by the twentieth-century, and though their 
limitations are well-known, microcosms provide essential material systems for testing 
abstract theories, including chaos.  
 We may now inquire into the fate of nineteenth-century literary efforts to 
comprehend the newly anthropogenic environment.  Many of the literary works 
discussed in this study are firmly established in the canon of English education at he 
university level, and are taught as superlative examples of nature writing, or 
Romantic naturalism, or Victorian colonial science.  In this final chapter I would like 
to survey some ways in which the viability of these literary ideas has been sustained 
in ecological science of the last 125 years.  The relationship, I suggest, is one akin to 
phagocytosis: in establishing their science through the turn of the twentieth-century, 
ecological theorists co-opted intellectual strategies that had sustained many fields, 
including literary tropes that seem well-removed from scientific methods.  Perhaps 
the perennial human struggle to understand the natural environment and bring parts of 
it under our control has resulted in this aesthetic binary between chaos and 
microcosm.  There is an intrinsic appeal to both ways of conceptualizing nature, as 
microcosmic, containable and intelligible at certain scales and as chaotic, recalcitrant, 
mysterious, and quixotic through time.  This dialectic of perceiving nature has been 
sustained by human experience.  This final chapter aims to bring the study of these 
two tropes into the twenty-first century by looking briefly at the intervening history of 
microcosmology, the state of narrative in contemporary ecology, and the implications 
that modeling and narrative hold in relation to our major conundrum of global climate 




II: Empirical Microcosms 
 
 Incidental microcosm experiments began appearing in the form of glass-
encased aquaria during the nineteenth-century.  Aquaria became a popular hobby for 
well-heeled naturalists to study the dynamics of aquatic nature in a domestic setting.85  
Before Londoner Robert Warington’s 1857 breakthrough of adding live seaweed to a 
bowl of fish, the water in the tank had to be replaced frequently in order to provide 
enough oxygen for the animals, at great trouble and expense to the owner.  Once the 
complementary relationship of nutrient exchange was announced to the public as 
involving the three trophic levels of producers, consumers, and decomposers, aquaria 
became very popular for their aesthetic and instructional appeal (Beyers and Odum 
179).  The microcosm’s intrinsic value lay in its analogical power: what it revealed in 
miniature could often be extrapolated to nature’s grandest scales, which lie on higher 
levels of organization and complexity.  Warington’s success with aquaria rem ined 
largely with the hobbyists, and microcosm techniques were not adopted into the 
sciences until later.  Microcosm biographer Howard Odum writes: “With the 
exception of a few scientists such as Warington, microcosmic theory in the 1800s was 
the realm of the philosophers.  However, in the first part of the twentieth century, the 
history of microcosmic thought shifted from philosophy to science, mainly biological 
science” (181).  In the first chapter I described how small systems in nature like 
islands and gardens became informal microcosm studies, especially for colonial 
naturalists.   
                                                
85 Another microcosm vogue of the Victorian age is the Crystal Palace at the Great Exhibition of 1851, 
the great glass and iron construction that was celebrat d as housing the botanical and artistic spoils of 




 The microcosm was not to become a formal scientific tool until it was adopted 
by Stephen Forbes, an American naturalist who was an innovator of experimental 
ecology in the late nineteenth-century.  Forbes fought for the Union for the duration 
of the Civil War, and was a mainly self-taught naturalist who focused on plains 
species, especially insects, and fish mortality in lakes (his site was Lake Mendota in 
Wisconsin).  He accepted a position at the University of Illinois in 1885.  His work 
serves as a fulcrum that shifts our attention from literary precursors to scientifi  
inheritors of microcosmic thinking, so I will return to it now.  Often read as an 
originary study in ecological survey courses, Forbes’s “The Lake as a Microcosm” 
(1887) steps between the rich conceptual ground of the microcosm and the literal, 
cataloguing, and reductive strategies of a nineteenth-century naturalist’s inventory.  
Like Keats’s odes, which rely on an engaged theory of imagination for their 
circumscription, Forbes requires his readers to engage their imaginations in order to 
conceptualize the laucustrine ecosystem set apart from the larger natural world.  
Forbes’s literary instincts are enlivened by his figure of study; he finds that the small 
lake occupies a liminal sphere in relation to time, space, and autonomy.  This 
scientific paper is not a dull catalogue of species composition and physical 
parameters: 
 One finds in a single body of water a far more complete and independent 
equilibrium of organic life and activity than on any equal body of land.  It is 
an islet of older, lower life in the midst of the higher more recent life of the 
surrounding region.  It forms a little world within itself, -- a microcosm within 
which all the elemental forces are at work and the play of life goes on in full, 
but on so small a scale as to bring it easily within the mental grasp. (77)       
 
A microcosmic system, Forbes claims, creates a small window into the wilderness 




lake are also denizens of a modern age; though set behind the water’s edge, they 
exchange nutrients and chemicals with the shore; though they are isolated in the “play 
of life,” they are vulnerable to changes on land.  Forbes was one of the vanguard of 
American limnologists who discovered that lakes can be more vulnerable to 
landscape alteration than adjacent plots of land, and that they can be hotspots of 
chemical concentration that become indicator systems for the effects of anthropogenic 
pollution.  Therefore the microcosm strategy can demonstrate both the self-sufficient 
stasis of a semi-closed system and the wild disequilibria that can shift a laucustrine 
ecosystem into an unrecognizable new order, or alternative state.  In this way lake 
microcosms are similar to island microcosms.  In Forbes’s crucial early vision, 
though, the lake is an idealized microcosm of life simplified, down-sized, and 
recalcitrant to evolutionary change; these virtues of easy intelligibility earn it a place 
at the table of the new ecology.       
 For his audience to understand the experimental conceit of a microcosm, 
Forbes asks that they read his words and attempt to form a “mental picture” of his 
holistic descriptions; the series becomes an extended ekphrasis on the artistic scenes 
of life under water.  As a descriptive supplier, Forbes aims to “furnish you the 
materials for a picture of life that swims, and creeps, and crawls and burrows and 
climbs through the water, in and on the bottom and among the feathery water plants 
with which large areas of these lakes are filled” (79-80); however, the scienti t does 
not deign to force order on the elements of nature that he supplies to his readers, his 
lyrical description is meant merely as a “background or setting of the picture of 




holism, the scheme of ecological order, necessarily comes through each individual 
imagination rather than finding obvious demonstration through the eyes of a strictly 
rational viewer.  He writes, “I will next endeavor – not to paint in the picture – for 
that I have not the artistic skill – but I will confine myself to the humbler and safer 
task of supplying you the pigments, leaving it to your own constructive imaginations 
to put them on the canvas” (81).  What follows is a passage akin to the boat scene in 
Shelley’s “Ode to the West Wind,” except that the language is inlaid with scientific 
nouns:   
When one sees acres of the shallower water black with water-fowl, and so 
clogged with weeds that a boat can scarcely be pushed through the mass; 
when, lifting a handful of the latter he finds them covered with shells and 
alive with small crustaceans; and then, dragging a towing net for a few 
minutes, finds it lined with myriads of diatoms and other microscopic Algae, 
and with multitudes of Entomostraca, he is likely to infer that these waters are 
everywhere swarming with life, from top to bottom, and shore to shore. (81)  
 
Though ecological systems largely exist on a middle scale, the same scale a  humans 
and therefore directly accessible to our senses (unlike DNA and black holes), we are 
nonetheless left to inferences and hypotheses, borne on imagination, that permit us to 
gain access to the parameters and dynamic relationships that make the scene a 
Concordia discors, a scheme of order amid the chaos.   
 Since the circumference of our attention is limited to this small lake and its 
complement of species, scientific order has a better chance of emerging from the 
bewildering heterogeneity of life.  Forbes is able to use his laucustrine microcosm to 
support the tenets of two crucial contemporary theories that were the great advances 
in nineteenth-century biology: biological mutualism and evolution by natural 




scientific investigation has demonstrated, but these two oft-inverse doctrines bri g us 
a long way towards explaining the phenotype of any ecological system.  Forbes 
explains,  
Two ideas are thus seen to be sufficient to explain the order evolved from this 
seeming chaos; the first that of a general community of interests among all 
classes of organic beings, and the second that of the beneficent power of 
natural selection which compels such adjustments of the rates of destruction 
and of multiplication of the various species as shall best promote this common 
interest. (87)    
 
Very much impressed by the aesthetic of balance that seems inviolable when natur is 
left to her own devices, Forbes’s order is akin to a climax community that has reached 
its final stage of maturity and remains in a virtually static state unless disturbed by 
untoward forces.  The aesthetics of economy and balance in nature are seen by some 
modern ecologists as quaint ideas derived from Enlightenment economics, and there 
is no doubt that Forbes has a slightly antiquated view of ecological organization, by 
contemporary standards.  But those of us born in the late twentieth-century have had 
very little experience of any ecosystem that has not been disturbed by human 
activities, both primary (clear-cutting of forests, dredging of lakes) and secondary 
(introduction of invasive species, boundary effects).  Perhaps a Midwestern lake in 
the nineteenth-century carried its own sense of austerity and maturity because it really 
was virtually unaffected by humans (Thoreau’s Walden pond was, by comparison, an 
accessible suburban lake that nevertheless inspired the long celebrated narrative of 
‘man meets wild and survives without conquering’).  For the early ecologist, some 
initial precepts were essential for teasing cause and relationship from the 
overabundance of nature-at-large.  Forbes’s microcosm paper was a blockbuster when 




concept that Darwin introduced as complex and essential relations of animals and 
plants in The Origin of Species; it supports Darwinian evolutionary theory as a game 
both of vicious competition and of synergetic fostering; it simplifies the cornucopia of 
all nature down to a single empirical object that can be approached as a whole 
through scientific methodology.    
 Forbes concludes his study with an overtly Darwinian passage reminiscent of 
the entangled bank trope, which excited the imaginations of so many thinkers who 
were not thrown into despair by the implications of ‘survival of the fittest’:   
In a system where life is the universal good, but the destruction of life well 
nigh universal occupation, an order has spontaneously risen which constantly 
tends to maintain life at the highest limit, -- a limit far higher, in fact, with 
respect to both quality and quantity, than would be possible in the absence of 
this destructive conflict.  Is there not, in this reflection, solid ground for a 
belief in the final beneficence of the laws of organic nature? (87)  
 
These laws, Forbes trusts, extend to the concerns of humans as a social, cooperative 
species, but the paradox between destruction and evolutionary change remains 
indissoluble at the heart of biology.  Where “order has spontaneously arisen,” we are 
compelled to believe that the chaos of daily “destruction of life” is a beneficet orce 
in the long run, that elemental chaos leads to some hierarchical order, and that the 
microcosm is a ready way to shed light on this insight.  Forbes’s legacy influenced 
the experimental strategies of ecologists through the twentieth-century, and as the 
science became more formalized with an increasing number of crises to understa  
and redress, microcosm experiments came to the fore as an effective technique for 
down-scaling, simplifying, and accelerating ecosystem dynamics.   
 Though Forbes’s scientific microcosm, like the microcosm images offered by 




brought indoors.  In a laboratory setting they are more controllable, more artificial 
systems that attempt to model the dynamics of real ecosystems.  Ecologists often 
adopt microcosms as pet projects, and grow fond of their constructions as super-
organisms of their own right.  As an example I quote a college-level text entitled 
Ecological Microcosms (1993), used as an instruction manual for constructing and 
maintaining (mainly aquatic) microcosms that can be manipulated along myriad 
variables according to the experimenter’s particular interest:  
The variety of intricate, small, experimental worlds constructed by various 
investigators rivals that of nature developed without human hands…we hope 
our readers can share our love of little systems, their mystery, their creatvity, 
their domesticity, their immortality, and the guidance they provide for the 
larger realms.  As living models, microcosms help bridge the details of reality 
with the abstractions of general systems, revealing the principles of the way 
all systems work. (Beyers and Odum vii-viii)  
 
The enthusiasm of this passage, which touts microcosmic “immortality” and paits 
the microcosmologist as a minor god manipulating her own worlds, points to both the 
strengths and the hazards of lab-based microcosm experiments.   Simplicity and 
intelligibility are highly valued virtues in the tortuous paths of ecological s ience, and 
remote, contained experimentation is much less invasive than direct environmental 
manipulation, which can result in spreading chemicals, dredging, and over-sampling.  
James Drake (1996) argues that laboratory microcosms, despite their simplicity, 
afford the clearest possible perspective on bedrock questions in biology, such as 
Forbes’s concern with the nature of the chaotic forces that direct evolutionary 
patterns: 
How much of the pattern of nature is the result of stochasticity and simple 
environmental filtering, and how much is the result of chaotic dynamics, 
assembly mechanics, and self-organization?  This question is fundamental to 




conducted in the laboratory where tight control is possible…The utility and 
power of microcosm analyses to provide insight into ecological systems is 
limited only by imagination and creativity.  We can think of no questions, 
from the most applied to the most abstract, to which microcosm analyses 
cannot be turned and insight gained.  The potential for more microcosm 
studies has steadily increased as new questions concerning biological 
invasions and introductions, species richness and productivity, global climate 
change, release of genetically engineered organisms, species extinctions, and 
other problems facing ecologists are addressed…Theory suggests rich 
dynamics at the cusp of chaos and anti-chaos, dynamics that are best explored 
initially under the highly controlled conditions of the laboratory…We stress 
that these systems are but models of the real world and are designed to 
address specific questions. (675) 
  
Perhaps it is the potential specificity, and not the potential universality, that now 
makes microcosmology a powerful strategy in ecology, but that perspective frustrates 
the original microcosmic ambition to apply a representative case to explain the 
workings of the ineffable macrocosm, supposing there is such a global unified 
construct.   
 Still, the transition from abstract theory (such as chaos) to specific material 
demonstration is enabled by the strict control of the artificial environment.  Drake’s 
words contribute the notion that ecological experiments begin with a spark of 
imagination, and microcosms are often the smoothest way of transferring the spark to 
ready kindling, and thereby eventually to set a controlled blaze.  Sharon Lawler’s 
sampling of important microcosm experiments in the second half of the twentieth-
century shows how broadly microcosm experiments can be applied to test ecological 
theories, including predator-prey dynamics, succession, and alternative community 
states (236).  E. O. Wilson’s theory of island biogeography (with Robert MacArthur) 




colonization and succession dynamics from zero (the experimenters fumigated the 
mangrove island to ensure they were starting with a dead zone) (Simberloff 1969).   
 Microcosms have become the major empirical tool for the sub-disciplines of 
ecotoxicology, soil biology, genetic engineering, and systems biology, and Lawler’s 
quote with which I opened this chapter suggests that microcosms are the best material
method for testing chaos theory in ecological systems (237, 248).  These claims have 
major implications for scientific theories of natural states.  Microcosms are our 
keystone for constructing a temporal theory of nature, and for understanding whether 
natural systems are best represented as coherent, balanced, autonomous, and 
organized or, as more recent ideas propose, erratic, patchy, contingent, and chaotic. 
As controlled and domesticated systems, microcosms provide an alternative to the 
statistical sampling of species composition in natural environments, another mainstay 
of experimental ecology.  
 Critics of modern microcosmology comment that the practice is an artificially 
hygienic, and therefore misleading, approach to a naturally muddy set of inquiries.  
Limnologist Stephen Carpenter (1996) worries about the demise of a practical 
education in nature-based ecology: 
 Who will train the ecologists needed for field science?  It is irresponsible for 
academic ecology to produce larval microcosmologists by canalizing graduate 
students into careers of small-scale experimentation.  There is cognitive 
danger that the microcosm (rather than the ecological system) will become the 
object of study, leading to needless confusion as results are over interpreted 
and over extended.  As ecology becomes more and more a science done 
indoors by urbanites, there is significant risk of losing our sense of context. 
(679)         
 
Working in the older tradition of Stephen Forbes, who found his microcosm in the 




isolated experiment can itself become so compelling as to obstruct the relationship 
between model and target system.  Ecologists can become so involved in getting th  
model correct (often a very delicate juggle of elements and energies) that the actual 
ecological system in peril continually degrades within its vulnerable state; the 
mechanical songbird by default replaces the abolished natural species.   
 To consider an analogy in literature, the Romantic movement circled its 
energy for organicism around a newfound valuation of holistic nature, and the poet 
was drawn outside to find representative subjects within the true context.  These poets 
were reacting to their perception of an overly artificial set of subjects (and prosody) 
borne on eighteenth-century Enlightenment science, which prized reductionist 
laboratory empiricism as the unique new knowledge.  Carpenter, it might be said, is
concerned that the Ode is a fast-fading violet covered up in leaves; students of 
ecology are only learning techniques of the laboratory by harnessing heroic couplets 
together.  Carpenter’s implicit aversion to “urbanite ecology” reminds us that the 
roots of the science grew, by necessity, out of sinewy, mucky empirical enterprise.  
By keeping attention on actual nature, rather than proxies of natural systems or 
samples removed from their natural context, Carpenter is revisiting the protests of 
John Clare, who defines “taste” in scientific practice as inherently contextual: 
But take these several beings from their homes, 
Each beauteous thing a withered thought becomes, 
Association fades and like a dream 
They are but shadows of the things they seem; 
Torn from their homes and happiness they stand 
The poor dull captives of a foreign land. (Shadows of Taste, ll. 147-152)     
  
For better or worse, from the time of Forbes scientific microcosms have often moved 




microcosms and modeling techniques in all the sciences have moved from the 
laboratory into the virtual world, yet a further level of abstraction that affords 
exponentially higher levels of variation and manipulation.  Computer models of 
global climatology attempt to approximate the actual complexity of the syst m they 
model.  These techniques are particularly valuable in the sciences that are nearly 
impossible to domesticate, such as climatology, which in some cases entertains 
millions of variables in its predictive analyses.  Climate change science is heavily 
invested in the viability of computer modeling, which uses the data provided by 
worldwide statistical sampling.  The various groups that design and maintain 
computer climate models demonstrate, by their frequent points of disagreement, how 
many strategies could potentially result in an accurate model of the Earth’s emergent 
fate over the next few hundred years.   
 Computer-based global climate models (GCMs) hardly need avatars to argue 
for their necessity, for when it comes to predicting climate change for cnturies to 
come, they are the only card we have to play.  These models are distinct from classic 
microcosms because they provide predictions of the future course of the whole globe, 
and they do not use a representative micro-system to do so.  However, the notion that 
we can contain and manipulate all the pertinent variables within a single model might 
be seen as a new species of virtual microcosm.  Another microcosmic featureof 
GCMs is that their data points, taken from experimental stations that sample 
relatively small areas, are extrapolated onto global dynamics.  GCMs are scrutinized 
by intellectual skeptics whose concerns are based in the hazards of solipsism.  The 




reality in any physical sense vanishes behind the daily need to tinker and perfect the 
simulacrum.  This is Stephen Carpenter’s argument from the discipline of 
experimental ecology.  The virtue of computer models including GCMs is also a 
hazard: their complexity helps in the prediction of global outcomes, but the way they 
arrived at these outcomes is only comprehensible by a small cohort of experts, oft n 
only the model-builders.  By aiming to preserve natural complexity, GCMs can be as 
difficult to understand as the global system they emulate (Dodson 19).  
Environmental philosopher Lucien Boia (2005) assigns heavy responsibility for the 
spread of “the most alarmist scenarios” to our dependence on models, which easily 
conflate existing reality with the virtual predictions that come out of these extr me, 
parameter-driven systems.  But with proper caution, he allows for their necessity, a  
“reality is too vast, too complex and chaotic to approach directly…They are 
extremely useful as long as we remember that they are not the real thing: they are 
methodological fictions” (177).    
 Of course, we have little way of empirically, physically, demonstrating the 
superiority of one model over another because the essence of prediction is to 
prognosticate, and then to wait and see.  Part of the computer modeling controversy is 
philosophical, as Amy Dalmedico (2007) has pointed out:  “Modeling practices, 
always pulled between abstraction and application, now found themselves subjected 
to another set of contradictory forces: should they be first and foremost predictiv  and 
operational, or cognitive and explanatory?” (126).  Ideally a model that is explanatory 
(or able to accurately recapitulate earth’s climate for the last several millennia) would 




scenarios according to the manipulation of variables).  But then the model must 
traverse the shadowy chasms of emergent effects, tipping points, and similar chaotic
behavior; few experts believe that climate change is a linear phenomenon and much 
consternation surrounds the potentially virulent tempo of glacial melting, the oceans 
turning from carbon sinks to carbon flows, increasing industrial emission, and 
collapsing ecosystems.  To elucidate these alarming potentials, global warming 
scientists turn to mathematical models of chaos. 
 Philosopher of science Mary S. Morgan (2007) cites the epistemological 
doubt that plagues the practice of virtual modeling because the “medium of 
representation found in mathematical models differs so much from the real geological 
or weather events they are taken to represent…Even for believers, the inference 
power of experiments with such [virtual] representations is necessarily weaker 
compared to those from experiments with representative whole-life models” (270).  
As we have seen, microcosm science has evolved over 150 years from nature-based, 
sampled systems to lab-based, representative systems, and finally to computer-based, 
virtual systems that are the farthest removed from physical nature, but may well be 
the best equipped to simulate natural complexity on a global scale.  Morgan has 
recently developed her ideas about a science that is not dependent on laws, but that 
uses representative cases, model systems, and exemplary narratives to move inquiry 
forward.  The latter strategy, an exemplary narrative that “converts our expe iments in 
life into experiences” involves narratives that “are taken to say something about a 




wider relevance indicates how such objects gain the autonomy to function more 
broadly as instruments of inquiry” (269, 273).   
 As a complement to any type of ecological modeling, I would like to consider 
the potential of narrative in ecology.  This discussion rejoins chapter two’s attention 
to chaotic narratives in environmental novels of the nineteenth-century, and extends 
its implications by bringing narrative theory into twenty-first century ecological 




III: Science Non-Fiction 
 
 What role might narrative play in ecological theories of a chaotic 
anthropogenic environment of the twenty-first century?  It is somewhat surprising 
that narrative has been so little acknowledged in scientific ecological understanding.  
Narrative in literary studies is an enormous field of inquiry, and its most basic tenets 
question how meaning is created by telling stories.  Reflective, intentional, and 
constructionist theories of narrative each suggest different roles that narr tive can 
play in relation to truth, from pure relation (reflective), to authorial designation 
(intentional), to the very creation (or construction) of meaning from a meaningless 
world (Cobley 2005, citing Stuart Hall).  The telling of tales is fundamental to our 
cognitive development, effectively weaving a series of discreet events into the 
coherent articulation of individual experience that constitutes self-identity, 
acculturation, and identification with nature, or a particular home place.  Perhaps 
ecology’s fascination with modeling the system, set in three dimensions of space, has 
abbreviated its attention to the spatial dimensions set in time, or narrative.  But other 
mainstays of ecological science, such as evolutionary theory and succession from a 
simple to a climax community, counter the a-temporal, static bias of systemic 
thinking.  Darwin’s evolution by natural selection is biology’s best example of an 
attempt at a purely reflective narrative of species in nature through time.    
 Gillian Beer’s literary study of Darwin complicates his reflections by 
theorizing how science is imagined, or constructed, out of particular cultural contexts.  
As outlined in chapter one, Darwin’s ideas of evolution depended on a slow, constant 




may well have been a construct of mid-nineteenth-century British narratives of 
purpose.  This study has questioned gradualist norms by examining nineteenth-
century fictional narratives of environmental chaos based on natural disasters.  Often 
narrative is an embedded engine that lurks beneath accounts of natural history writ en 
by scientists more interested in facts than in stories, which can frightfully be ikened 
to myth-status.  Peter Bowler discusses the tension in evolutionary science 
surrounding narratives of human phylogeny that “resemble folktales or creation 
myths, a suggestion which horrified modern paleo-anthropologists who thought that it 
implied that they too were still only ‘telling stories.’  In fact, all explanations of 
particular events in phylogeny which invoke adaptation have a narrative structure 
(often called an adaptive scenario)” (2003: 282).  Whether these narratives are purely 
reflective of an external truth, or constructs of particular authorial egos or cultu al 
conditions is, of course, an ongoing source of debate.      
 I would like to consider the facts of evolutionary history as narrated by H.G. 
Wells, a man very aware of the rhetorical power of a story, but still dedicated to 
establishing a correct narrative of evolutionary patterns within a scientific discourse.  
Wells is one of the few thinkers who straddled science and literature well into the 
twentieth-century, and his book The Science of Life(1929)86 seeks to narrativize 
modern understandings of the life sciences without depending on fictional scenarios 
to illustrate them.  Wells’s scientific account of evolutionary history weaves together 
the facts of evolution with threads of modernist ideology, which makes his work a 
                                                
86 The book is written with co-authors Julian Huxley (grandson of Thomas Huxley and brother of 
Aldous Huxley) and H.G.’s own son, G.P. Wells.  Huxley, who is celebrated as one of the architects of 
the modern synthesis in Biology, helped to lend this encyclopedic book validity within scientific 




scientific narrative rather than simply a description of observed processes in nature.  
Where the Victorians were enamored with coherence and increasing complexity, w  
see how Wells’s twentieth-century science narrative comes to deny anything 
resembling teleology or “purpose” in evolution: 
Variation is at random; selection sifts and guides it, as nearly as possible into 
the direction prescribed by the particular conditions of environment.  Once we 
realize this, we must give up any idea that evolution is purposeful.  It is full of 
apparent purpose; but this is apparent only, it is not real purpose.  It is the 
result of purposeless and random variation sifted by purposeless and 
automatic selection.  The term purpose has a very definite meaning.  It is a 
psychological term, describing a certain familiar state of our own 
consciousness: it implies the prevision of an end, and a determination to reach 
that end.  (641)         
 
Though purpose is useful in helping us conceptualize how comparative order has 
arisen from comparative disorder through evolutionary time, Wells et al.here banish 
purpose from explanations of physiological change, and assign it to our brains as a 
particular perspective.  Further, they do not deny the overwhelming task of 
conceptualizing this “drama” or the very small and recent part we have been giv n on 
the ecological stage:  
Evolution is the sum of a swarm of processes, now independent now mutually 
interfering.  The plot of the drama is not a single thread but a tangled skein of 
hundreds of threads of which our own is only one.  (786) 
 
They chastise the antiquated view of purely-gradualist evolution by gesturing to the 
mass-extinction events that Gould and Eldredge would use in the 1970s to make the 
case for evolution by punctuated equilibrium.  In the story of the Cretaceous 
extinctions sixty-five million years ago, which put an end to dinosaur rule,  
the pressure of environment on life, a pressure quite external and fortuitous, 
makes itself felt.  The great climactic revolution that killed off the dominant 
reptiles opened the door of opportunity to the mammals: their warm blood 




was now a help when climate cut down the world’s vegetable supply…finally 
climate comes in again to extinguish many of the strange and exciting 
creatures which the same blind agency, by removing their competitors, earlier
started on their evolutionary career.  Change of climate may cause extinction 
directly, as it did with so many of the larger herbavores during the Ice Age, or 
indirectly…Looked at thus, Evolution would seem to be a chaotic affair, its 
changes dictated by one accident after another, each one the outcome of the 
chance advantage of the geological moment.  (My italics, 788-789) 
 
By making these bold and unflinching statements of historical relativity, Wells et al. 
begin the important work of introducing chaos to scientific natural history of the 
twentieth-century.  Passages like these are baldly opposed to designed, balanced, 
economical aesthetics of previous centuries, and the authors take care to explain how 
our cognitive processes would have given us such former illusions in the guise of 
indomitable truths. Though Wells is attempting an objective description of biological 
processes, he is indebted to narrative devices of order and causation in this history of 
evolution, even when that order arises from fortuitous and chaotic events.  Wells’s 
The Time Machine, which tells the narrative of divergence of Eloi and Morlocks 
within industrial society, relates to his twentieth-century fact-driven narrative of 
evolutionary tempo.  Historical contingency is the basis for major trends in evolution, 
as illustrated in the working classes in factories evolving into spidery Morlocks as 
well as the ancestral mammals rising and radiating into a wealth of niches newly 
opened by the end-Cretaceous catastrophe.  It must merely be imagined for it to be 
possible, and once it is possible, scientific evidence accumulates to verify or nullify.   
     Ecological historian Donald Worster (1994) emphasizes the paradigm shift in 
ecology that has taken place within the last few decades, after the science of chaos 
had been established in the 1960s using computer-based mathematical models.  




succession, climax, and equilibrium advanced especially by Fredric Clements and 
Eugene Odum, and these later scientists found a very different dynamic operating in 
nature (9).  Replacing the older aesthetic of the mature climax ecosystem that is 
reached when undisturbed was a vision of a continually-shifting mosaic of species 
and communities that never reaches a point of stability because disturbances (small 
and large) are always occurring.  In the words of Drury and Nisbet (1973), succes ion 
was merely the observation of “differential growth, differential survival, and perhaps 
differential dispersal of species adapted to grow at different points on stress
gradients” (quoted in Worster 1994: 9).  This conceptual shift permitted the discovery 
of ecological chaos, wherein nature is seen as inherently erratic, contingent, and very 
difficult to model for predictive purposes.  If success in science is the ability to 
predict outcomes, chaos is a fundamental rift in the road of ecological modeling that 
has driven many ecologists inside, into computer-based virtual spheres where such 
complex behavior is somewhat more approachable (13).  Chaos in population 
dynamics can also be modeled using physical microcosms, as noted above.  This 
revolution in thinking about nature, Worster contends, rivals the conceptual 
revolutions of quantum mechanics and relativity that marked the beginning of the 
twentieth-century, and it signals a further break from the Newtonian worldview (14).  
It also reminds us of the central importance of environmental disturbances in 
subsequent ecological communities, disturbances that are constant and myriad: 
variations in wind and rain patterns, storms, tornadoes, earthquakes, volcanoes, 
climate change.  These kinds of major environmental disturbance drove the dynamics 




interpretation of geological catastrophism in the nineteenth-century was prescient of 
concepts that ecology is now citing as fundamental.   
 Environmental history is a useful resource for understanding how stories 
about nature contribute to our comprehension of nature’s processes, and how 
narrative plays a shadow role behind reductionism and systems modeling in 
explaining ecological dynamics.  Environmental historians often make use of lit rary 
theory to explain how their work affects the public’s vision of particular places in 
nature, and especially how humans have used these places both at particular points in 
time and over wide sweeps of human history.       
 William Cronon is prominent among environmental historians who use a 
foundation of narrative theory to inform their work.  Known for his carefully detailed, 
yet philosophical environmental histories of the Midwestern United States during 
industrialization, Cronon’s work sits at the crux between objective history and 
polemical treatise.  He is familiar with the post-modern critiques of false coherence 
and embedded value systems in the narratives that form the foundations of human 
cultures, but he notes that narratives (unlike chronicles that impose no relationship 
between events) have the power of making an audience care about the landscape or 
ecosystem at the center of concern.  He argues for the efficacy of the motivational 
power in responsible narrative:   
 Despite the tensions that inevitably exist between nature and our narrative 
discourse, we cannot help but embrace storytelling if we hope to persuade 
readers of the importance of our subject…Narrative is thus inescapably bound 
to the very names we give the world.  Rather than evade it – which is in any 
event impossible – we must learn to use it consciously, responsibly, self-
critically.  To try to escape the value judgments that accompany storytelling is 
to miss the point of history itself, for the stories we tell, like the questions we 





Though a skeptic might comment that “value” here is most often imposed by the 
hegemonic cultural forces in charge of telling heroic stories, value systems ar  ost 
often overt in environmental narratives and recent histories work hard to critique the 
hegemony of industry and capital that has come to command many of the nature’s 
landscapes during the nineteenth and twentieth-centuries.  Cronon notes that the same 
set of events can yield several stories that are utterly at odds when it comes to a sense 
of value, and his words echo literary theories of comedy and tragedy: 
 Stories are intrinsically teleological forms, in which an event is explained by 
the prior events or causes that lead up to it…if the tale is of progress, then the 
closing landscape is a garden; if the tale is of crisis and decline, the closing 
landscape (whether located in the past or future) is a wasteland…A trackless 
waste must become a grassland civilization.  Or: a fragile ecosystem must 
become a Dust Bowl…However serious the epistemological problems it 
creates, this commitment to teleology and narrative gives environmental 
history – all history – its moral center. (1370) 
 
Compelling narratives with a critical eye on the values of the culture from which 
they’ve emerged, such as the narrative that renders the Dust Bowl event a tragedy of 
human hubris, can cause serious problems for the status quo that directs industrial or 
agrarian operations within a particular ecosystem.  Narrative, so closely tied to our 
cognitive process of learning, has a unique facility of changing opinions when it 
comes to our relations with the natural world.  The morality that seems inherent to 
narrative (with apologies to Oscar Wilde) is particularly powerful in enviro mental 
stories because it continually relates human activity to observed changes in nature.   
 Environmental history, at least, has its conventions and methods established 
by the long legacy of historical theory.  But ecological science, which usually studies 




objectively scientific while keeping an open eye for impacts and effects that are 
degrading to the environment and therefore fraught with values.  Should value be left 
with the environmentalists, and ecology remain austere by keeping its attention o  
mechanism rather than narrative?  Ecological science, many would argue, is not even 
intelligible without the services of causal narrative, and so value (translated into 
legislation) may be an inescapable outcome of scientific studies set in impacted 
ecosystems.  It follows that the funding sources of ecological studies must be taken 
into account; the EPA, Fish and Wildlife Service, and other governmental groups 
whose role is to monitor and legislate anthropogenic activity must consider both 
industry-based and third-party impact assessments (which often contribute very 
different kinds of narratives based on the same study) before making decisions about, 
for example, the effects of agricultural chemicals on surrounding environments.  
Ecology’s moral problem is whether or not to engage in morality.  Nuclear science 
could be said to have had a similar debate in the middle of last century; what 
distinguishes ecology’s moral bind is that its subject encompasses every niche that 
life has filled, yet its directives are so often guided by financial imperatives inimical 
to the inherent valuation of life for its own sake, a biocentric ethic.   
 The proleptic narrative of a changing environment has become a new genre in 
science writing, and it aspires towards the realm of non-fiction.  The stories about 
possible futures that make climate change models intelligible are based on scientific 
details that are our closest prognoses.  Chaos, of course, complicates these scenarios.  
Turning the predictive powers of models into narratives that envision the future is 




model might predict that sea levels will rise by one meter in the next century, but that 
prediction only gains power when a narrative draws out its consequences: coastal 
cities engulfed, arable land lost, more virulent hurricanes, the spread of disease, and 
so on.  Alan Weisman’s The World Without Us(2007) accommodates the predictions 
of many scientific disciplines into a coherent, wide-ranging story of what ould take 
place on Earth if humans disappeared.  Weisman’s vision includes the fate of 
different types of buildings, nuclear power plants, farmland, synthetic compounds, 
species biodiversity, and landmarks such as Mount Rushmore (which is carved out of 
stoic granite that would remain recognizable for 7.2 million years) (182).  These 
narratives are more than scientifically-detailed versions of ‘past is prologue,’ because 
they attempt to conceive of the unprecedented.  But evidence of past upheaval is still 
our best method for futurizing non-fiction narrative, and climate scientists look to the
evidence of major landscape shifts and mass extinctions that define past geological 
epochs in order to figure on the next few centuries.   
 The novels explored in chapter two of this study take a narrative approach to 
describing ecosystems in chaos, and that perspective allows them to juxtapose levels 
of impact across scale and time.  Gilbert White’s narrative, for example, achieves a 
decades-long perspective of environmental change through the accretion of quotidian 
impressions and deductions; each anecdote he carefully relates (such as the mother 
bird killed by the felling of her home oak tree) comes into a relationship with higher-
order events (such as increasing deforestation in Selbourne through the eighteenth-
century); similarly, patterns of constancy (the return of migratory birds at very 




(the birds’ absence, as well as extraordinary weather events that might explain 
anomalous behavior in a particular year).  The fictional novels studied in chapter two 
effectively involve the reader in radical environmental fluxes using the intermediary 
of a charismatic protagonist.  The narrative strategies in these novels allow the wild 
manipulation of time (particularly in Shelley and Wells) and vivid accounts of the 
transformation of ecological place (in all three).  Without narrative as the organizing, 
causational, and momentum-generating device, Gilbert White would only have 
compiled anecdotal lists of seasonal birds, Lionel Verney’s epidemiological 
observations would lose their relationship to human extinction, Felix Aquilas’s post-
apocalypse fauna would be a merely fictional catalogue of taxonomic data, and the 
Time Traveler would have no deep evolutionary future to articulate.  The 
manipulation of conventional linear narrative into its fragmenting, pogo-stick 
condition in each of these works effectively conveys the many-leveled, interrela d, 
and yet chance-driven condition of the natural world, and particularly the ecologies of 
an anthropogenic future.     
 Science writers and environmental historians are well aware that narrative is 
essential to widespread intelligibility, and much of their work involves accumulating 
individual studies or events and stringing them together with some believable sense of 
causation.  The general public generally does not listen to ecological information until 
it appears in narrative form: Rachel Carson seized the public’s attention with a 
narrative about the effects of industrial chemicals on watersheds in Silent pring 
(1962); James Lovelock took an idea constructed around analogy and modeling and 




many threads of scientific theoretical eschatology to produce a bracing vis on of the 
post-human globe in The World Without Us (2007).  With the components of 
mechanism and model arranged linearly and hierarchically by the device of narrative, 
ecological science may be able to move fully into the public notice where it is most 
able to provide important answers and directives.   
 There is a sub-culture of ecologists who aspire to narrative as part of the real 
work of their science.  Because this practice is avidly interdisciplinary, extending well 
beyond the sciences to embrace the humanities, its practice is at the margins of 
scientific ecology and articles on the subject are few, and recent.  Part of the drive to 
bring narrative into the practice of scientific ecology emerges from the desire to make 
the scientific work accessible and intelligible to a wider audience.  If ecological 
studies are wedged between the pages of disciplinary journals, they are unlikely to 
have an effect on the populace unless the study is picked up by a science writer who 
employs narrative to translate the case into a general discursive condition or tre d.  
Only with the final step of the story told can a sense of value emerge from a scientific 
study.  These radical ecologists (I mean in the epistemological sense) contend tha  
narrative can resolve inconsistencies in scientific modeling and provide intellig bl  
protocols for further investigation and action:  
The power of science comes from the capacity of its narratives to convince us 
that something is general, and we should agree on it.  And this agreement 
arises even when the story is quite long and encompasses inconsistencies.  
Furthermore, we seem to be able to agree even when there is no logical 
necessity in the outcome.  We agree on evolution and global warming, even 
when many of the detailed models are at odds with each other…the story of 
anthropogenic global warming just feels right, and the science of it is 
confident…The power of narratives, as with the power of myths, is their 
capacity to rise above contradiction, when the juxtaposition of large disparate 





Zellmer’s characterization of narrative in ecology proposes that scienti ts create many 
conflicting models to explain natural systems, but that a kind of uber-narrative of 
overall processes (species evolve; the climate is changing because of industrial 
emissions) might serve as a point of resolution and unanimity.  It may not even mattr 
whether the meaning that is created by narrative is reflective of external ruth or 
merely constructs a façade of truthfulness; a simple consensus about meaning 
promotes changes in practice.  Literary scholars with an interest in the twenty-first 
century environment should find themselves fully equipped to instill ecological 
principles, controversies, and eventualities in their students in a way that 
complements the work of their colleagues in the sciences.  Ecology is not merely a set 
of empirical strategies continuous with physics, chemistry, and biology; it now finds 
that it must form theories accounting for unprecedented events.  Narrative is ess ntial 
to the practice of prediction in addition to being the vehicle of calls to action; it is 
capable of bearing the weight of predicting outcomes and instilling values to an 
inclusive audience.  Mathematical chaos is an abstraction that is impossible to narra e, 
but ecological models of chaos in nature rely on narrative to find a voice.  The chaotic 
narrative of outcomes in anthropogenic nature meanders, branches, joins, and, we all 
hope, does not drop off the edge around the next turn.    
 But nature is fraught with edges.  Most organisms make their niche in liminal 
spaces where elemental exchange is maximized, such as at the edges of bodies of 
water (rather than in the open ocean), and in terrestrial ecosystems.  This reliance on 
interfaces demonstrates how the minimum requirements for life, water and an eergy




interspecific competition and allows evolution.87  Eugene and Howard Odum, two 
prominent microcosm ecologists of the twentieth-century, took their study of the 
ultra-liminal estuary ecosystem into the theoretical realm by including chaos theory in 
the dynamics of general complexity.  With the new suggestion of “pulsing” as a 
fundamental pattern, the Odums critique the conservationist ethos with the suggestion 
that random variations are endemic to the behavior of any complex system.  The 
Odums’s pulsing paradigm (1995) welcomes chaotic narrative into the mainstream of 
ecological understanding: 
One of our comfortable concepts of nature visualizes growth followed by a 
leveling.  In these days when society is beginning to recognize the limits of 
the biosphere, people, scientists, and governments talk of sustainability, that 
is, managing growth so that the life-support carrying capacity of the earth is 
not exceeded.  The steady state is seen as a goal for such efforts as well as the 
final result of self-organization in nature.  However, there may be a more 
realistic concept, that nature pulses even after carrying capacity or saturation 
limits are reached – a new paradigm we define and present examples of in this 
paper…We suggest that if pulsing is general, then what is sustainable in 
ecosystems, is a repeating oscillation that is often poised on the edge of chaos.  
(547) 
 
This influential paper dating from 1995 sent legions of ecologists to look for the 
pulsing phenomenon elsewhere, and chaotic ecology buoyed these efforts to 
understand the nuanced relationship between stability and disorder in nature through 
time.  Carolyn Merchant’s recent history of environmentalism (2007) includes chaotic 
ecology as one of only four fundamental approaches to the science (the others are 
human, organismic [population], and economic [systems]); again, we are given the 
                                                
87 G.E. Hutchinson has a brief but enlightening discus ion of the phenomenon of liminal preference:  
“The two conditions of liquid and an energy source ar presumably fundamental.  It is almost 
impossible to imaging anything like an organism developing as a pattern in gaseous mixture, and 
though an adult completely solid-state organism might be thought of, it is difficult to conceive how it 
could develop.  It is also important to note that although organisms can live in the free liquid phase of 
lakes and oceans, most species prefer an environment of interfaces; this may well have been a 




impression that ‘balance’ in nature is really only a temporary state of poise before 
rapid reorganization changes the system.  She writes,  
The chaotic model of nature allows for the full expression of nature as an 
actor and shaper of history, rather than a passable backdrop to the inorganic 
machine.  Unpredictable natural events and climatic conditions can trigger 
changes and transitions in local places, the impacts of which may be felt at 
great distances. (2007: 116)    
 
Following the lead of the Odums, Merchant’s humanistic perspective on the patterns 
of ecology imposes a narrative of complexity that complicates classic 
environmentalism: 
…recent work in complexity theory characterizes a complex system as one 
that exists on the edge between order and chaos…Whereas an ethic based on 
the balance of nature grants humans the capacity and power to restore 
degraded systems, chaos and complexity theory challenge humanity to 
recognize nature as both predictable and unpredictable, orderly and 
disorderly. (190) 
 
Though this paradigm of universal indeterminacy could have a handcuffing effect on 
such an important science in the twenty-first century, complexity, the science of order 
versus chaos, provides an intriguing new avenue towards elucidating nature that goes 
well beyond classic reductionism.  Though ecological science built its foundation on 
the traditional scientific epistemology of simplifying complex systems down t  their 
components, studying parts of the system in isolation, and manipulating simplified 
models, the new emphasis rests with narrating the flux among natural forces in th ir
play of perpetual dynamism.  Narrative has greater respect for holism than does the 
mechanist or systems approach, and it is usually more supportive of an imaginative 
approach to science.  Donald Worster celebrates the recuperation of mythology in 




If the ultimate test of any body of scientific knowledge was its ability to 
predict events, then the sciences, despite so many grand successes, were 
frequently failing the test.  Making sense of that failure was the mission of an 
altogether new kind of inquiry calling itself the science of chaos… For 
whatever reason, whether because the empirical data suggested it or because 
extrascientific cultural trends did – the experience of so much rapid, 
unpredictable, disturbing change in the world around them – scientists were 
beginning to pay attention to what they had long managed to avoid seeing.  
Nature was far more complex than they had ever realized, or indeed, some 
were beginning to hint, than science ever could realize.  Chaos was, like Gaia, 
a word that came welling up from the lost pagan cosmology of ancient Greece 
to seize the imagination of avant-garde scientists.  If the earth goddess had 
long ago brought life an order into existence, then chaos had been her 
opposite: the realm where disorder still ruled, a dark underworld…The 
scientific study of chaos began… (1994: 406-7)      
 
Chaos, far from its own agent in the universe, requires the complement control to 
have context, and the ancient mythological intuition of a balance between ordered 
harmony and an elemental tumult seemed at last to have some empirical basis, 
corroborated by mathematical and observational methods.  With Bill Cronon’s 
evidence that historical environmental narrative connotes values, Zellmer et al.’s 
hypothesis that narrative is an essential tool for telling tales of ecologi al complexity, 
and the Odums’ pulsing paradigm that narrates ecosystems’ position between stability
and flux through time, ecology has arrived at a post-normal condition that is its own 




IV: Ecological Futures 
 
 Global climate change is the dramatic ecological process that we have come to 
expect as a future reality, and which has come into the public ken using a 
coordination of models and narratives.  Certainly the Keeling curve, itself a visual 
narrative of increasing carbon dioxide concentrations in the northern hemisphere for 
the past half century, is the most immediately accessible heuristic that has made the 
public aware of a direct relationship between industrial emissions and atmospheric 
carbon concentrations.  This relationship began in earnest in nineteenth-century 
England, the first nation to witness both the objective and subjective bi-products of 
industrial productivity.  Industrialism quickly laid its thumbprint on the immediate 
landscape and on the visages of its workers.  Only slightly more gradually, in a 
narrative of two centuries, have the global implications of large-scale fossil fuel 
consumption become apparent.   
 Lucien Boia’s book length meditation on the ways weather has affected 
human imagination identifies the turn of the twenty-first century as unique in history.  
Though the nineteenth-century grew accustomed to the tension between technological 
millennium and apocalypse (as shown especially in Wells), the plausibility of humans 
permanently changing the course of climate and extinctions has now become almost 
commonplace.  As Boia notes, the agent of disruption has shifted from capricious 
nature to hubristic humans: 
 For the first time in history, catastrophe scenarios based on humanity’s ab lity 
to trigger the forces of destruction have become plausible.  This goes far 
beyond anything imagined at the turn of the century, when sensitivities were 
attuned to cosmic and natural disasters.  An incipient anti-utopianism had 




technology, but technology had not yet been seen as an agent that might 
destroy not only the human soul but the entire human race, or at least might 
completely disrupt conditions of life on the planet.  This is the new danger, the 
technological ‘flood’ of the future. (150-151)   
 
True to the cognitive ingenuity that launched H. sapiens onto the top of nature’s pile 
of consumers around 50,000 years ago, we continue to imagine solutions to the 
climate conundrum based on new technologies, from light bulbs to hybrid cars to 
wind farms to a sulfur dioxide parasol in the atmosphere.  Technology must evolve 
according to environmental imperatives, just like species evolve or lose their niche.  
But emphasis on reduction of uses (and the triangulation of reduction through more 
efficient technology) is still most often an economic imposition rather than a free 
choice.   
 Even with all our epistemological devices turned on the problem, the future 
remains a dark casement and we imagine many scenarios beyond.  The term scenaio 
itself captures the hybrid offspring of a predictive model joined with a narrative, and 
gives some footing to policy decisions such as the emission protocols many 
developed nations are now pursuing.  Scenarios are politicized stories about the 
future, and we have a diverse family of them ranging from apocalyptic to soporific.  
A recent article in Science magazine by Richard Kerr (2007) shows the necessity of 
cooperation between climate modeling and narrating the proleptic realities of he 
twenty-first century.  Kerr quotes two scientific experts on their frustrations with the 
parallax between evidence and action; this gap lies between our ability to model the 
future and our powers of narrating what must be done to redress the situation.  The 
first reviewer, a climatologist, says, “The IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 




communication.”  Similarly, his geoscientist colleague laments, “All the facts are 
there in the [main-report] chapter, but the SPM [Summary for Policy Makers] didn’t
tie those facts together in a coherent statement of risk that would allow a policymaker 
to make an informed decision” (1413).  Kerr identifies the over-reliance on models as 
an issue that needs correction in future action; scientists working with the IPCC feel 
the pressure to rely heavily on models for generating data because anything else, 
including narrative, is “speculation.”  But modeling, he suspects, is a new way for 
policymakers to stick their heads in the sand: “By ignoring factors that can’t yet be 
modeled, IPCC came up with deceptively reassuring numbers.”  Such factors would 
certainly include the tipping points theoretically associated with the polar icecap 
melting, boreal methane release, oceanic carbon dioxide sinks filling, and decreasing 
planetary albedo (reflectivity) as less ice and snow cover the dark faces of water and 
ground.  In the last 250 years a fundamental shift in the relationship between human 
activity and the natural environment has set the global system on a new, cryptical 
course.  Industrialization, begun in England but rapidly emigrating to the European 
continent and America, and later to the Middle East, the Far East, and the Southern 
Hemisphere, has overtly turned the natural environment into a resource base, and the 
atmosphere now contains 37% more carbon dioxide than it did in 1750.88   
     Perhaps scientists should not be expected to earn an A in communication; 
after all, their training has circled around the scientific touchstone of model-bas d 
prediction.  The humanities can take full part in the late-industrial future by helping 
scientists communicate with policymakers, and aiding the public imagination with 
                                                
88 The World Meteorological Organization keeps records of yearly carbon dioxide increases; see Press 





behavior modifications, homegrown solutions, and adaptive management in a 
changing set of environmental imperatives.  The metaphor of a model, and the 
narrative of a prognosis, are grown from the ground of humanistic inquiry, and 
literature has historically been our best device for proving the hypotheses of 
metaphors and narratives.  With such an intriguing set of stories to tell, the issue of 
climate change will continue to grow in public intrigue, perhaps permitting individual 
action to prescribe legislation rather than the reverse.  With our powers in narrative 
and metaphor, humanists may be able to help make fictional what is now a proleptic 
non-fiction.   
 The nineteenth-century gave us both the seed of a future problem, in the form 
of industrialism, and the early impetus for solving that problem by developing 
conceptual techniques for investigating nature.  Two of these concepts are the tropes 
of chaos and the microcosm.  Romantic and Victorian perspectives on ecology were 
often strained between the aesthetic appreciation of natural beauty and the scientific 
investigation into how natural systems work.  This dissertation has sought to resolve 
these contrasted modes of dwelling in nature by proposing that two essential tropes 
provided both the aesthetic and the empirical grounds for study; extending this 
relationship is the complementary role of microcosm as model, and chaos as a 
narrative practice.  Tracing specific relations of influence between disciplines, 
countries, and centuries is an elusive goal.  Instead, I hope to have demonstrated that 
both the humanities and the sciences have sought answers to how industrialism might 
change future conditions for our species and all the others.  The insight pursued by 




humanistic origins of ecological knowledge in the modern industrial world.  The 
more we appreciate that ecology of the twenty-first century is more than just a






 This study examined the history of two ideas in the ecological context of the 
nineteenth-century.  I focused on British literature because England was the first 
industrialized country to recognize anthropogenic shifts in its climate and landsc pe, 
and the literature and science of Great Britain are recognized as pushing the vanguard 
of knowledge in the nineteenth-century.  The conjunction of eco-historical moments 
with epistemological innovations has been a fruitful way to approach the 
interdisciplinary history of ecological thinking ever since the early stages of 
industrialism.  I have analyzed innovative novels that envision contingency in nature 
and drive their plots using the radical notion of ecological punctuations, rather than 
coherent gradualism, in narratives of nature through time.  I have identified the 
conceit of the microcosm as a way to delimit and organize nature, and shown how it 
was a particularly powerful trope in formal lyric poetry due to interdependent systems 
of prosody.  These perspectives on chaotic narrative and microcosmic lyricism 
suggest that the tropes were useful literary tools for analyzing nature’s behavior, and I 
noted affinities between these humanistic works and methods that have subsequently 
been developed in modern ecological science.      
 The tropes of chaos and microcosm have a more rich and subtle relationship 
than mere opposition.  In literature, the focal power of the microcosm proved to be a 
powerful way to envision fragility in natural systems, since anecdotes of local 
despoilment could readily be extrapolated onto larger landscapes.  Scientific 
microcosms, as physical models of natural systems at large, are the most f asible way 




the microcosm is a method of analysis, and chaos is a pattern that both resists and 
rewards the analytical attention made possible by modeling.  The terms of thi
relationship between controlled stability and chaotic reorganization are tested with 
every new experiment, whether in the field, the laboratory, or the library.  I have 
suggested that our literary ancestry from the nineteenth-century provided important 
early hypotheses about the new relations between control and disorder in 
anthropogenic environments.   
One might argue that the relationship between disciplines has changed in the 
last 200 years from a condition of mutual discovery using similar methods to one of 
subordination, where science “discovers” with its esoteric and highly quantified 
methods, and the humanities reacts to these findings but has little role in their 
generation.  I would contend that interdisciplinary mutualism in ecology lives, 
perhaps closer to its nineteenth-century form than we would have thought.  Science 
has indeed assumed dominion over the analysis of natural systems, but experimental 
findings are evidently not sufficient in themselves to shift the behaviors of large 
populations towards sustainable practices.  William Morris’s 1880s lamentation that 
British culture cared for pictures of ideal landscapes but was indifferent to the 
preservation of those natural places revealed a troubling gap between representation 
and reality.  It is now no longer legitimate to feature the Bengal tier in a nature show 
without describing its many sources of endangerment.  The humanities hold a unique 
role in accommodating ecological realities and futurities for popular consumption; 
novels, documentaries, feature films, blogs, and web resources devoted to developing 




change, especially in relation to dystopian narratives of the future, and writing about 
sustainability using microcosmic ideals like bioregionalism and community 
gardening, are essential mediation points for the humanities of the twenty-first 
century.                    
 This interdisciplinary perspective is essential to our teaching literature to 
students (and their parents) who often have a more straightened notion of the practical 
value of a college education than the liberal arts curriculum originally conceived.  By 
legitimating the power of creativity and imagination not only in literature bt also in 
science, we dislodge a few bricks from the walls between specialized disciplines.  
Literary ecocriticism highlights the necessity of collective enterprise when it comes to 
facing off the looming environmental problems of the twenty-first century, none of 
which fall entirely within a single building in the university.  
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